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SYNOPSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE STATES
The following synopsis highlights significant environmental
law developments in the states. The individual state synopses in-
clude environmental legislation, caselaw, and recent develop-
ments from May 1, 1988 to August 30, 1989. Each state is listed
in alphabetical order to facilitate efficient reference.'
ALABAMA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Effective September 14, 1989, the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management (ADEM) will be empowered to limit
the importation of out-of-state hazardous waste from twenty-
three states and from the District of Columbia to Alabama's haz-
ardous waste landfill in the city of Emelle.2 The ban, Act 89-788,
was enacted by the state legislature in the 1989 session.3 The ban
applies to all hazardous waste regulated under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), and requires states which lack adequate treatment or
disposal facilities to sign a capacity assurance agreement with Ala-
bama before they may be authorized to ship waste to an Alabama
hazardous treatment facility. 4 ADEM states that the purpose of
Act 89-788 is to encourage states which have no hazardous waste
disposal facilities of their own to take action. 5
Recently, the Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC) has been discussing the need for additional strategies to
combat ozone formation in the southeastern states.6 DEC's con-
cern stems from the fact that the southeastern states, because of
their plentiful vegetative sources, are producing much higher
levels of ozone.7 The state is attempting to convince the federal
1. Some states and state subjects have been omitted from this synopsis for
lack of significant developments in the area of environmental law.
2. Ban Enacted on Shipments of Waste from States without Disposal Facilities, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) 804 (Sept. 8, 1989).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Different Ozone Strategies May Be Needed for Southeast Areas, Alabama Official
Says, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1576 (Dec. 2, 1988).
7. Id. Background levels of ozone are much higher because volatile organic
(245)
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government to fund research programs in order to find out more
about the nature and potential control of ozone in the region."
WATER POLLUTION
In Hereford v. City of Linden 9, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that when a city constructs a test well in anticipation of ex-
panding it into a public water supply, the city must first obtain a
permit from ADEM.' 0 The plaintiffs demanded that the city be
required to obtain a permit for construction of its water well pro-
ject. " The court agreed, emphasizing the importance of having
ADEM monitor such a project from its inception in order to avoid
potential contamination problems.' 2
ALASKA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In light of the Exxon Valdez disaster, there recently have
been several laws passed in the State of Alaska addressing oil pol-
lution control. House Bill 68 calls for strengthening existing lia-
bility and cost recovery provisions for oil and hazardous
substance releases.' 3 House Bill 68 would make it easier for the
state to collect money from companies that are responsible for oil
discharge. 14
Senate Bill 271 increases civil fines for oil spills to a maxi-
mum of $50.00 per gallon of oil spilled. 15 The maximum penalty
may be imposed if a court determines the discharge was caused by
compounds (VOCs) are emitted by these vegetative sources. Id. VOCs, which
are also emitted by automobiles and industrial plants nationwide, combine with
nitrogen oxides in the presence of sunlight to form ozone. Id. The pollutant is a
major component of smog. Id.
8. Id.
9. 540 So.2d 49 (Ala. 1988).
10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 50. Plaintiffs argued that ADEM is required to issue a permit
before a test well may be drilled. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the drilling could
cause grave damage to their water supply. Id. ADEM revoked the city's permit
but stated that such a permit was not required for a test well, and that ADEM
would require the city to secure a permit if the city planned to extend the project
to provide water for the city. Id. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion which was denied. Id.
12. Id. at 51.
13. Governor Signs Bills on Liability, Civil Penalies for Crude Oil Spills, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 161 (May 19, 1989).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 162.
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STATE SYNOPSIS
either the defendant's intentional act or its gross negligence.16
Three additional bills have been sent to the governor, but
not yet signed. Senate Bill 264 would establish both a state oil
and hazardous substance response office and a corps of volun-
teers trained in the cleanup of hazardous releases.' 7 A second
bill, Senate Bill 261, would require the Department of Environ-
mental Conservation (DEC) to create statewide oil and hazardous
substance discharge and prevention plans.' 8 Thirdly, Senate Bill
260 would impose a severance tax of five cents per barrel on oil to
be appropriated to an oil and hazardous substance release re-
sponse fund. 19
WATER POLLUTION
In State v. Anderson,20 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that
DEC could require approval of potential subdivision plans as a
prerequisite to the sale of lots in the subdivision. 2' DEC required
that persons proposing subdivision plans had to first submit to
DEC, for its approval, a plan showing proposed sewage facilities,
wastewater treatment works and disposal systems, drinking water
systems, and the amount of sewage that would typically be gener-
ated by the subdivision.22 The plaintiff, a real estate broker, ob-
jected to the pre-subdivision requirements, and filed a complaint
against DEC seeking an injunction against the requirements' en-
forcement.23 The Superior Court issued a final judgement invali-
dating DEC's pre-subdivision requirements, and enjoined DEC
from their enforcement of the requirements.2 4 The Supreme
Court of Alaska reversed the Superior Court's ruling, and held
that the pre-subdivision requirements were: 1) within the scope of
authority of DEC; 2) reasonable; and, 3) not in conflict with any
other state statute.25
In Miners Advocacy Council, Inc. v. State of Alaska, Department of
Environmental Conservation,26 another Alaska Supreme Court deci-
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 749 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1988).
21. Id. at 1343.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1344-47.
26. 778 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1989).
1990] 247
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sion, the court held that DEC could certify National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permits2 7 for placer miners
on a group basis, rather than on an individual, site-specific ba-
sis.2 The plaintiffs, the Miners Advocacy Council (MAC), argued
that both federal law and DEC regulations required individual,
on-site investigation before a permit could be issued.29 The court
disagreed, stating that, because Congress intended to leave the
issuance of NPDES permits to the states' discretion, DEC was per-
mitted to issue permits on a group basis if it so chose.30
ARIZONA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recent developments in the area of air pollution include the
signing of Senate Bill 1029 by Governor Mofford.3 1 Senate Bill
1029 is a new environmental law authorizing $1 million for a
"brown cloud"3 2 study aimed at reducing ozone pollution levels
in the Phoenix and Tucson areas.33
AIR POLLUTION
In Arizona v. Thomas,34 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit denied the State of Arizona's petition for review
of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of
Arizona's state implementation plan (SIP) for attaining national
ambient air quality standards.3 5 Arizona submitted a proposed
plan, which was rejected by EPA as too deficient. 36 The court
held that the decision of EPA was correct, and therefore denied
the state of Arizona's petition for review.37
27. NPDES permits are required under section 402 of the Clean Water Act
to authorize any discharge by point sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1972 & Supp.
1987).
28. Id. at 1134.
29. Id. at 1131.
30. Id. at 1133-34. After a review of the legislative history of the federal
Clean Water Act, the court concluded that Congress intended the state to play a
primary role in the certification of permits. Id. at 1133.
31. Governor Signs Underground Storage TanA Bill, Three Other Pieces of Environ-
mental Litigation, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 479 (June 23, 1989).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 829 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 835. Pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act, each state is required
to submit to EPA the state's plan for attaining certain levels of particular air
pollutants. Id.
36. Id. at 840.
37. Id.
4
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CALIFORNIA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On August 3, 1989, California enacted a law that revised the
funding base for its hazardous waste program. 38 The law imposes
base rates for superfund taxes and disposal fees, an environmen-
tal tax on industry, and uses monies from the general fund. This
is the first time that taxpayers have paid for the cost of cleaning
up hazardous waste. 39
In September of 1988, the California state legislature passed
Senate Bill 1997 which revised the vehicle emissions inspection
program by establishing five levels of motor vehicle classifications
based upon model year and emission control technology.40 The
bill also created a sliding repair cost to owners ranging from $50
for older models to $300 for newer ones.4' Beginning in 1990,
the law will also require auto manufacturers to warrant emission
control equipment components for three years or 50,000 miles,
and to replace or repair equipment that fails within these limits
free of charge to the vehicle owner.42 Under the law, sellers of
cars in private transactions will be required to test smog levels
before the Department of Motor Vehicles will grant approval of
the sale. 43
Also in September of 1988, the California legislature passed
several laws with respect to the duties of the state Air Resources
Board (ARB).44 Bill AB 4392 requires ARB to conduct a hearing
concerning the reduction of public exposure to toxic air contami-
nants from motor vehicles by June 30, 1990.4 5
Pursuant to another bill, AB 2595, ARB must establish crite-
ria for designating air basins as either attainment or non-attain-
ment areas for state ambient air quality standards.4 6 A report
addressing the possible attainment of these standards for various
pollutants must be submitted to the legislature by January 1,
38. Governor Signs Bill Revamping Funding for Hazardous Waste Regulation,
Cleanup, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 733 (Aug. 25, 1989).
39. Id.
40. Bill To Improve Auto Emission Checks among Measures Approved by Deukmejian,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1188 (Oct. 14, 1988).
41. id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46 Id.
1990] 249
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1991. 47 ARB must also take whatever measures that are neces-
sary to achieve a 55% reduction in organic gas emissions from
motor vehicles and other mobile sources and, in addition, a 15%
reduction in nitrogen oxides by January 1, 1992.4 8
Once again, in September of 1988, the California Legislature
passed Senate Bill 1931 which extended the exemption from state
fuel volatility standards for ethanol-gasoline fuel blends contain-
ing at least 10% ethanol until October 1, 1993. 49 The extension,
however, will only apply to gasoline blends that meet current vol-
atility standards.5°
Again in September of 1988, the California Legislature also
enacted Senate Bill 2297. 51 The law requires the South Coast Air
Quality Management District to adopt a five-year program to in-
crease the use of clean-burning fuels by August 1, 1989.52 The
law encourages an increased use of clean-burning fuels in both
the stationary source and transportation sectors. 53
Also in September of 1988, the California Legislature en-
acted AB 2942.54 The law allows regional water quality control
boards to exempt certain surface impoundments related to min-
ing wastes from the Toxic Pits Cleanup Act. 55 A second law, AB
3843, allows regional water quality control boards to exempt sur-
face impoundments containing agricultural drainage water from
the Toxic Pits Cleanup Act.56
Bill AB 1983 was another law enacted by the California legis-
lature in September of 1988. Bill AB 1983 sets the penalties for
the reckless handling, treatment, storage, or transportation of
hazardous wastes that creates an unreasonable risk of fire, explo-
sion, serious injury, or death. 57 The bill establishes fines for vio-
lations ranging from $5,000 to $100,000 for each day of violation
and/or a jail sentence of up to three years. 58
Again, in September of 1988, the California Legislature
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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passed AB 3188 which prohibits the transport of hazardous
wastes within California destined for uncertified facilities outside
the state or for sites on the federal superfund national priorities
list.59 Transport of hazardous wastes destined for a foreign coun-
try is also restricted.60 The penalties for violating the statute in-
clude a fine of up to $25,000 and one year in jail.6 1
AIR POLLUTION
In Western Oil and Gas Association v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Con-
trol District,62 the California Supreme Court held that the Tanner
Act (Act)63 did not preclude air pollution control districts from
regulating emissions of a substance before the state Air Re-
sources Board (ARB) had identified the substance as a toxic air
contaminant. 64 The court noted that before passage of the Act
the districts had the authority to regulate air pollution in this
manner, and that since the Act did not expressly preempt the dis-
trict's authority, the district could continue to regulate air pollu-
tants in the absence of action by the ARB.65 The court also
concluded that the legislative history did not support a finding of
implied preemption. 66
WATER POLLUTION
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. State Water Resources Con-
trol Board,67 the California Court of Appeal for the Third District
held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 6s re-
quired the state to act in compliance with federal regulations only
with respect to areas that FWPCA regulated. 69 The court also
held that FWPCA did not invalidate the state's authority to regu-
late nonpoint sources of pollution not contemplated by FWPCA,
and, that the state was in fact required to do so by FWPCA.70
In Lake Madrone Water District v. State Water Resources Control
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1989).
63. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39650-39674 (West 1984 & Supp.
1989).
64. 49 Cal. 3d at 411, 777 P.2d at 158, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
65. Id. at 417-18, 777 P.2d at 162, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
66. Id. at 419-20, 777 P.2d at 163-64, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
67. 210 Cal. App. 3d 1421, 259 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1989).
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
69. 210 Cal. App. at 1431, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40.
70. Id.
1990]
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Board,7 1 due to complaints that the release of silt from a dam was
causing damage downstream, the state Water Resources Control
Board issued an abatement order to prevent the operators of the
dam from opening the dam's gates until a plan had been devel-
oped to prevent the discharge of silt into an adjoining creek at a
rate greater than that at which the silt entered the lake. 72 The
order also required the Lake Madrone Water District (District) to
prepare a plan for removing the downstream sediment. 73
The District, subsequently brought an action to revoke the
abatement order arguing that under the Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act (Act),74 silt and sediment were not waste,75
and that the District was not a discharger of waste. 76 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal for the Third District looked to the statutuory
language of the Act. The court noted that waste was defined to
include any waste substances associated with human habitation. 77
Because the dam was built for purposes of human habitation, and
because the dam caused a build up of silt that would not naturally
occur, the court held that the District was a producer of waste as
defined by the Act. 78 The court also held that, given the ordinary
usage of the word, the release of built up sediment was a "dis-
charge" as defined by the Act. 79
In Paredes v. County of Fresno,80 the California Court of Appeal
for the Fifth District denied the plaintiffs' claim that the County of
Fresno (County) had to take action against operators of public
water systems that were contaminated above an "action level" 8'
for a particular contaminant.82 The court noted that the Depart-
ment of Health Services (DHS) had the duty to set and enforce
primary and secondary standards regarding unhealthy levels of
contaminants in drinking water.8 3 The court also noted, however,
71. 209 Cal. App. 3d 163, 256 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989).
72. Id. at 166-67, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
73. Id.
74. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-14075 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
75. 209 Cal. App. 3d at 167, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 168, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
78. Id. at 169-71, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
79. Id. at 175, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
80. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1, 249 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1988).
81. According to the court "'[a]n 'action level' is a level of contamination
which, if exceeded, signals, in the opinion of the State Department of Health
Services, a need for caution by potential water consumers." Id. at 3 n. 2, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 593 n. 2.
82. Id. at 3-4, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
83. Id. at 3, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
8
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that for small public water systems, local authorities had responsi-
bility for enforcing these standards. 84 Since local governments
act on behalf of DHS, they cannot act with any greater authority
than that given them by DHS.8 5 Consequently, the court held
that where DHS had adopted an "action level" for a water con-
taminant but did not employ the "action level" as an enforceable
standard, local govenment had no authority or duty to enforce
the "action level" as a standard, and that failure to do so did not
create a cause of action. 86
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In People v. Martin,8 7 the defendant was convicted of trans-
porting and disposing hazardous waste in the form of empty con-
tainers.8 8 The defendant argued that California did not regulate
transportation of empty containers because empty containers
were not defined in the Hazardous Waste and Disposal Act, 89 and
that as a result the state regulations were preempted by federal
regulations which exempted empty containers.90 The California
Court of Appeal for the Second District found that although Cali-
fornia did not define empty containers, the state did nevertheless
regulate them because empty containers were included on a list of
recyclable hazardous waste types.9 ' In addition the court noted
that since California regulations were more stringent than federal
regulations, the California regulations were to apply.92
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT CASES
In Laurel Heights Improvement Association of San Francisco, Inc. v.
Regents of the University of California,93 the plaintiffs challenged the
defendant's Environmental Impact Report (EIR) 94 for failure to
discuss future uses of the defendant's proposed relocation site for
84. Id. at 7-8, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
85. Id. at 11, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
86. Id. at 12-13, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 599-600.
87. 211 Cal. App. 3d 699, 259 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1989).
88. Id. at 704, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25249.340 (West 1984 & Supp.
1990).
90. 211 Cal. App. 3d at 707, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
91. Id. at 708, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
92. Id.
93. 47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988).
94. The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires an EIR for
every project that an agency determines may have a significant environmental
impact.
1990] 253
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biomedical research facilities.95 The defendants argued that an
EIR was not required for the site because they had not yet been
given final approval for their future plans.96 The court held that
because the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) re-
quired the EIRs to be prepared as early as feasible,97 "approval of
a project or future portions of a project [was] not a prerequisite
for an [EIR]." 98
The court used a two-pronged test in order to determine
when an EIR had to include an analysis of the environmental im-
pact of future uses: "(1) [when] the future use [was] a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the initial project; and (2) [when] the
future use [was] likely to change the scope or nature of the initial
project or its environmental effects." 99
In McQueen v. Board of Directors of the Mid-Peninsula Regional
Open Space District,1° ° the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District held that under the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA),10 ' an environmental impact review was required where
the defendant, Board of Directors of the Mid-Peninsula Regional
Open Space District, acquired improved surplus federal realty
that contained hazardous wastes.' 0 2 The court explained that
under CEQA, by acquiring the property, the District also ac-
quired the legal responsibility to maintain, store or dispose of the
hazardous wastes properly.'0 3 The court noted the distinction in
CEQA between "sale" and "acquisition", and held that CEQA
did not provide a compliance exemption for "acquisitions" of
government properties. '04
In Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino, 10 5 the California Court of
Appeal for the First District held that the county of Mendocino
95. 47 Cal. 3d at 387, 764 P.2d at 279-80, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
96. Id. at 394, 764 P.2d at 284, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 395, 764 P.2d at 284, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
99. Id. at 396, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433. The court also held
that CEQA required that an EIR include a meaningful discussion of both project
alternatives and mitigation measures. Id.
100. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 249 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1988).
101. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
102. 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1130, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
103. Id. at 1146-47, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 44445. The court also noted that the
District's obligation to conduct an EIR was not discharged by an agreement in
which the federal government was responsible for undertaking the cleanup of
the hazardous waste. Id.
104. Id. at 1146, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
105. 202 Cal. App. 3d 296, 248 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1988).
10
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(County) failed to comply with CEQA ° 6 when the county granted
a use permit to construct a private sewage treatment plant with-
out requiring an EIR.' 0 7 The court noted that the test for deter-
mining whether the county complied with CEQA in evaluating the
need for an EIR was whether or not an objective good faith effort
to comply had been demonstrated. 08 The court found that: 1)
the County's initial study was "a token observance of regulatory
requirements"; 0 9 2) the County, by directing the applicant to
conduct the relevant studies subject to approval by the planning
commission, had improperly delegated legal responsibility;' 10
and, 3) the County had improperly postponed the environmental
review to a future date resulting in preclusion of public scrutiny
of the project."'
COLORADO
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the winter of 1988, Colorado's "Better Air Cam-
paign," which included a voluntary no-drive program and an oxy-
genated fuels program, required that the gasoline sold by
retailers have 2% oxygen by weight." 2 The campaign measures
represent an attempt by the state to reduce carbon monoxide
emissions from automobiles." 13
In March 1989, the Colorado Legislature enacted HB 1016;
HB 1016 added paper recycling facilities to the existing list of fa-
cilities that were exempt from state requirements." 4 The exemp-
tion applies as long as the recycling facilities are not on the site of
a landfill or incineration operation. " 5
106. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
107. 202 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
108. Id. at 305, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 357. Evidence of a good faith effort in-
cludes completion of a proper initial study to determine the need for an EIR and
conducting an environmental assessment at the earliest possible time before ap-
proval of the project. Id.
109. Id. at 305, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
110. Id. at 307, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
111. Id. at 307-08, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
112. Colorado's 1988-89 Better Air Campaign Includes Oxygenated Fuels, No-Drive
Programs, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1437 (Nov. 11, 1989).
113. Id.
114. Governor Approves Paper Recycling Plant Exemption, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2611 (Apr. 14, 1989). The list of exemption facilities includes glass, metal, and
cloth recycling plants. Id.
115. Id.
1990] 255
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SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In State of Colorado Legislature v. Department of the Army, 1 6 the
state brought an action under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA),"1 7 while a prior suit" Is had been brought by
the state against the Army under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). "19
The Army asserted that the RCRA action should have been dis-
missed because the CERCLA action took precedence over the
RCRA action.' 20 The District Court found no support for the
Army's argument.' 2 ' The court noted that CERCLA was in-
tended to operate independently and in addition to RCRA, and
that neither CERCLA nor RCRA were mutually exclusive.' 22
The Army also argued that RCRA section 6001,123 which
provides, inter alia, that federal facilities are subject to state and
local requirements, should be construed narrowly, and that Colo-
rado's regulatory standards were not sufficiently precise or objec-
tive. 12 4 The court, however, held that the state's standards were
nearly verbatim recitations of federal regulations promulgated by
the EPA.' 25
In State v. Idarado Mining Co.,126 the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado held that the state's response
efforts under CERCIA 27 had to be consistent with the National
Contingency Plan.' 28 Moreover, the court reiterated that the de-
fendant bore the burden of proving that the state's response ef-
forts were not consistent with the National Contingency Plan.' 29
In Idarado Mining, the court found that the defendants, owners
and operators of mines, were liable for the cleanup of hazardous
116. 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
119. 707 F. Supp. at 1563.
120. Id. at 1565.
121. Id. at 1569.
122. Id.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982).
124. 707 F. Supp. at 1570-71.
125. Id. at 1571-72.
126. 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Colo. 1989).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
128. 707 F. Supp. at 1230. The National Contingency Plan, which promul-
gates administrative procedures and standards for response action, can be found
at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1986).
129. 707 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
12
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waste.130
CONNECTICUT
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On August 7, 1989, Hamden, Connecticut became the first
municipality in the state to adopt a ban on non-biodegradable re-
tail food containers. 13 1 The ordinance prohibits the use of polyvi-
nyl chloride and polystyrene food wrappings, boxes, bags, non-
reusable plates and cups, and cup lids.' 32 The ban is expected to
affect local restaurants, groceries, school cafeterias, and other re-
tail food establishments. 3 3 Violation of the ordinance could lead
to a maximum penalty of $100 in fines per day for non-compli-
ance and three months in jail. 134
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Enthone, Inc. v. Bannon,'3 5 the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut held that the manufacturer of specialty chemicals, which were
not hazardous until utilized by customers, was not subject to a
statutory hazardous waste assessment13 6 as a generator for re-
cycling or transshipping waste returned to it by its customers. 3 7
The court concluded that the manufacturer did not fall within the
definition of generator 138 as defined by state regulations. 139
DELAWARE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On December 8, 1988, regulations went into effect which re-
quire, inter alia,'40 that operators of sanitary and industrial solid
130. Id. at 1232.
131. Connectwut: Hamden Council Passes State's First Ban on Non-biodegradable
Retail Food Packaging, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 702 (Aug. 18, 1989).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 211 Conn. 655, 560 A.2d 971 (1989).
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-132 (1958 & Supp. 1989).
137. 211 Conn. at 661, 560 A.2d at 975.
138. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-449(c)-(1)(c) (1988).
139. 211 Conn. at 660, 590 A.2d at 974.
140. Other provisions require that the Delaware Department of Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Control (DNREC):
find that a proposed site is suitable for a landfill before a permit is is-
sued; require owners and operators to provide proof of insurance and
financial responsibility before the opening and during the operation of
1990]
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waste landfills install synthetic liners forty-five millimeters either
in thickness or clay liners five feet in thickness.' 4 ' Also required
by the regulations is a five foot separation between the liner and
the seasonal high water level.' 42
On January 20, 1989, regulations went into effect which re-
quire the registration of underground and above-ground heating
oil storage tanks with capacities of more than 1,100 gallons, and
the labeling of the tanks with the tank size and substance
stored.' 43 The regulations also prohibit the use of bare steel
tanks. '44
A ban on the installation of low-pressure pipe septic systems
was lifted by the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and
Environmental Control (DNREC) on May 1, 1989.145 Use of the
systems was suspended on October 7, 1988, "because of a high
rate of failures."' 46
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In State v. General Chemical Corporation,14 7 the Delaware Supe-
rior Court held that the former Environmental Control Reporting
Statute 148 (ECRS) was repealed by House Bill 330 (H.B. 330), 149
and that no savings clause was either explicit or implicit from the
new rule. '50 H.B. 330 was amended to incorporate section 102 of
the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA),' 5' Section 311 of the Clean
any landfill; and require owners and operators to monitor and maintain
landfills for 30 years after closure.
State Issues Solid Waste Landfill Rules to Protect Aquifers Supplying Drinking Water, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1784-85 (Dec. 30, 1988).
141. Id. at 1784.
142. Id.
143. State Imposes New Requirements for Large Heating Oil Storage Tanks, 19 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1916 (Jan. 27, 1989).
144. Id.
145. Delaware Lifts Ban on Low-Pressure Septic Pipe, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 184
(May 26, 1989).
146. State Suspends Use of Low-Pressure Septic Systems, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1293 (Nov. 4, 1988). Although it was expected that only five percent of the
standard low-pressure pipes would malfunction, a survey indicated that thirty-
two percent of the pipes were not functioning properly. Id.
147. 559 A.2d 292 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988).
148. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6028 (Supp. 1988).
149. Id.
150. 559 A.2d at 301.
151. 42 U.S.C. 9602 (1983 and Supp. 1989).
14
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Water Act, ' 5 2 and DNREC regulations. 5 3
The court also held that the former ECRS was not void for
vagueness. 154 Defendant, General Chemical Corporation (Gen-
eral) argued that the statute's requirement that General give no-
tice to DNREC of discharges of air contaminants or water
pollutants at the "earliest opportunity" was vague both on its face
and as applied to General.' 55 The court responded that, since
there was no First Amendment issue in the case, it would make no
finding as to whether the statute was vague on its face.' 5 6 The
court also stated that when it could articulate factors by which
both the person subject to the statute and the finder of fact could
reasonably determine the statute's meaning, the statute would
not be held void for vagueness as applied to the person. 5 7 After
listing a number of factors by which a person subject to the re-
porting standard could be guided, 5 8 the court defined the term
"earliest opportunity" as "the 'earliest time under all of the cir-
cumstances after immediate remedial safety measures had been
taken at which a reasonable person could report' to DNREC."'59
FLORIDA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Exposure to liability from the contamination caused by un-
derground storage tanks is a major national concern. Florida has
addressed this problem by enacting the Petroleum Liability Insur-
ance Program to be administered by the Department of Environ-
152. 33 U.S.C. 1321 (1986 and Supp. 1989).
153. 559 A.2d at 300.
154. Id. at 295-97.
155. Id. at 294.
156. Id. at 295.
157. Id. at 297.
158. The factors include
(1) The time of day or night that the discharge occurs; (2) the staffing
on the location; (3) the ability of on-site staff to judge the nature of and
extent of the discharge; (4) the potential threat to the health and safety
of employees necessitating immediate remedial action; (5) the potential
threat to the health and safety of innocent bystanders including neigh-
boring property owners and others who may, by mere happenstance,
stumble upon the scene necessitating immediate remedial action; (6)
the number and length of time of contacts to emergency response per-
sonnel made by the person subject to report; (7) the ability of the dis-
charger to notify the DNREC in a quick, short-hand manner so that the
overall response mechanisms can be used; (8) in short and most impor-
tantly, the overt circumstances surrounding the discharge.
Id.
159. Id.
1990] 259
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mental Regulation for the owners and operators of these tanks. 160
The program provides third party liability insurance to qualified
program participants for incidents of contamination related to the
storage of petroleum products, and provides restoration for eligi-
ble sites for those in the liability insurance program or those eligi-
ble for self-insurance. 16' The program grants up to one million
dollars in coverage for each incident with a deductible of five hun-
dred dollars. 162 Premiums are determined and approved by the
Department of Insurance. 6s In essence, the program steps up
the insurance protection for owners and operators of storage
tanks who may lack sufficient financial resources for such
liabilities.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
In State v. Montco Research Products, Inc.,' 4 the District Court
of Appeals for the Fifth District of Florida held that certain envi-
ronmental and pollution control statutes did not require allega-
tion or proof of actual harm. 165 With respect to Count IV,
criminal pollution,'6 the Florida District Court of Appeals dis-
agreed with the trial court's statutory interpretation requiring
that actual harm be alleged whenever the violation of an environ-
mental or pollution control statute having a penal provision is
charged.' 67 In reversing Counts I, II, and III, and finding a suffi-
cient allegation of actual harm in Count IV, the Montco court
demonstrated that the element of actual harm could not be en-
grafted on all environmental and pollution control statutes with
penal provisions. 168
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.3072(1) (West Supp. 1989).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 376.3072(2).
163. Id. § 376.3072(4).
164. 529 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
165. Id. The court found that the language of the first three counts suffi-
ciently tracked the statutory language and determined them to be improperly
dismissed by the trial court. Id. at 827.
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.161(1)(a)(3) (1983).
167. 529 So. 2d at 827. The court agreed that the criminal statute needed
proof of actual harm, however, this requirement was improperly imputed to
Counts I, II, and III.
168. 529 So. 2d at 827-28.
16
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GEORGIA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1988, the Georgia legislature amended the Georgia Haz-
ardous Waste Management Authority Act (Act), 169 by including
within the definition of "project" the renovation of any existing
waste treatment or disposal facility that provides for the treat-
ment, storage, or disposal of any solid waste requiring special
handling.' 70 The amendment also adds a new provision which
would permit the Department of Industry and Trade to plan,
own, and operate a hazardous waste facility and to charge a fee
for the use of such a state facility.' 7t Additionally, the Act now
provides partial immunity from liability to members, officers, and
employees of the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Au-
thority.' 72 The effective date of the amended Act was July 1,
1988.173
Also in 1988, the Georgia legislature enacted a new section
to the Pesticide Control Act of 1976 (Act) 174 in order to limit the
possibility of strict liability being imposed on violators of the
Act. 175 This new section establishes a negligence standard for
farmers who pollute the land, waters, air or other resources of the
state through application or use of fertilizers, plant growth regu-
lators or pesticides.' 76 The Act does not limit an individual's
right of action for personal injury or damage to property resulting
from the application or use of chemicals by a person or entity
169. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-100 to -113 (1988). In 1981, the Georgia Leg-
islature enacted the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Authority Act which
created the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Authority (HWMA). The
HWMA was to be "an instrumentality of the State of Georgia and a public cor-
poration." GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-102 (1988). The legislature granted the
HWMA broad comprehensive authority. Id.
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-101(3) (1988).
171. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-103(11) (1988).
172. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-103.2 (1988).
173. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-100 to -113 (1988).
174. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-7-50 to -73 (1988). That same year the legisla-
ture also enacted the Pesticide Use and Application Act. GA. CODE ANN. H§ 2-7-
90 to 114 (1988). Both Acts seemed to establish a negligence standard for pur-
poses of determining liability, but opened the door to strict liability by stating
that they did not authorize any person to violate any law or regulation whose
enforcement was assigned to the Department of Natural Resources. GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-7-72, 2-7-103 (1988).
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170 (Supp. 1989).
176. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170(a)(l)-(3). The establishment of the negli-
gence standard is accomplished by defining the due care standard for farmers in
the application of the aforementioned chemicals or pesticides. Id.
1990]
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engaged in agricultural or farming operations. 77 The Act simi-
larly does not prohibit strict products liability for any manufac-
turer of such fertilizers, plant growth regulators, or pesticides.' 7 8
Additionally, in 1988, the Georgia legislature added a new
section to its Solid Waste Management Act (Act)179 implementing
a "good neighbor" policy by requiring that a county obtain ap-
proval from a neighboring county before constructing a solid
waste disposal site within one-half mile of the county line.' 80
However, even without the consent of a neighboring county, the
Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources (DNR) may approve the site "if the
requesting county provides evidence that no alternative sites or
methods are available."'' The Act presently only applies to
counties with a population of at least 350,000.182 As of April 1,
1990, the Act will apply to all counties, regardless of size.' 83
In local matters, one of the counties that comprises metro-
politan Atlanta has approved a ban on laundry detergents with
more than a five percent phosphorous content. 8 4 The Fulton
County Commission approved the resolution banning phosphate
detergents on April 19, 1989, and the ban took effect on Novem-
ber 1, 1989.185 Sale of phosphate detergents after this date could
result in a $500 fine. 18 6 The commission acted in response to a
request from DNR to remove phosphorous from their waste water
discharge. 1s7
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
On June 22, 1989, the Georgia Supreme Court decided
177. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170(b) (Supp. 1989).
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-170(d) (Supp. 1989).
179. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 1208-20 to -45 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
180. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-28.1(a)(1) (Supp. 1989).
181. Id. Previously, only authorization of the Director was required to ob-
tain a permit to construct or operate a solid waste facility. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-
8-27(a) (1988).
182. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-28.1 (Supp. 1989).
183. Id.
184. Ban on Phosphate Detergents Approved to Limit Algae Blooms in Chattahochee,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2704 (Apr. 28, 1989).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. Studies have shown that phosphorous discharged into the Chatta-
hoochee River (200 million gallons of treated city waste water are discharged
into the river daily) is causing algae to grow in a downriver lake. Id. It has been
estimated that 4 million pounds of phosphorous are pumped into the river an-
nually. Id.
18
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Claussen v. Aetna Casuality &Surety Co.. I88 The plaintiff had filed an
action against Aetna seeking a declaratory judgment that the in-
surance company was obligated under a "comprehensive general
liability" policy to pay for the costs to be incurred in connection
with the Environmental Protection Ageny's (EPA) demand that
his contaminated property be cleaned up.' 8 9 The plaintiff, Claus-
sen, had previously leased the site to the city ofJacksonville, Flor-
ida for use as a landfill. 90 Aetna denied coverage, and made a
cross motion for summary judgment citing exclusion (f) of the
policy, commonly referred to as the "pollution exclusion"
clause.' 9 1 The federal district court granted Aetna's motion for
summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.' 92 The Eleventh Circuit certified to the Georgia Supreme
Court the question of whether or not the pollution exclusion
clause applied and determined that the question was a matter of
state law, and therefore a matter for the state court to decide.' 93
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision ultimately rested on
its interpretation of the word "sudden" as used in the pollution
exclusion clause of the plaintiff's comprehensive general liability
policy. '94 The court held that construing "sudden" to mean "un-
expected" would not violate the Georgia rules of contract inter-
pretation, and therefore the clause did not preclude coverage for
liability for environmental contamination cleanup costs. 195
188. 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989).
189. 380 S.E.2d at 687.
190. Id.
191. Id. The clause states that coverage is excluded for:
... bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, or release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acide, al-
kalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irri-
tants, contaminants or other pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion
does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
or accidental ....
Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 380 S.E.2d at 687-90.
195. Id. Aetna argued that the use of the word "sudden" could only mean
-abrupt". But the court held that if an insurance contract was capable of being
construed two ways, as it was in this case, it would be construed against the
insurer and in favor of the insured. Id.
1990]
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PESTICIDES
In Radtke v. Arrow Exterminators, Inc., 19 6 a Georgia Superior
Court jury awarded $400,000 to a family whose home was made
uninhabitable by the misuse of DP Concentrate, a pesticide con-
taining chlordane and heptachlor. The plaintiffs sued the exter-
minator for the negligent application of the pesticide, claiming
that the defendant's negligence resulted in a variety of compensa-
ble health problems. 197 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $130,000
in punitive damages and $270,000 in compensatory damages. 198
HAWAII
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 11, 1989, Hawaii became the first state to enact an
ozone-layer protection law when Governor John Waihee signed a
measure restricting sales of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-containing
air conditioning refrigerants and requiring air conditioning
repairpersons to use machines that recycle CFCs.' 99 The law, Act
77 of the 1989 Legislature, takes effect January 1, 1991, and bans
over-the-counter sales of CFC refrigerants in quantities of less
than fifteen pounds. Aerosol-size cans of refrigerants are pres-
ently sold to do-it-yourselfers to recharge automobile air condi-
tioning units.200 The long lead time before the law becomes
effective is designed to allow the industry time to develop suitable
alternatives to CFCs.20 The law would also treat as an offender
any person who causes or allows CFCs to be released into the air
from any source.202
Violators of this law would be subject to a $100 fine per of-
fense, and the contractors would be subject to having their
licenses suspended, revoked, or not renewed. 203 The Office of
Consumer Protection of the State Department of Commerce and
Consumer Affairs will be responsible for the enforcement of the
196. Jury Awards $400,000 to Family whose Home Was Contaminated by Chlor-
dane, 13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 164 (May 5, 1989).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Measure Signed by Governor to Restrict Sale of CFC-Containing Air Condition-
ing Refrigerants, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 162 (May 17, 1989). CFC- 11, CFC-12,
CFC- 113, CFC-! 14, CFC-! 15, and CFC-502 will be covered by the new law. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
20
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new law.2 ° 4
Another recent development showed that the potential for
groundwater contamination by pesticides, herbicides, or plant
fungicides exists at a majority of sugar cane, pineapple, and seed
corn plantations throughout Hawaii, according to a report by the
State Department of Agriculture. 20 5 The report, completed in
January 1989, inventoried known sites of pesticide mixing and
loading at the various plantations, and sampled the soil to a depth
of nine feet at two of the sites. 2°6
The report neither drew conclusions nor made recommenda-
tions, nor did it cite any of the sampled plantations.207 While
fines and penalties, including referral to stricter Health Depart-
ment regulations, could be handed down by the Health Depart-
ment where the law allows, the plantations, through the use of
consent agreements, are being given an opportunity to improve
their handling, not only of the pesticides, but also of the empty
pesticide containers and run-off irrigation water.208
Under a recent proposal from the State Health Department,
installations of cesspools for sewage disposal would end in Hawaii
in 1991. 2 09 Hawaii is one of a handful of states that still allow
installation of cesspools for such disposal. 210 The proposal would
ban cesspool use altogether by the year 2000.211 Homeowners
have voiced concerns about the policy, focusing on the cost of
replacing cesspools with septic tanks. 212 Cesspools cost $2,000 to
$3,000 to install.213 Septic tanks could cost at least $6,000 more
than cesspools. 214 There is also a shortage of septic tank install-
ers in Hawaii. 215
204. Id.
205. Agricultural Chemicals Threaten Ground Water at Most Plantations Invento-
ried, State Reports, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2556 (March 31, 1989). The report said
that 52 different pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides are used by the planta-
tions in Hawaii. Id. Among the most commonly used chemicals are Armex (di-
uron), Aatrex (atrazine), Velpar (hexazinone), Evik (amaetryn), Dalpon, Tilt, and
Polado. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. State Health Department Proposes Ban on Installation, Use of Cesspools by
2000, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2635 (Apr. 21, 1989).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
1990] 265
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To answer these concerns, state Representative Mark An-
drews introduced a bill (HB 471) that would require the Health
Department to document the risk of ground water contamination,
rather than issue a blanket policy affecting all cesspools state-
wide.2 16 Though the measure passed the House, it is being held
up in the Senate Agriculture Committee.2 17
In other recent news involving the Hawaii State Health De-
partment (Department), it was announced by Director Lewin that
an improved response and a "proactive" stance toward environ-
mental concerns will most likely be the major features of a reor-
ganization and restructuring of the Health Department. 218
Criticized in the past for inadequate responses and unprepared-
ness for environmental emergencies, the Health Department,
under Director Lewin, the first medical doctor in twenty years to
head the Department, has proposed a plan to make the environ-
mental health section of the Health Department more
responsive. 219
In legislative testimony, Director Lewin emphasized that his
health state plan would strengthen communication within the
government, while providing support services for environmental
protection programs. 220 "The proposed reorganization," he said,
"and a new laboratory will further enhance our abilities to protect
and manage our environment. Through the establishment of
sound health-based environmental policies, we feel we can allow
for controlled growth without compromising the health and wel-
fare of the people of Hawaii." 22 1
IDAHO
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Governor Cecil Andrus announced, on September 7, 1988,
that an agreement was reached between industry and conserva-
tionists on anti-degradation standards for state surface waters. 222
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 'Proactive' Stance toward Environment Expected from Departmental Reorgani-
zation, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2703 (Apr. 28, 1989).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2704.
221. Id.
222. Governor's Task Force Reaches Agreement on Non-Point Source Water Pollution
Standards, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 998 (Sept. 16, 1988). While most aspects of the
agreement will be implemented by rules and regulations, some provisions re-
quired legislative approval in 1989. Id.
22
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Previously, Idaho was the only of the fifty states without anti-deg-
radation standards to protect water bodies from non-point source
pollution.223
At the heart of the agreement is the establishment of six river
basin committees to review pending industrial activities every two
years. 22 4 The committees are composed of industry, conserva-
tionists, and state agency members, and will determine which
streams in each area will be subject to activity-by-activity re-
view. 225 If the committees are unable to reach a consensus, the
governor will make a final decision with respect to the appropri-
ate anti-degradation standard. 226
On May 19, 1989, Idaho imposed an emergency restriction
on the chemical daminozide for all food and flower crops by es-
tablishing a notification and permit system for growers who pos-
sess the pesticide or intend to use it.227 Idaho became the second
state to ban the use of daminozide on food crops. 228
On May 18, Governor Cecil Andrus announced that the
Idaho Department of Agriculture (Department) will maintain
records of owners and users of Alar, the commercial name of
daminozide. 22 9 The list will be made public in the hope of dis-
couraging growers from using Alar.230 The restriction requires
any person who possesses Alar to report it to the state agricul-
tural department immediately. 23' Any person intending to use
Alar must obtain a permit through the Department at least forty-
eight hours in advance of using it.232 Failure to notify the agricul-
tural department of possession or use of Alar can result in civil
and criminal penalties of up to a $1,000 fine and/or a year in
jail. 233
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. Activity-by-activity review entails a review of each industrial activ-
ity that contributes to non-point source pollution. Id.
226. Id.
227. Idaho Becomes Second State to Ban Use of Daminozide on Food Crops, 13
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 293-94 (May 26, 1989).
228. Id. Rhode Island banned its use on May 11, 1989. See, Rhode Island
Environment Agency Places Emergency Ban on Daminozide, 13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA)
188 (May 12, 1989).
229. 13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 293.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. The permit application must include the user's full name and ad-
dress, location, type and total acreage of crop to be treated, and the percent
amount of Alar to be used. Id.
233. Id.
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ILLINOIS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On January 1, 1989, the Illinois legislature amended the
state's Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act,
and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The purpose of
the amendments was to ensure compliance with the guidelines of
federal legislation and to create guidelines for state legislation.
This compliance was to be achieved by making federal guidelines
"required rules" of the state environmental protection acts.23 4
The amendment requires the state Pollution Control Board
(Board) to adopt regulations that are identical in substance to
federal regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 235 The amend-
ment also directs the Board to adopt regulations relating to haz-
ardous waste management that were at least as stringent as those
adopted under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976.236
The purpose of this legislation is to ensure that guidelines
promulgated by the Board will be at least as stringent as the
guidelines established by the federal government for environ-
mental protection. 237 Not only do the amendments establish fed-
eral guidelines as a floor for environmental protection, but they
further empower the Board to establish state guidelines which go
above and beyond those set by the federal government. 238
AIR POLLUTION
In Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Pollution Control Board,23 9
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District determined
that the power of the Pollution Control Board (Board) to regulate
the activities of polluters was limited by the Board's own prior
policy.240 The case involved a suit brought by Central Illinois
Public Service Company (Central Illinois), a company that oper-
ated a steam generating unit.2 4' Central Illinois challenged the
Board's affirmance of an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
234. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1028.2 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
235. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1022.4 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 165 I11. App. 3d 354, 518 N.E.2d 1354 (1988).
240. Id. at 366, 518 N.E.2d at 1362.
241. Id. at 355, 518 N.E.2d at 1355.
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decision which placed, as a condition on Central Illinois'. operat-
ing permit, a limitation that Central Illinois could not exceed a
sulfur dioxide emission of 6.0 pounds/mbtu.2 42 Central Illinois
argued that the Board, in effect, had eliminated the emission stan-
dard's applicability to large emissions sources by finding that
compliance with the standard was technically and economically
infeasible.243
The court held that if the meaning of the language of a regu-
lation was debatable, and circumstances had not changed since
the promulgation of that regulation, an administrative agency
would be bound by a long-standing interpretation of the regula-
tion.2 44 The court determined that the Board could not impose
the 6.0 pounds/mbtu emission standard on Central Illinois be-
cause the Board had a long-standing interpretation of the regula-
tion applying these emission standards to large emissions
sources.
245
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Clutts v. Beas/ey,24 6 the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth
District, held that the Pollution Control Board's (Board) affirm-
ance of the Alexander County Board's approval of a proposed re-
gional landfill complied with statutory requisites for factual
findings, and that the approval of the proposed landfill was in ac-
cord with the evidence presented to the Alexander County
Board.2 47
The plaintiff, a landowner whose property would be adjacent
to the proposed landfill, argued that the Board's decision was in-
adequate because it did not include specific evidentiary findings
of fact regarding the criteria for approval of the proposed land-
fill. 24 8 The court rejected this argument, holding that a written
decision by the Board, with a record showing the basis for its de-
cision, was sufficient.2 49
The court also rejected the adjacent landowner's argument
that the landfill proposal did not meet the statutory requirements
242. Id.
243. Id. at 359, 518 N.E.2d at 1357.
244. Id. at 366, 518 N.E.2d at 1362.
245. Id.
246. 185 Ill. App. 3d 543, 541 N.E.2d 844 (1989).
247. Id. at 543, 541 N.E.2d at 844.
248. Id. at 544, 541 N.E.2d at 845.
249. Id. at 544-46, 541 N.E.2d at 845-46.
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for approval.2 50 Although Illinois law requires that a new landfill
be necessary to accommodate area waste needs, the court deter-
mined that the landfill did not have to "be necessary in absolute
terms ... [but in] terms of expediency and reasonable conven-
ience." 251 As to the location of the proposed landfill, the court
determined that the landfill had been designed by an experienced
engineer, and that the location had minimized incompatibility
with, and effect on, property values.252
IOWA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has pro-
posed new standards to regulate non-point source pollution of
groundwater. 253 This proposal is the result of a mandate of the
1987 Iowa Groundwater Protection Act (Act)254 which requires
DNR to assess state groundwater standards.2 55 The proposal
provides groundwater regulation which is lacking in the 1987 Act.
The proposal is aimed most specifically at farm chemicals.2 56 If
approved by the legislature, the proposal may require manufac-
turers of certain farm chemicals to develop strategies to prevent
groundwater contamination. 257
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In State v. Butler,258 the Jasper County Board of Health
(Board) sought discretionary review of a district court decision
which overturned the conviction of a landowner for failure to
comply with a Board order requiring him to renovate his sewage
system.2 59 The landowner had received an extension of time in
which to comply with the order so that he would be able to meet
the new sewage disposal regulation. 26 The landowner refused to
250. Id. at 545, 541 N.E.2d at 846.
251. Id. (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039.2(a) (Smith-Hurd
1988)).
252. Id.
253. Iowa Agency Submits Non-Point Pollution Plan, 19 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2137
(Feb. 10, 1989).
254. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455 (West 1989).
255. Iowa Agency Submits Non-Point Pollution Plan, 19 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2137
(Feb. 10, 1989).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 419 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1988).
259. Id.
260. Id.
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss1/7
STATE SYNOPSIS
construct his sewage system in accordance with the guidelines of
the regulation, and was therefore sued by the Board in magis-
trate's court.26' The magistrate's jury convicted him of a simple
misdemeanor for violation of the Iowa Code.262 The district
court overturned the conviction on the ground that, because the
landowner's sewage disposal system was already in place when
the regulation was promulgated, the new regulation did not apply
to the landowner's property. 263
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the landowner's sew-
age disposal system was not excluded from the regulation. 26
The court found that the regulation, which prohibited the dis-
charge of sewage into any ditch, applied to all private sewage dis-
posal systems which were not accessible to a public sewer.2 65 The
court further explained that the regulation applied regardless of
the time at which the private system was constructed. 266 The
court determined that the landowner was in violation of the regu-
lation, and that the violation "was an act which authorized the
local board of health to order alteration of the system." 267
KANSAS
WA TER POLLUTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in
Nunn v. Chemical Waste Mangement, Inc. ,268 held that a waste dispo-
sal facility owner who guaranteed compliance with existing envi-
ronmental laws in a land transfer contract would be liable for any
breach of that guarantee.2 69 Chemical Waste Management
(CWM) bought a waste disposal facility in Wichita from National
Industrial Environmental Services (NIES).2 70 NIES guaranteed
that the facility was in full compliance with all applicable environ-
mental laws. 27 1 Kansas' Department of Health and the Environ-
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 137.21 (West 1989)). The administrative
regulations regarding sewage disposal were adopted after the landowner's sew-
age disposal was in place. Id.
264. Id. at 362.
265. d. at 363.
266. Id.
267. Id. The case was remanded by the court for further proceedings.
268. 856 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1988).
269. Id. at 1468.
270. Id. at 1466.
271. Id. at 1467.
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ment closed the facility thirteen months after NIES transferred
the land to CWM, citing leakage of waste from the facility into
nearby ground water.272 CWM thereafter ceased to make pay-
ments to NIES for the facility and sued NIES for breach of the
gaurantee.273 The United States District Court of the District of
Kanasas awarded $8.7 million to CWM for remedial costs and lost
profits. 274 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision
but modified its damage award.275 The Tenth Circuit denied
CWM's request for lost profits and required CWM to render full
payment of the promissory note to NIES as soon as NIES satisfied
the damage award.276
KENTUCKY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Kentucky Legislature passed a bill in 1988 which put re-
strictions on incineration methods for the destruction of obsolete
chemical weapons. 277 The legislature passed the bill in response
to an Army plan to begin incineration operations on chemical
weapons at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot in 1992.278
The Army is required by Congress, as part of a budgetary plan for
manufacturing new chemical weapons, to destroy all existing
chemical weapons. 279 The new Kentucky law would compel the
Army to observe certain incineration technology, including a
99.9999 percent efficiency in the destruction of the chemicals and
a thorough training and evacuation program, before the chemical
weapons could be burned in the state.280
AIR POLLUTION
In Bell Concrete Industries, Inc. v. Kentucky Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet,28 the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky held that: 1) the Kentucky Natural Resources and Protec-
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1466.
275. Id. at 1471.
276. Warranty of Environmental Compliance Breached by Ground Water Contamina-
tion, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 990 (Sept. 16, 1988).
277. Kentucky Urges Army to Reconsider Options, Take More Comments on Plan to
Burn Weapons, 19 Env't Rep (BNA) 428 (July 29, 1988).
278. Id. at 428.
279. Id. at 429.
280. Id.
281. 764 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
28
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tion Cabinet (Cabinet) could cite a corporation for violation of a
permit regulation where the corporation was aware that it was re-
quired to obtain permits;28 2 and, 2) the Cabinet could not cite a
corporation for violation of a fugitive emission regulation,
promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act,28 3 if the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) had disapproved of the
regulation.284
Upon a Cabinet inspection, it was revealed that Bell Concrete
Industries, Inc. (Bell), had constructed or modified an air pollu-
tion source on its property in violation of a Cabinet permit regu-
lation.28 5 The Cabinet cited Bell not only for the violation of the
permit regulation, but also for two violations of a fugitive emis-
sions regulation.28 6 The Cabinet fined Bell $5,500 in civil penal-
ties for the cumulative violations. 2 7 A Kentucky Circuit Court
affirmed the Cabinet's order to pay the fines, and Bell appealed to
the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 288
With respect to the alleged fugitive emissions violations, the
court of appeals explained that the Cabinet had promulgated the
fugitive emissions regulations in response to a mandate by the
federal government requiring Kentucky to take steps to attain air
quality of specific standards pursuant to the Clean Air Act.28 9
The court noted that since the Clean Air Act required the states
to submit their fugitive emissions regulations to EPA for its ap-
proval, any regulations that received EPA's disapproval would be
considered invalid.29° The court of appeals found that, because
the Cabinet fugitive emissions regulation had met with EPA dis-
approval, the fugitive emissions regulation was invalid, and could
not, therefore, have been applied to Bell. 29' The court ordered
the civil penalties to be reduced by the amount which was reflec-
tive of the fine for the fugitive emissions violation. 292
The court also found that, with respect to the permit viola-
282. Id. at 636-37.
283. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
284. Bell, 764 S.W.2d at 636.
285. Id. at 634.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 635.
290. Id. at 636.
291. Id. The court seemed to imply from the fact that the regulation never
appeared in the Federal Register that Bell could not have had notice of its exist-
ence. See id.
292. Id. at 637.
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tions, because Bell had notice of the permit regulation, and be-
cause EPA had not disapproved of that regulation, the Cabinet
had acted within its proper power to cite Bell for any permit viola-
tions.293 The civil penalties that the Cabinet had levied for Bell's
permit violations were therefore upheld.294
LOUISIANA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The quality of Louisiana's drinking water became a source of
concern in 1989. EPA designated the Chicot Aquifer in south-
west Louisiana 295 and the Southern Hills Regional Aquifer in
southeast Louisiana 296 as the sole or principal sources of drinking
water for their respective regions. This designation makes all
projects in the area which receive federal funds subject to EPA
review in order to reduce the risk of groundwater
contamination. 297
The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
found that forty percent of the bodies of water surveyed in the
state have significant pollution problems. 298 DEQ discovered
that the source of the problem is "non-point source pollution",
mostly resulting from urban and agricultural runoff.29 9
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
The major hazardous waste case in Louisiana has revolved
around Marine Shale Processors, Inc. (MSP).3 0° First, DEQ fined
MSP, as an incinerator, for $2.8 million because of water pollu-
293. Id. at 636-37.
294. Id. at 637.
295. EPA Regions Grant Local Requests to Protect Drinking Water in Four States,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 229 (June 17, 1988).
296. EPA Regions Grant Local Requests to Protect Drinking Water in Four States,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 369 (July 15, 1988).
297. EPA Regions Grant Local Requests to Protect Drinking Water in Four States,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 229 (June 17, 1988).
298. State Finds 40 Percent of Water Bodies Have Significant Problems Due to Pollu-
tion, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 750 (Aug. 26, 1988).
299. Id.
300. Roemer Signs Law on Recycling Standards, Ending Effort to Close Marine Shale
Incinerator, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 704 (Aug. 19, 1988). The battle began when
Governor Buddy Roemer signed Louisiana Senate Bill 739 into law as Act 874.
Id. The act imposed new controls on hazardous waste recycling facilites by hold-
ing them to the same emission standards as regular incinerators. Id. MSP claims
that its major competitors, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council and Rollins En-
vironmental Services, pushed for the legislation as a way to cause problems. Id.
30
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tion violations at its Amelia facility in October 1988.301 MSP then
sued DEQ to force determination of its status as a recycler or as a
incinerator. 302
Finally, DEQ ordered MSP to close down the Amelia facility
in May 1989.303 The company continued to incinerate while con-
testing the order in an administrative hearing.3° 4 The State
pointed to violations of its hazardous waste laws, including the
importation of hazardous waste from Canada on nineteen occa-
sions, as the reason for the closure order.30 5 MSP's request for a
hearing stayed the order's affect. 30 6 MSP claimed that its waste
importation from Canada complied with EPA regulations which
superseded Louisiana's law and barred MSP's liability.30 7 Ac-
cording to the state's attorney general, MSP avoided Louisiana
law by moving the wastes into Louisiana via another state.3 08
MAINE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1989, the Maine legislature enacted laws establishing the
Maine Waste Management Agency (Agency). 3°9 The objectives of
the Agency are to implement an integrated approach to solid
waste management directed toward the processing, reuse, re-
cycling, and reduction of generated toxic and non-toxic waste
through the state.310 The Agency is authorized, among other
things, to promulgate rules necessary to carry out its responsibili-
ties, to make arrangements pertaining to the purchase, sale, and
use of recycled products, and, if an emergency occurs with rela-
301. Marine Shale Fined $2.8 Million for Various Water Pollution Violations, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1187-88 (Oct. 14, 1988). MSP refused to pay claiming it is a
recycler and not an incinerator. DEQ then fined it as a recycler based on these
claims. The fine was also imposed because of numerous other violations of state
law.
302. Louisiana Ordered to Hold Hearing on Status of Marine Shale Facility, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1486-87 (Nov. 25, 1988). If found to be an incinerator, MSP
would be bound by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and would
need a permit to do business. Effectively, MSP would shut down because the
required permit takes a long time to acquire. Id. at 1486.
303. Louisiana Orders Marine Shale Shutdown; Firm Seeks Hearing, Delays Order's
Effect, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 187-88 (June 2, 1989).
304. Id. at 187.
305. Id. at 187-88.
306. Id. at 188.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 2101-2193 (West Supp. 1989).
310. Id. § 2101.
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tion to the disposal of hazardous waste anywhere in the state, to
direct solid wastes from one public or private waste facility to an-
other.31' The Agency may also enter into contracts, including,
but not limited to, contracts with firms, corporations, state agen-
cies, the United States government, and local municipalities. The
ability to contract was given to the Agency so that it could bargain
for services related to the recycling and disposal of solid waste.31 2
Also in 1989, the Maine legislature passed several amend-
ments to the Maine Hazardous Waste, Septage and Solid Waste
Management Act (Act).313 Under the Act, the Maine Environ-
mental Protection Board (Board) is authorized to adopt provi-
sions for public notification concerning the location of land
spreading and sludge storage facilities. 314
The Act requires each municipality in the state to provide
disposal services for domestic and commercial solid waste gener-
ated within each municipality. 3 1 5 Municipalities are obligated to
enact ordinances requiring transporters of solid waste to segre-
gate wastes, and to deliver wastes generated within the municipal-
ity to a designated reclamation facility.3 16
Again in 1989, the Maine legislature passed amendments to
311. Id. § 2103(1).
312. Id. The Agency's duties include, but are not limited to, the develop-
ment of a state waste management and recycling plan, assisting in regional and
municipal waste recycling and waste reduction programs, promoting waste re-
duction, developing siting criteria for disposal facilities, reviewing applications
for expanded solid waste facilities, and instituting, in a court of competent juris-
diction, proceedings against any individual or entity to compel compliance with
any of the Agency's established regulations. Id. § 2103(2).
313. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 §§ 1301-10-B (1964 & West Supp. 1989).
314. Id. § 1304(13-A). Other regulations adopted by the board relate to
pulp and paper mill sludge produced at industrial facilities. Id. § 1304(13-
A)(B)(1)&(2). The regulations on pulp and paper mill sludge produced at these
industrial facilities include provisions for the maximum storage period at facili-
ties without impervious liners, leachate collection and treatment to be fixed at
six months, and the prohibition on the location of sludge storage sites within
300 feet of a year-round river, stream, brook or pond nor within 75 feet of any
intermittent stream or brook, or any natural drainage way, including gullies,
swales, and ravines. Id. Other provisions mandate that facilities without imper-
vious liners and leachate collection systems be used only once in any ten year
period. Id. § 1304(13-A)(B)(3).
315. Id. § 1304-B(1).
316. Id. § 1304-B(2). The amendments also place limitations on a munici-
pality's ability to enter into service contracts for the disposal, transportation, and
handling of solid waste. The Act stipulates that the primary obligation of each
municipality, which is to supercede all other contracts made with other parties to
recycle or reduce solid waste, is to secure a minimum solid waste tonnage level
for use by local waste disposal facilities. Id. § 1304(B)(4-A).
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the law governing the protection of natural resources.3 17 The
amendments pertain to the state's rivers and streams, great
ponds, fragile mountain areas, freshwater wetlands, significant
wildlife habitat, coastal wetlands, and coastal sand dunes.318 The
definition of coastal wetlands was expanded to include flat or
other contiguous lowlands subject to tidal action during the maxi-
mum spring tide level as identified by the tide tables published by
the National Ocean Service.3 19 Deleted from the definition of
coastal wetlands were those areas subject to annual storm flowage
at any time, excepting periods of maximum storm activity.3 20 The
definition of freshwater wetlands was expanded to include areas
of ten or more contiguous acres and areas of less than ten contig-
uous acres which are adjacent to a surface body of water.32' This
freshwater wetlands definition excludes any river, stream or
brook whose combined surface area, in a natural state, is in excess
of ten acres, and whose inundated or saturated surface or ground
water is sufficient to support wetland vegetation.3 22 Amendments
to the Lake Restoration and Protection Fund (Fund), also found
under the collection of laws governing the protection of natural
resources, authorizes the Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (DEP) to establish a staffing program to provide information
and guidance for the implementation of local standards for the
protection and restoration of the state's lakes.3 23 DEP is also au-
thorized, in conformity with the regulations establishing the fund,
to develop a program to educate the public about lake restora-
tion. 324 DEP is also obligated, under the regulations establishing
the fund, to encourage research within the state on lake vulnera-
bility to pollution, control of phosphorous pollution in the lakes,
and development of new lake and waterland diagnostic tools.3 25
Amendments were also made to the natural resources laws
with respect to the maintenance and repair of private crossings
317. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-A to 480-S (1964 & West Supp.
1989).
318. Id. § 480-A.
319. Id. § 480-B(2).
320. Id.
321. Id. § 480-B(4)(B). These areas include, but are not limited to, great
ponds, rivers, streams, and brooks. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. § 480-N(l).
324. Id. § 480-N(4). The program shall target school children, and shall
involve extensive use of the media. Id.
325. Id. § 480-N(5)(A),(B), & (C).
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over fragile ecological areas. 326 Such maintenance and repair
measures will be permitted only so long as erosion control meas-
ures are used to prevent sedimentation of the fragile ecological
areas, any repairs or maintenance to crossing do not block fish
from passage through the areas, and any repairs or maintenance
do not amount to an additional intrusion into the fragile area.3 27
In 1989, the Maine legislature also made several amend-
ments to its laws governing the protection and improvement of
air quality.3 28 The 1989 amendments simply required the Board
of Environmental Protection (Board), when establishing emission
standards, to consider the degree of air pollution existing within a
particular region of the state, the length of time necessary to in-
form persons affected by the establishment of these emission
standards of their existence, and the time necessary for persons
affected by these new emission standards to install air pollution
control apparatus to comply with the new emission standards. 329
A major addition to these emission laws included classifica-
tion of incinerators by chamber volume and ability to burn solid
waste. 330 Classification and segregation of human, animal, indus-
trial, and commercial waste for incineration purposes were also
added by the 1989 amendments. 33 ' In addition to classification
requirements, discharges of particulate matter from incinerators,
which result in the soiling of property or in the creation of a nui-
sance condition, was limited to 150 micrograms per cubic meter
for any twenty-four hour period.33 2
Finally, amendments were enacted requiring commercial, in-
dustrial, federal, state, and municipal facilities that contribute to
the discharge of fugitive emissions, to establish and maintain a
continuing program for the management of such emissions dur-
ing any periods of construction, renovation, or normal operation
in order to avoid potential nuisances created by these
326. Id. § 480-Q(2).
327. Id. § 480-Q.2)(A), (B), & (C). Borings of soils or sand dunes adjacent
to a great pond, river, stream, or brook, coastal wetland, freshwater wetland or
sand dune are exempt from provisions found under these laws so long as there
is no permanent harm to the wetland vegetation. Id. § 480-Q( 10). Any practice
of agriculture within the state, however, is not to be considered exempt from the
provisions found in these laws. Id.
328. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 581-610-A (1964 & West Supp. 1989).
329. Id. § 585.
330. Id. § 590-C.
331. Id. § 590-D.
332. Id. § 592-A(l).
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emissions.333
WATER POLLUTION
In Camden & Rockland Water Co. v. Town of Hope,334 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine denied the Zoning Boards of
Appeals of the Town of Hope (town zoning board) the right to
prohibit a company from building a pumping station on a state-
owned great pond.3 3 5 Prior to the town zoning board's denial of
the company's right to build, the company had been granted a
permit by the legislature to construct the pumping station.336
The court found that where prior legislation had expressly
granted a company the right to construct a pumping station, the
town zoning board was precluded from exercising regulatory con-
trol with regard to the manner and extent to which the pumping
station would withdraw water from the pond.3 3 7
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Secure Environments Inc. v. Town of Norridgewock,33 8 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the right of the Board
of Selectmen (Board) of the Town of Norridgewock (Town) to
deny a corporation's applications to construct and operate a se-
cure landfill on property the corporation owned in town.339 The
court found that the corporation failed to comply with criteria set
forth in the town's landfill ordinance. The landfill ordinance re-
quired the corporation to provide adequate technical and finan-
cial capacity to properly construct, operate, maintain, and close
its landfill disposal facility.3 40
The court held that the town ordinance was in compliance
with provisions found in the Maine Hazardous Waste, Septage,
and Solid Waste Management Act (Act).34 1 The court explained
that the Act allowed municipalities to pass ordinances with re-
spect to the regulation of solid waste and septage disposal, pro-
333. Id. § 592-A(2).
334. 543 A.2d 827 (Me. 1988).
335. Id. at 828.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 829. The court also stated that, because the company offered to
minimize the noise pollution emanating from the pump facility, the town zoning
board acted arbitrarily in denying the company's application to build a pumping
station. Id. at 830.
338. 544 A.2d 319 (Me. 1988).
339. Id. at 321.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 322.
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vided that the ordinances were no less stringent than, or
inconsistent with, the regulations found in the Act. 34 2 The court
concluded by finding that the town had the authority to enact
measures that would require the corporation to meet the town's
ordinances before permitting the construction of the site in order
to protect, enhance, and maintain the quality of the
environment. 343
MARYLAND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In May of 1989, the Maryland legislature passed several
amendments to its landfill siting laws.3 44 General provisions re-
lating to notice requirements on hearings conducted by the Mary-
land Secretary of the Department of the Environment
(Secretary)4 5 were amended to include provisions requiring the
landfill applicants to give notice of their applications by certified
mail to the Secretary and to each member of the General Assem-
bly in whose district a landfill system or incinerator will be lo-
cated.M6 The 1989 amendments also require applicants seeking a
permit for a rubble landfill to give notice of the application and
pre-permit hearing before the Department of the Environment
(Department),3 47 by certified mail to the members of the General
Assembly who represent the legislative district in which a rubble
landfill will be located and to owners of real property located ad-
jacent to the proposed site.3 48 Applicants must also post notice
about the pre-permit hearing in a conspicuous place on the pro-
posed landfill site.349
The Secretary is prohibited from issuing a permit for.a rub-
ble landfill unless the county in which the rubble landfill is located
has specified the kinds of waste that may be disposed of in its
342. Id.
343. Id. The court determined that both the regulations adopted in the
town ordinance, and those found in the Maine Site Location and Development
Act, made the construction of a landfill in the town dependent on the financial
capacity of the developer, the traffic flow in and around the site, and the suitabil-
ity of the soil for the construction of a landfill site. Id.
344. MD. ENv'T CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 to 9-278 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
345. The Secretary conducts hearings in order to determine whether an in-
dividual or entity may be permitted to install, alter, or extend a public water
supply, sewage, or refuse disposal system.
346. Id. § 9-209(b)(4).
347. Id. § 9-209(c).
348. Id.
349. Id.
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solid waste management plan.350 An additional regulation on the
landfill renewal applications requires a permit holder to give no-
tice, by certified mail, of the renewal application to each member
of the General Assembly in whose district the landfill system is
located.35'
Amendments were also passed with respect to the siting laws
for storage or disposal of sewage sludge. Applications for per-
mits for the storage or disposal of sewage sludge require a public
hearing conducted by the Department. The hearing must be con-
ducted prior to the granting of a permit to construct or expand a
structure used for the storage or disposal of any type of sewage
sludge.352 If multiple counties and municipal corporations are af-
fected by the granting of a sludge storage permit, the Department
may choose to hold a consolidated hearing among the affected
parties.353
Amendments have also been added to the provisions of the
Maryland siting laws penalizing individuals or corporations that
violate permit restrictions on the disposal and storage of sewage
sludges 4 The Department may penalize any individual or corpo-
ration up to $1000.3 5 5 The sum will vary depending upon the
willfulness of the violators, any actual harm to the environment or
human health, the cost of cleanup and the cost of restoring the
lost natural resources, interference with general welfare, health
and property, the location of harm resulting from the permit vio-
lation, the technology available to eliminate the violation, and the
extent to which the current violation is part of a recurrent pattern
committed by the violator.3 56 If a permit holder fails to correct a
permit violation, each day that the violation goes unchecked will
be treated as a separate and distinct violation for penalty pur-
poses.3 57 A lien will be placed on the property of any permit
holder who fails to pay any accrued penalties to the state of Mary-
land for past permit violations.358 All penalties collected are to
be placed in the Sewage Sludge Utilization Fund. 59
350. Id. § 9-210(b).
351. Id. § 9-213(b)(2).
352. d. § 9-234.1(b).
353. Id. § 9-234.1 (d).
354. Id. § 9-269(b).
355. Id. § 9-269(b)(2)(i) & (ii).
356. Id.
357. Id. § 9-269(b)(3).
358. Id. § 9-269(b)(5)(i).
359. Id. § 9-269(b)(6).
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The 1989 amendments to the siting laws also established the
State Used Tire Cleanup and Recycling Fund (fund).360 The fund
is to be used to remove and recycle used tires form disposal facili-
ties, while implementing measures to restore those natural re-
sources found on the site.3 6' All expenditures used to remedy
violations of siting laws at a particular site are to be paid to the
Department by the owner and operator of the site.362 The reim-
bursement monies go into the fund.3 63 The Attorney General of
the State of Maryland may bring an action to recover costs and
interest from any owner or operator of a tire disposal facility who
fails to make these reimbursements.364
An owner or operator of a used tire disposal facility may ap-
ply to the Secretary of the Department for financial aid in re-
cycling and disposing of used tires to avoid paying a huge lump
sum.3 6 5 If the financial aid requested by the applicant is granted
by the Secretary, it shall be treated as a loan to be repaid by the
applicant within thirty years.3 66
Several amendments to Maryland's water management laws
were passed by the Maryland legislature in 1989. The amend-
ments focused on oil storage in the state 3 67 Included among
these amendments are provisions requiring any owner, operator,
or person in charge of an underground oil storage facility to reg-
ister it with the Department of the Environment (Department).3 68
Upon failure to register, the Department may preclude any sale of
oil from the underground oil facility.3 69 If any registered under-
ground oil storage facility is no longer in use, the owner or opera-
tor of that facility is required to notify the Department of this
occurrence no later than thirty days after its removal or discontin-
360. Id. § 9-273.
361. Id. § 9-275(1).
362. Id. § 9-276(a).
363. Id.
364. Id. § 9-276(b).
365. Id. § 9-277(b). The application will be granted or denied based upon
previous efforts expended by the applicant to correct the problem, the appli-
cant's financial capacity, the problem prevention aspects of the proposed pro-
ject, the cost effectiveness of the proposed project, provisions for monitoring
and review, contribution of the proposed project toward meeting state and local
solid waste plans and goals, and measures to assure accountability of all funds
awarded to the applicant. Id.
366. Id. § 9-278(b)(1) & (2).
367. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. §§ 4-401 to 4-418 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
368. Id. § 4-411.1 (a).
369. Id. § 4-411.1 (b).
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uance.370 The Department is authorized to adopt regulations de-
fining "underground storage facility" and to pursue "any other
measures necessary to regulate the use of underground oilfacilities."-371
Representatives of the Department may at any reasonable
time enter any oil storage facility to inspect the oil storage facility,
to obtain water, oil, or soil samples from the facility, and to mea-
sure the volume and kinds of substances received or stored in the
facility.3 72 Additionally, the Department may enter any property
to assume control of any oil spill if the party responsible for the
spill has not acted promptly to remove the spill or has not under-
taken any measure to rectify the condition.3 73 If a Department
representative is denied entry into the oil storage facility, the Sec-
retary of the Department may seek an injunction to enter the fa-
cility or property.3 74
WA TER POLLUTION
In Department of the Environment v. Showell,3 75 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that the Maryland Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene (Department) had implicit authority to exe-
cute a consent order requiring a landowner to agree to restric-
tions on access to a public sewer system as a condition to the
landowner's receiving of federal funds from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).3 76 A local landowner claimed that the
Department's consent decree constituted a land use restriction on
his property.3 77 The court found that, although the Department
had no express authority to restrict access of a landowner to a
public sewage system, the Secretary of the Department possessed
broad powers to regulate sanitary facilities and initiate pollution
control measures.3 78 Therefore, the court found that the execu-
tion of the consent decree was a valid exercise of the implicit pow-
370. Id. § 4-411.1 (c).
371. Id. § 4-411.1(d).
372. Id. § 4-415.1(a).
373. Id. § 4-415.1(b).
374. Id. § 4-415.1(c).
375. 316 Md. 259, 558 A.2d 391 (1989).
376. Id. at 259, 558 A.2d at 391.
377. Id. at 266, 558 A.2d at 394.
378. Id. at 269, 558 A.2d at 396. Additionally, the court stated that, under
Maryland statutory law, the Department was encouraged to comply with the con-
ditions made by the federal government regarding the acceptance and adminis-
tration of monetary grants. Id. at 271, 558 A.2d at 397.
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ers of the Department to prevent water pollution.3 79
MICHIGAN
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In an effort to encourage recycling and waste reduction pro-
grams, Governor Blanchard signed a measure to provide funding
for these programs on June 29, 1989.380 The bill, (HB 4178),
provides counties with authority to impose a surcharge on house-
holds and multi-dwelling units to fund the recycling and waste
reduction programs.38 ' The surcharge could, in the most ex-
treme case, amount to $25 annually per household.38 2 The bill's
surcharge provisions are, however, subject to a referendum vote,
by which the residents of Michigan may block the bill's passage
into law.3 83
Pursuant to Public Act 148 (Act), signed by Governor
Blanchard on July 6, 1989, three-fourths of the unclaimed money
from deposits on cans and bottles will be placed into a fund for
environmental programs, the remainder to go to retailers.38 4
Under this Act, equal shares of the environmental funds will go
toward toxic waste, solid waste, and a monitoring program for the
cleanup of hazardous waste 38 5 The cleanup money may not,
however, be used for a period of ten years, at which time only the
interest from the fund will be available.38 6 The principle of the
379. Id. The court also rejected assertions made by the landowner that the
consent order amounted to usurpation of the power of local governmental enti-
ties to control non-point source pollution and land use. Id. at 272, 558 A.2d at
397. The court held that the consent order's effect on land use and non-point
source pollution was incidental to the Department's valid regulation of water
pollution within the state. Id. at 272-73, 558 A.2d at 398. The court found that
the consent order did not place any real restrictions on the landowner's use of
his land since he was not precluded from developing his land and installing a
private sewage system. Id.
Finally, the court addressed the landowner's claim that the Department's
decision to execute the consent order was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 272-
73, 558 A.2d at 397-98. The court found that any burden placed on the land-
owner's rights were necessary and reasonable to promote the health and welfare
of the community. Id. at 273, 558 A.2d at 398.
380. Law Allows Counties to Tax Households for Recycling, Waste Reduction Pro-
grams, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 581 (July 21, 1989).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. New Law on Bottle, Can Deposits Reserves Unclaimed Funds for Cleanup, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) 545 (July 14, 1989).
385. Id.
386. Id.
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fund will be left to generate additional income.38 7
Governor Blanchard also signed Public Act 52 (Act) on June
12, 1989, which deals with the disposal of incinerator ash.388 Ma-
jor provisions of the Act provide the following: (1) incinerator
ash is exempted from Michigan's hazardous waste law; (2) a stan-
dard will be set for landfill designs; and, (3) owners are required
to demonstrate their financial responsibility.38 9 This law also
clears the way for incinerators planned by several other Michigan
cities, but does not cover ash from hazardous waste incinera-
tion.390 A number of environmental groups, including the Sierra
Club's Michigan affiliate, have opposed this measure.39 '
The state of Michigan has also established new rules for the
handling and disposal of medical waste.392 The Medical Waste
Emergency Rules were selected on June 1, 1989, over the more
costly federal program.395 The federal program, the result of a
bill (HR 3515) passed by the 100th Congress, is a pilot program
that requires participating states to fill out detailed forms.394
Under the new Michigan rules, all generators of medical waste
must submit their plans for the handling and disposal of the waste
to the State Health Department for review.3 95
AIR POLLUTION
In Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. Province of Ontario v. City of De-
troit,3 9 6 the Canadian government and nonprofit environmental
groups filed actions challenging the defendant's proposed solid
waste combustion facility.3 97 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Environmental Pro-
tection Act (MEPA)398 was not to be deemed federal law since
MEPA was not part of Michigan's State Implementation Plan
387. Id.
388. Municipal Incinerator Ash Disposal Law Clears Way for Startup of Idled Facili-
ties, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 477-78 (June 23, 1989).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. State Establishes Medical Waste Program: Cost Put at One Fourth that of Fed-
eral System, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 336 (June 9, 1989).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989).
397. Id. at 333.
398. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201 to .1207 (West 1987).
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(SIP) under the Clean Air Act (CAA).3 99 Consequently, MEPA
creates "state environmental common law that is unaffected by
federal law." 400
In addition, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's
holding with respect to the CAA's preemptive effect on MEPA.40 '
The Sixth Circuit held that the CAA did not preempt actions
under MEPA; rather, the CAA preempted state law only to the
extent that the CAA was more stringent than state law.40 2 The
Sixth Circuit further held that nonprofit groups were not barred
by the CAA from filing claims under MEPA.403
In a state court of appeals case, Detroit Edison Company v. Mich-
igan Air Pollution Control Commission,40 4 the court held that the Air
Pollution Control Commission had the authority to include
promulgated rules as conditions for permits as long as the rules
did not violate the Air Pollution Control Act.40 5 The court also
held that the authority to include these rules as conditions for
permits did not deny the procedural or due process rights of the
permittees.4 °6
WATER POLLUTION
In Thomas Township v. John Sexton Corp. ,407 one of the issues
before the court was whether a local or a statewide perspective
should be adopted when applying MEPA's impairment stan-
dard. 408 This case focused on the fate of an abandoned clay pit
399. Province of Ontario, 874 F.2d at 341. The court stated that MEPA is not
federal law since: (1) it is not part of the State Implementation Plan; and, (2) it
does not create standards enforceable by the Clean Air Act. Id. The Clean Air
Act is located at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1983 & Supp. V 1987).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Province of Ontario, 874 F.2d at 342.
403. Id. at 342-43. The Sixth Circuit therefore reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit and remanded with
instructions for the district court to remand the action to the state court from
which it had been removed. Id. at 344. The case had reached this point by virtue
of, first, being removed from state court by defendant, City of Detroit and, sec-
ond, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denying plaintiffs'
motion for remand to the state court and granting defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgement. Id. at 333-34. The appeals from both these orders were con-
solidated and held: both improvidently granted. Id.
404. 167 Mich. App. 651, 423 N.W.2d 306 (1988).
405. Id. The Air Pollution Control Act is located at MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 336.11 to .106 (West 1987).
406. Detroit Edison Company, 167 Mich. App. at 661, 423 N.W.2d at 311.
407. 173 Mich. App. 507, 434 N.W.2d 644 (1988).
408. Id. at 516, 434 N.W.2d at 647. The distinction of a statewide versus a
local perspective was outlined in Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Association v. Dion,
42
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss1/7
STATE SYNOPSIS
which had filled with water. The Natural Resources Commission
granted the respondent, the John Sexton Corporation, an Inland
Lakes and Streams Act (ILSA) permit to drain the artificial
lake.409 The court held that the statewide perspective was the
proper perspective when determining whether MEPA properly
prohibited the draining of the lake.4 10
MINNESOTA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In an effort to protect Minnesota's ground water from the
adverse effects of pesticides, Governor Perpich signed a bill, (SF
262), into law on June 2, 1989. 4 11 A major provision of the bill
requires that pesticides be registered with the state before their
use.4 12 In addition, the bill provides for the creation of a fund
financed by pesticide-user fees to address the problems of water
pollution. 4'3
WATER POLLUTION
In City of Morton v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 4 14 the
Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA) validly amended its rules when it im-
posed a two percent limit on grant amendments due to increased
costs for the construction of publicly-owned wastewater treatment
facilities. 415 The MPCA is empowered to grant both federal and
state funds to municipalities for the construction of wastewater
facilities. 41 6 Under MPCA rules, as amended, grant amendments
for increases due to unanticipated site conditions are limited to
114 Mich. App. 495, 507, 320 N.W.2d 668, 673 (1982). The Kimberly Hills court
held that legislative intent was clear that a statewide perspective was necessary.
Id. MEPA's impairment standard is based on Article 4, § 52 of the Michigan
Constitution, which directs the legislature to provide for the protection of the
state's environment from pollution and impairment.
409. Thomas Township, 173 Mich. App. at 509-10, 434 N.W.2d at 645.
410. Id. at 517, 434 N.W.2d at 648. The court cited Kimberly Hills as
controlling.
411. Govenor Signs Ground Water Legislation; Bill Focuses on Agricultural Chemical
Control, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 451-52 (June 6, 1989).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. 437 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
415. Id. at 743. The petitioners in this case were municipalities seeking a
pre-enforcement declaratory action challenging the MPCA's new rule. Id.
416. Id. Municipalities must first apply to the MPCA for financial assist-
ance. Id.
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two percent of the as-bid costs. 417
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In In re Greater Morrison Sanitary Landfill,418 the Court of Ap-
peals of Minnesota held that cities and municipalities could be
held individually liable for costs associated with the closing of
landfills, even though they had withdrawn from the landfill board
before the closure order.419 In this case, a number of cities and
municipalities entered into a joint agreement to create a land-
fill.420 The landfill was managed by a landfill board made up of
one representative from each governmental unit.42' The court,
fearing a "last one out is it" contest,422 held that costs of the clos-
ing of the landfill should have been shared by previous owners
and operators. 423
MISSISSIPPI
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 20, 1988, Governor Mabus signed two significant
pieces of environmental legislation. The first, the Mississippi
Water Pollution Control Revolving Fund Act,424 which went into
effect immediately upon the governor's signature, provides funds
to municipalities for wastewater treatment projects. The funds
are collected in accordance with the federal Clean Water Act
417. Id. The current version of the rule is at MINN. STAT. § 7075.0420(2)
(1987).
418. 435 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
419. Id. at 99-100. The statute authorizing the MPCA to close landfills is at
MINN. STAT. §§ 116.07(40, (4g) (1987). The cities and municipalities in this case
argued that the statute should be construed to require only current owners and
operators to close the landfill. 435 N.W.2d at 94.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 99-100. The court also rejected the cities' and municipalities'
argument that the statutory provisions concerned with the closing of landfills,
MINN. STAT. § 116.07 (40 (1987) and the state Superfund Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 115B.03 (l)(a)(l) (1987) should be construed together in these matters as they
are in par materia. 435 N.W.2d at 97-99. The court held that these two statutes
were not designed to address the same problems and as a result could not be
construed together. Id. The court noted that the landfill closure law was
designed to address landfills and impact only those who owned or operated
landfills. On the other hand, the Superfund Act was designed to address hazard-
ous chemicals and impact primarily those who release or transport such chemi-
cals. Id.
424. SB 2142, codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-81 to -87 (Supp.
1988).
44
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amendments of 1987.425 The second significant piece of legisla-
tion, the Mississippi Underground Storage Tank Act of 1988,426
creates a regulatory program for underground storage tanks and
liability for cleanup costs for those responsible for leaking
tanks. 427
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Pennick v. Mississippi Commission on Natural Resource,428 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the Bureau of Natural Re-
sources (the Bureau) was required to shut down the operation of
a holding pond for creosote runoff because the owner of the
property refused to join the lessee/operator of the property in
signing the application for hazardous waste permits. 42 9 The court
also held that if the plaintiff, as the lessee/operator of the prop-
erty, was unable to obtain a permit to operate the holding pool,
he would be required to pay for any cleanup costs.4 3 0 The court
noted that the state of Mississippi had adopted the federal regula-
tions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through the
Mississippi Hazardous Waste Regulations as amended. Accord-
ingly, the court explained that the owner of the creosote plant
was required to sign the permit.43' Despite findings that the
holding pond had not contaminated the ground water,432 and
that the cleanup costs would put the lessee in bankruptcy, the
court held that the Bureau had to close the operation of the hold-
ing pond. 43 3
MISSOURI
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1989, Missouri made several statutory changes to existing
environmental provisions in the areas of hazardous waste, envi-
425. Governor Signs Legislation to Establish Revolving Loan Fund, Storage Tank
Control, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 104 (May 27, 1988).
426. SB 2857, codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-401 to -433 (Supp.
1988).
427. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 104 (May 27, 1988).
428. 533 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1988).
429. Id. at 181.
430. Id. at 180.
431. Id. at 181. Specifically, section 270 of the Mississippi Hazardous
Waste Act requires the owner of a plant to sign for the permit. Id.
432. Id. at 180. The court found, however, that the pond presented a clear
"potential" for polluting. Id. at 181.
433. Id. at 180.
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ronmental protection, and administration. On June 20, 1989, the
Missouri General Assembly repealed existing statutory hazardous
waste categories, and empowered the Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Commission to formulate a new set of hazardous waste clas-
sifications based on the annual tonnage of waste produced by
individual waste generators.43 4 The new version of the statute
also provided a cap on fees charged to hazardous waste genera-
tors, and enumerated several exceptions from fee require-
ments. 435 All fees collected are to be earmarked for the
hazardous waste remedial fund. 43 6
On June 21, 1989, new sections were added to the new ver-
sion of the statute. These new sections relate to the recycling of
paper and aluminum cans, procurement policies of state agencies,
and restrictions on foam and plastic containers.43 7 Contract spec-
ifications for various paper products will be changed to reflect
higher percentages of recycled paper.438 As of January 1, 1992,
the amendment prohibits the sale or distribution of food or bev-
erage containers made from "polystyrene foam manufactured us-
ing any fully halogenated chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) found by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be an
ozone-depleting chemical." 439
In 1989, the Missouri Emergency Response Commission440
was established pursuant to amendments to existing law, and was
charged with responsibilities over coordination and implementa-
tion of emergency plans and the formation of local emergency
planning districts.44 ' These activities will be funded from the
chemical emergency preparedness fund as well as from other allo-
cations from other government agencies, including the federal
government.442
In 1988, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) developed proposed regulations governing standards for
commercial operations using polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs).443 The proposed regulations encompass contingency
434. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.479 (Supp. 1990).
435. Id. § 260.479, 2-5.
436. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.480 (Supp. 1990).
437. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 34.031-34.034.4 (Supp. 1990).
438. Id. § 34.031 2(2)(a)-(d).
439. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 34.034.1-34.034.4 (Supp. 1990).
440. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 292.602-623 (Supp. 1990).
441. Id. § 292.602.
442. Id. § 292.607, 1-2.
443. PCB Facilities Would Have to Obtain DNR Permit Under Proposed Legislation,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 348 (July 8, 1988).
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planning, waste analysis, financial and recordkeeping concerns,
protection of groundwater, tank systems, and incinerators. 4 "
On May 5, 1988, Missouri GovernorJohn D. Ashcroft signed
legislation requiring treatment of infectious waste using the best
available technology and extending the hazardous waste category
tax funding of the state superfund through 1995.445 The new law
also provides that the Department of Natural Resources must re-
view and approve transport routes for new hazardous waste
facilities.4 6
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
With regard to hazardous waste disposal plans, in Mertzlufft v.
Bunker Recycling & Reclamation, Inc. ,447 the plaintiffs sought to en-
join the operation of an infectious waste incinerator without the
necessary state permits. Appeals followed the circuit court's
granting of a permanent injunction and denying of attorneys'
fees. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District
held that local residents had standing to seek equitable relief in
the form of an injunction under the Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Law,4 8 that the local residents were not required to prove
irreparable harm, and that a separate preliminary injunction
against the Department of Natural Resources did not render the
present action moot.449 Finally, the court of appeals held
mandatory the award of attorneys' fees. 450
TOXIC TORTS
Concerning biological injuries received from exposure to
toxic chemicals, in Elam v. Alcolac,4 5 1 toxic emissions from a chem-
ical plant formed the basis for a number of claims by local resi-
dents alleging biological injuries caused by toxic chemicals. 452
The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs after which the circuit
court denied the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, but granted a new trial concerning the award of
444. Id.
445. Law Requires Treatment of Infectious Waste, Exten& Tax Financing State
Superfund to 1995, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 49 (May 13, 1988).
446. Id.
447. 760 S.W.2d. 592 (Mo. App. 1988).
448. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.350-260.434 (1986).
449. 760 S.W.2d at 599-600.
450. Id. at 600-02.
451. 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1988).
452. Id. at 49-50.
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compensatory and punitive damages for negligence claims. 453
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held that
the jury finding that toxic emissions emanating from the plant
were the legal cause of the plaintiffs' injuries was supported by
the evidence, that the trial court correctly ruled on the evidentiary
questions with the exception of the impermissible admission of
evidence regarding chemically-induced AIDS syndrome, and that
punitive damages were a question for resolution by the jury.454
LAND USE
In Green Acres Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. State,455 the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Western District held that the establish-
ment, maintenance, and management of wildlife areas were not
an unreasonable use of the State's constitutional authority, and
that it did not constitute an unreasonable use of land or the main-
tenance of a nuisance. 456 The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
missal of plaintiff landowners' petition against the state seeking
damages for the inverse condemnation of crops as a result of the
establishment and maintenance of wildlife areas. 457 The court
reasoned that the damage on the plaintiffs' land caused by the
foraging of wild birds from the wildlife preserve was insufficient
to state a cause of action.458 Moreover, the court of appeals
found that the inverse condemnation claim was insupportable
with respect to the state-owned wildlife management areas be-
cause the state exercised no control over the plaintiffs' land. 459
MONTANA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1989, Montana enacted the Wastewater Treatment Re-
volving Fund Act (Act) which serves as enabling legislation for the
implementation of federal Clean Water Act requirements. 46° The
Act provides financial assistance to local governments and private
453. Id.
454. Id. at 229-30.
455. 766 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. App. 1988).
456. Id. at 652.
457. Id. at 650.
458. Id. at 652.
459. Id. at 651-52.
460. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-1101 to 1122 (1989). The necessity for
state revolving funds is dictated by the terms of the federal Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1387 (West Supp. 1989).
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enterprises for the cost of wastewater treatment works.46' Also in
1989, the Montana Hazardous Waste Act was amended and re-
titled the Montana Hazardous Waste and Underground Storage
Tank Act (Act). 462 The amendment of the Act ensured, inter alia,
that petroleum products and hazardous substances stored in un-
derground tanks would be subject to state regulation.463 Addi-
tionally, corrective action for hazardous waste management
facility permit compliance was expanded to include releases be-
yond facility boundaries. 64 Inspections by the Department of
Health and Environmental Sciences pursuant to the recent
amendment may now be made upon reasonable suspicion of non-
compliance with storage regulations. 465
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
In Butte-Silver Bow Local Government v. State,4c6 the Montana
Supreme Court held that the Resource Indemnity Trust Act
(RITA)4 6 7 did not violate the reclamation section 468 of the Envi-
ronmental and Natural Resources Article of the State Constitu-
tion. 469 The Supreme Court found that the language of the
reclamation section did not restrict the use of RITA funds to the
reclamation of lands as a matter of statutory construction.470 As a
461. Id. § 75-5-1103 (1989).
462. Id. § 75-10-401 to 451 (1989).
463. Id. § 75-10-402 (3) (1989).
464. Id. § 75-10-406 (7) (1989).
465. Id. § 75-10-410 (1)(a)(i) (1989).
466. 768 P.2d 327 (1989).
467. Montana Resource Indemnity Trust Act, MONr. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-
101 to 203 (1989). RITA was enacted to set up a permanent resource indemnity
trust funded by a mineral extraction tax to indemnify Montana citizens for the
long-term depletion of the state's mineral resource base and environmental
damage from mining activities. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-38-102 (1989).
468. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 2. The reclamation section of the Environ-
mental and Natural Resources Article states that: "All lands disturbed by the
taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed. The legislature shall provide ef-
fective requirements and standards for the reclamation of lands disturbed."
MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(1).
469. 768 P.2d 327, 330-31 (1989). The Montana Supreme Court also held
that registered voters and taxpayers had standing to question the constitutional-
ity of RITA and the use of trust funds, and that original jurisdiction require-
ments of the Supreme Court were met. Id. at 329. The Supreme Court further
held that the statute permitted allocations to programs other than reclamation,
and expenditures made did not contravene the provision excluding general op-
erating expenses from allocation. Id. at 331.
470. Id. at 330-31. Subsection (2) of the reclamation section of the Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources Article simply stated that: "The legislature shall
provide for a fund, to be known as the resource indemnity trust of the state of
Montana, to be funded by such taxes on the extraction of natural resources as
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result, appropriations made for general operating expenses to the
Department of State Lands, the Department of Livestock, and the
Department of Natural Resources in the 1987 biennium were per-
missible uses of RITA funds. 47'
NEBRASKA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As of July 1, 1989, an amendment to the Wastewater Treat-
ment Operator Certification Act4 7 2 went into effect.4 73 The
amendment provides for appeal from decisions of the Director of
Environmental Control by any person, in accordance with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.4 74  Another act, the Wastewater
Treatment Facilities Construction Assistance Act, became effec-
tive on August 25, 1989.4 7 5 The essential purpose of this act is to
provide local governments with financial incentives in the form of
low-interest loans in order to stimulate the undertaking of waste-
water treatment projects in local areas. 476 A cash fund, known as
the Wastewater Treatment Facilities Construction Loan Fund, has
been created to satisfy the water pollution control revolving fund
requirement 4 7 7 of the federal Clean Water Act.4 7 8 Loan eligibility
is available for: "[slecondary treatment and appurtenances; infil-
tration and inflow correction; major sewer system rehabilitation;
the legislature may from time to time impose for that purpose." MONT. CONST.
art. IX, § 2(2). The Supreme Court noted that subsection (3) merely limited the
use of trust principal to the extent of $100 million, and did not foreclose alterna-
tive uses of trust income or principal over and above the protected amount. 768
P.2d at 331.
471. Id. at 332. The Supreme Court held that use of RITA funds for the
operation of programs designed to improve the total environment did not con-
stitute violations of fiduciary trust responsibilities. Id.
472. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-15, 128 to 81-15, 143 (1987).
473. NEB. REV. STAT § 81-15, 142 (Supp. 1988).
474. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-15, 142 (1987). The definitions section of the
Act states that "director" refers to the Director of Environmental Control. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-15, 129 (4) (1987).
475. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-15, 147 to 81-15, 158 (Supp. 1989).
476. Id. at 148.
477. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381-87 (West Supp. 1989). Under the federal Clean
Water Act the federal government is responsible for making "capitalization
grants to each State for the purpose of establishing a water pollution control
revolving fund" for construction of publicly-owned treatment works, implemen-
tation of nonpoint source management programs, and development and imple-
mentation of national estuary programs. 33 U.S.C. § 1381 (a) (West Supp.
1989). Monies held by the state water pollution revolving funds will be made
available to eligible municipal, intermunicipal, interstate, or State agencies. 33
U.S.C. § 1383 (c) (West Supp. 1989).
478. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1986).
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new collector sewers and appurtenances; new interceptors and
appurtenances; and correction of combined sewer overflows." 479
NEW HAMPSHIRE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In K W Thompson Tool Co. v. United States,480 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the discretionary
function exception 48 ' applied to the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity under the Federal Tort Claims Act.4 8 2 This decision enabled
the plaintiff, a firearms manufacturer, to sue the United States for
alleged violations committed by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). 483 The plaintiff was subject to regulations under
the Clean Water Act (Act)4 8 for the discharges made in the
course of its manufacturing process. The plaintiff was sued by
EPA for criminal violation of the Act. The plaintiff alleged that:
1) EPA failed to properly train and supervise EPA personnel; 2)
EPA failed to use valid scientific data in issuing National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits for discharges; and, 3)
EPA breached its duty to follow EPA policy by prosecuting the
plaintiff criminally rather than civilly. 48 5
The court stated that the only mandatory duty imposed on
479. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15, 154 (Supp. 1989).
480. 836 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1988).
481. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Supp. V 1987). The discretionary function ex-
ception states that sovereign immunity applies to:
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
ernment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regula-
tion, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
Id.
This application of sovereign immunity is an exception to the waiver of 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b).
482. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. V 1987). The Federal Tort Claims Act allows
suit to be brought against the Federal Government:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting in the scope of his office of employment, under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
Id.
483. K W. Thompson Tool Co., 836 F.2d at 727-28.
484. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1369 (1982).
485. K. W Thompson Tool Co., 836 F.2d at 727.
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EPA by the Act was that comprehensive programs be developed
in order to control water pollution. The court also noted that
EPA had wide discretion in determining how to develop and ad-
minister water pollution control programs. 48 6 The court ex-
plained that EPA policy statements were intended as flexible
general guidelines, and that the decision to prosecute was within
EPA's discretion. The court determined that if it were to involve
itself in the agency's decision to prosecute, it would be "trespass-
ing on an executive function." 48 7
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,4s8 New Hampshire
joined forces with the Environmental Defense Fund to compel the
EPA Administrator to promulgate revised National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for sulphur oxides.48 9 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the EPA Administrator
did not have a nondiscretionary duty enforceable in district court
to revise NAAQS for sulphur oxides. The Second Circuit did,
however, state that the district court had jurisdiction to compel
the EPA Administrator to take some formal action. 49°
The Second Circuit determined further that subsection (d) of
section 7409 of the Clean Air Act, 49' which requires the EPA Ad-
ministrator to review published criteria for pollutants and to pro-
mulgate new standards for pollutants every five years, was not to
be read as imposing a mandatory duty on the EPA Administrator,
nor was it to be read in conjunction with the clearly mandatory
language of subsection (a) of section 7409 of the Clean Air Act.4 92
The court concluded by finding that the section 7409(d) lan-
guage "as may be appropriate," was discretionary and governed
all of section 7409(d), while interpreting the language of "shall"
in section 7409(d) to mean that the district court had jurisdiction
to order the EPA Administrator to make some formal decision
regarding revision of NAAQS. 493
In Massachusetts v. United States,494 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that a Nuclear Regulatory Com-
486. Id. at 728.
487. Id. at 729.
488. 870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1989).
489. d. at 894.
490. Id.
491. 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
492. The language of § 7409(d) states that: "the Administrator shall com-
plete a thorough review of the criteria published ... and promulgate such new
standards as may be appropriate ...... 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (1982).
493. Thomas, 870 F.2d at 898. 42 U.S.C § 7409(a) (1982).
494. 856 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1988).
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mission (NRC) regulation which allowed licensing of a nuclear
power facility under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was not unrea-
sonable.495 The regulation was challenged because it did not re-
quire state and local governments to participate in developing the
radiological emergency plan required in the event of a disaster
under the AEA. 496 The court explained that the AEA did not
condition issuance of a license by the NRC exclusively on the
existence of a state or local emergency plan.4 9 7 The court
deemed reasonable the NRC's issuance of a license based on a
theory that state and local officials who refused to cooperate in
developing a local emergency plan would ultimately cooperate
with whatever plan was in place in the event of an emergency. 498
AIR POLLUTION
In In re City of Berlin,499 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
ruled on an administrative determination made by the State Air
Resources Council stating that a manufacturer was entitled to
statutory tax exemptions for "any treatment facility, device, appli-
ance, or installation" which had the purpose of* "reducing, con-
trolling, or eliminating any source of air or water pollution." 500
The same statute allowed similar tax exemptions for "any real es-
tate necessary" to carry out the reduction of any source of air or
water pollution.50' The court held that the manufacturer's con-
struction of a bark-burning boiler, which did not emit sulphur di-
oxide pollution, did not come within the purview of the statute
because no "treatment" was undertaken. 502 The court distin-
guished between the use of manufacturing processes that did not
pollute and those that actually "treat[ed]" existing pollutants. 50 3
The court then turned its attention to the manufacturer's tall
stacks. The court held that the manufacturer's tall stacks did
495. Id. at 383. The Atomic Energy Act is located at 42 U.S.C. § 2011
(1954). The specific section referred to by the court was section 2201(i)(3). Id.
496. Id. at 380.
497. Id. at 383.
498. Id. This theory is referred to as the "realism doctrine." Id. The court
determined that it was not unreasonable for the NRC to presume that state and
local governments, despite misgivings about the adequacy of a utility plan
would, in the event of an emergency at the plant, follow the only viable emer-
gency plan. d.
499. 131 N.H. 285, 553 A.2d 758 (1988).
500. Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:12-a (Supp. 1988)).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 288, 553 A.2d at 761.
503. Id.
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qualify under the statute for exemption from property taxes. 5°4
The court stated that the use of tall stacks was sufficiently similar
to the use of a discharge tunnel to control thermal discharge pol-
lution, which was already deemed eligible for tax exemption
under the statute.5 05
ZONING
In Rowe v. Town of North Hampton,50 6 the plaintiff appealed
from the denial of an application for a variance from the town's
wetlands ordinance. The plaintiff alleged that denial of the vari-
ance would result in unnecessary hardship because alternative
uses for the land were not economically viable.50 7 The court set
forth five requirements508 which the applicant had to satisfy in or-
der to obtain a variance pursuant to the statute.50° The court
stated that the plaintiff had failed to establish that a denial of the
variance would result in unnecessary hardship to her.510 The
court found that the financial situation of the applicant did not
determine whether a hardship existed, rather the court stated that
the hardship was determined by the uniqueness of the land.51'
Because the plaintiff failed to prove that construction of a house
and septic tank system on this land would not adversely affect its
wetland status, construction was precluded by the local wetlands
ordinance.5 1 2
The court also addressed the plaintiff's contention that de-
nial of the variance was an unconstitutional taking, and that the
wetlands restrictions substantially deprived her of an economical
use of her land.5 1 3 In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court ex-
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. 131 N.H. 424, 553 A.2d 1331 (1989).
507. Id. at 426, 553 A.2d at 1334.
508. Id. at 427, 553 A.2d at 1333. The five requirements set forth by the
court were:
1) that a denial of the variance would result in unnecessary hardship to
the applicant;
2) that no diminution in value of surrounding properties would occur;
3) that the proposed use would not be contrary to the spirit of the
ordinance;
4) that granting the variance would benefit the public interest; and,
5) that granting the variance would do substantial justice.
Id.
509. Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674.33 (b)).
510. Id. at 431, 553 A.2d at 1336.
511. Id. at 429, 553 A.2d at 1334.
512. Id. at 432, 553 A.2d at 1336.
513. Id. at 426, 553 A.2d at 1332.
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plained that the test to determine whether a taking had occurred
was "whether the property owner ha[d] made a showing that the
regulation thwart[ed] her substantial, justified expectations con-
cerning the property and whether the burden the government ac-
tion cast upon the property owner was unreasonably onerous." 5 1 4
The court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff
had no "substantial or justified expectation" regarding the prop-
erty when it was purchased because there were laws in effect at
the time that indicated a strong public policy for protecting wet-
lands. 515 Further, the court explained that the land would still
have value even if construction were not permitted, and the fact
that the land would not be worth as much without the variance
did not make the statute unconstitutional as to the plaintiff.51 6
FORESTRY
In Town of Wolfeboro v. Smith,517 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court interpreted the grandfather clause of a statute5 l8 which re-
quired landowners to obtain permits before their property could
be excavated. The court set forth a three-pronged test that the
landowners had to meet in order for an excavation to qualify
under the grandfather clause: 1) the excavation had to have been
actively pursued by the landowners at the time when the law re-
quiring permits became effective; 2) there must have been an ob-
jective manifestation of the landowner's intent to excavate the
area prior to the enactment of the permit law; and, 3) that contin-
ued excavation would not have had a substantially different and
adverse impact on the neighborhood.5 1 9 The court concluded
that the landowners in this case failed to show that the intent to
excavate existed prior to the imposition of the permit require-
ment and therefore, the excavators did not meet their burden of
514. Id. at 430, 553 A.2d at 1335.
515. Id. at 431, 553 A.2d at 1336.
516. Id.
517. 131 N.H. 449, 556 A.2d 755 (1989).
518. Id. at 452, 556 A.2d at 757 (citing 1979 N.H. LAws 481:3). This grand-
father clause provides that:
(a]ny owner of an existing excavation in use as of the effective date of
this act [Aug. 24, 1979] and which is subject to this act may continue
such existing excavation without a permit but shall perform restoration
in compliance with RSA 155-E:5 within a reasonable period following
the intended cessation of the excavation or any completed section
thereof.
Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-E (1977)).
519. Id. at 457, 556 A.2d at 759.
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proof.520
NEW JERSEY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988 (Act) makes it illegal to
dump sewage, sludge or industrial waste into the ocean after De-
cember 31, 1991.521 In order to ensure compliance with the Act,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began to issue per-
mits which worked to limit the amount and type of sewage, sludge
or industrial waste that could legally be disposed of in the
ocean. 522 In addition to issuing permits, EPA is in the process of
negotiating with each dumper to phase out ocean dumping, to
replace ocean dumping with interim disposal methods, and to ul-
timately establish an alternative plan for long-term disposal. 523
The Act imposes penalties, starting at $600 per dry ton, for
dumping beyond the deadline. 524
In March 1989, six New Jersey dumpers broke off negotia-
tions with EPA and filed a lawsuit. 52 5 The lawsuit challenged
EPA's authority to require the dumpers to implement a long-term
alternative to ocean dumping by December 31, 1991 in order to
avoid paying dumping fees. The dumpers argued that they
should have been allowed to waive the dumping fees because they
would have ceased ocean dumping by 1991. EPA stood by its re-
quirement that in order to qualify for a waiver the dumpers must
have had a long-term alternative by December 3, 1991. The EPA
did, however, stipulate that all fees would be returned if the
dumper in fact did reach the 1991 deadline.52 6
In another matter New Jersey Representative Guy Molinari
520. Id. at 457, 556 A.2d at 760.
521. 33 U.S.C. § 1414b(a) (1988).
522. On May 16, 1989, an EPA official made an announcement that the
discharge rates for ocean dumping would be reduced significantly under tenta-
tive, permits negotiated by EPA and nine New York and New Jersey ocean dump-
ers of sewage sludge. Terms of New Ocean Dumping Permits Would Mean Lower Rates,
EPA Official Says, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 144 (May 19, 1989).
523. Id. Two bills introduced in the House, HR 1469 and HR 1281, would
impose even tougher penalties under the Act. Id. Some of the proposed alter-
natives included watering, out-of-state landfilling, or incineration as interim al-
ternatives. All five New Jersey dumpers proposed to use incineration as their
long-term solution. Three New York dumpers plan to sell their dewatered
sludge and have yet to decide on a long-term alternative. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. The April 19th lawsuit was Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v.
Reilly, No. C-89-1670 (D.NJ. filed April 19, 1989).
526. Id.
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issued a report in April 1989 detailing toxic chemical releases re-
ported by manufacturers in northeastern New Jersey for 1987.
The report also called for a stronger focus on environmental pro-
tection programs, pollution prevention, and research dealing with
the effects of toxic chemicals on human health.5 2 7 Molinari's re-
port was based on 1,200 toxic release inventory reports filed
under section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act.52 8
According to the report, nearly 14.5 million pounds of toxic
chemicals were released into the air, 39.6 million pounds released
into water, 41 million pounds transferred to publicly owned treat-
ment works, and 54 million pounds shipped offsite.5 2 9 Molinari
said that "these statistics show that the area studied must be con-
sidered one of the most severely stressed in the United States in
terms of toxic pollution and that its population should be consid-
ered one of the most at risk from such pollutants.-5 3 0
On May 1, 1989, the New Jersey Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (DEP) proposed the classification of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) as hazardous waste.5 3 ' DEP's
intention was to cover any inadequacies in current federal
regulations. 532
DEP stated that "Itihe listing of PCBs as a hazardous waste
will require generators, transporters, servicing/recycling compa-
nies, and transfer, storage, and disposal facilities that accumulate
or dispose of PCB hazardous waste to comply with state hazard-
ous waste rules, which will protect against both accidental and de-
liberate release of PCBs into the environment.-5 33 The economic
impact of the new regulations is predicted to be "moderate" ac-
527. Report Details Emissions in New Jersey, Calls for Stronger Environmental Pro-
tection, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 163 (May 19, 1989).
528. Id. Molinari's report consisted of studies of 296 facilities in five New
Jersey counties. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. 21 N.J. REG. 1047 (proposed May 1, 1989). This proposal would also
subject PCBs to stringent controls on transportation, storage, and disposal. Dis-
posal of the PCB compounds in landfills would be banned. Id. at 1048.
532. Id. at 1048-50. Noting that federal regulations under the 1976 Toxic
Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1988)) exempt generators of
small quantities of PCBs, DEP stated that there would be no such exemption in
the proposed state regulation, and that "[aill quantities of wastes containing
PCBs at concentrations at or above 50 ppm would be fully regulated as hazard-
ous waste." Id.
533. Classification of PCBs as Hazardous Waste, Stringent Storage, Disposal Controls
Proposed, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 208-09 (June 2, 1989).
1990]
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cording to the DEP.534
EPA approved New Jersey and New York regulations limiting
the volatility of gasoline sold in those states during the summer
months. 535 The purpose of this regulation is to limit volatile or-
ganic compound emissions from gasoline, which contribute to
ozone formation.5 36 Both regulations were scheduled to take ef-
fect between June 30 and September 15, 1989.537
AIR POLLUTION
In American Petroleum Institute v. New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection,538 the Superior Court of New Jersey decided a
case which dealt with recent regulations promulgated by the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The reg-
ulations prescribed an implementation schedule for stage II vapor
recovery systems. 53 9 American Petroleum Institute challenged
the validity of DER's regulations arguing that: 1) the new regula-
tions were "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable"; and, 2) the
implementation schedule prescribed in the regulations was not
supported by the record.O4°
The court sustained the validity of DER's regulations after an
examination of the legislative history of the regulations. The
court held that the regulations were consistent with the purpose
and intent of the legislature.I 4 1
534. Id.
535. Fuel Volatility Rules Approved for NJ, NY, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 480 (June
23, 1989). The states were limited to 9.0 pounds per square inch Reid vapor
pressure. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. 230 N.J. Super. 563, 554 A.2d 3 (1989).
539. Stage II Vapor Recovery requirements are set forth in N.J. ADMIN.
CODE at 7:27-16.3(): "[tjransfer of gasoline into vehicular fuel tanks (must) be
performed using a vapor control system... designed, operated and maintained
to prevent VOS [volatile organic substance] emissions to the outside atmos-
phere.., and to prevent overfilling of vehicular fuel tanks and spillage." Id. at
565, 554 A.2d at 4.
540. Id. at 566-67, 554 A.2d at 5.
541. The legislative history stressed the need for such a regulation given
the volatility of the pollutants that would be released absent such regulation.
The legislative history focused primarily on the effect the regulations would
have on limiting the deterioration of atmospheric ozone. It was also noted that
twenty-six states had already seen fit to pass similar regulations to capture gaso-
line vapors which had been forced out of the tanks of vehicles. Id. at 566, 554
A.2d at 4.
The court also stressed the purpose of the Stage II Vapor Recovery Pro-
gram and the need to regulate VOS emissions to achieve the program's goal of
attaining the National Ambient Air Quality Standard. Finally, the court rejected
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WATER POLLUTION
The Superior Court of New Jersey ruled on the issues of
stream encroachment permits and temporary solid waste facility
permits in In re Stream Encroachment Permit. 542 In the case the court
held that the State Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) was not acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably by
granting stream encroachment permits for a resource recovery fa-
cility. The court stated that DEP had properly relied on "exten-
sive studies over a long period of years" showing that no feasible
alternative site was available. 54 3 The court further held that
DEP's authority for granting such permits was within the legisla-
tive framework and criteria for such matters. 544
The court also held that the issuance of temporary solid
waste permits prior to disclosure statement approval was not pro-
hibited by New Jersey's Solid Waste Management Act54 5 because
the record was sufficient to support a DEP conclusion that the
corporation had been rehabilitated. 54 6
NEW MEXICO
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1988, the New Mexico legislature amended its Air Quality
Control Act s4 7 to permit local governing bodies to license private
vehicle emissions inspection and testing stations5 4s Subsequent
to the amendments, both the city of Albuquerque and the sur-
American Petroleum's argument that the regulation was not supported by the
record of public hearings. Id. at 566-67, 554 A.2d at 5.
542. 231 NJ. Super. 443, 555 A.2d 1123 (1989).
543. Id. at 455, 555 A.2d at 1128.
544. Id. at 459, 555 A.2d at 1131.
545. NJ. STAT. ANN. 13:IE - 133(d).
546. Stream Encroachment, 231 N.J. Super. at 455-63, 555 A.2d at 1127-29.
Throughout the opinion, the court stressed that its review of the action of the
administrative agency had to be limited. The court followed the basic principle
of deference to the Agency unless it found that the Agency determination (in
this case regarding the issuance of permits) was arbitrary, capricious, and unrea-
sonable. Id.
547. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-2-1 to 74-217 (1978).
548. Sanctions Imposed in 1985 Lifted After Albuquerque Reinstates I/M Program,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1117 (Sept. 30, 1988). The Albuquerque area of New Mex-
ico has had some of the most severe carbon monoxide problems in the country,
caused to a large extent by vehicle emissions. Id. In 1985, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) imposed sanctions when the city of Albuquerque and
surrounding Bernalillo County terminated their emissions inspection and test-
ing programs. Id. The program was dropped in 1984 when the New Mexico
Superior Court ruled that local governments lacked the power to charge fees for
inspections at stations operated by local governments. Id.
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rounding Bernalillo County made plans to implement inspection
and monitoring (I/M) requirements for vehicle emissions.M9
EPA quickly responded to the new requirements by lifting prior
sanctions imposed upon New Mexico, including the denial of fed-
eral air quality assistance funds and the potential loss of federal
highway construction funds.550
In March 1989, New Mexico Governor Garrey Carruthers ve-
toed comprehensive waste legislation passed by the state legisla-
ture. 55 1 The law was intended to tighten the state's landfill
regulations and would have mandated, for waste generated by
other states, recycling and fees for dumping garbage in New Mex-
ico. 55 2 A day after vetoing this legislation, the Governor an-
nounced a one-year moratorium on opening new landfills in the
state. 553 Nevertheless, New Mexico remains the only state which
does not require the licensing of landfills.M
On March 30, 1989, the New Mexico legislature enacted the
Hazardous Chemicals Information Act. 555 This statute "codifies
federal reporting requirements into state law, authorizes enforce-
ment of the requirements and mandates a fee system to help fund
the program.- 556 The new law, which became effective on July 1,
1989, incorporates the reporting requirements under the Emer-
gency Planning and Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). 557 The statute
further authorizes civil penalties of up to $5000 for willful non-
compliance with any of the reporting requirements and creates
the Hazardous Chemicals Information Management Fund to help
finance state management of data submitted in compliance with
the law. 5 58
New Mexico received a $1.1 million grant to finance the reg-
ulation and reclamation expenses of the state's abandoned mine
lands and surface coal mine programs for one year beginning
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Governor Vetoes Solid Waste Bill, Imposes Moratorium on New Landfills, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2524 (Mar. 24, 1989).
552. Id.
553. Id. at 2525.
554. See State Looks at Municipal Waste Regulations to Stave Off Flow of Out-of-
State Garbage, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1506 (Nov. 25, 1988).
555. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4E-1 to -9 (1989).
556. Id.
557. See Governor Signs Title III Measure Codifying EPCRA Reporting Require-
ments, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2610 (Apr. 14, 1989). The EPCRA is also known as
Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).
558. Id. at 2611.
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June 30, 1988.559 The grant, funded by a combination of Interior
Department appropriations and abandoned mine land funds, was
divided between New Mexico's abandoned mine lands cleanup
program and the inspection and enforcement program for active
surface mines. 560
NEW YORK
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1988, New York enacted a Solid Waste Management Act
which established solid waste management priorities as follows:
(a) first, to reduce the amount of solid waste generated;
(b) second, to reuse material for the purpose for which it was
originally intended or to recycle material that cannot be
reused;
(c) third, to recover, in an environmentally acceptable man-
ner, energy from solid waste that can not [sic] be economi-
cally and technically reused or recycled; and
(d) fourth, to dispose of solid waste that is not being reused,
recycled or from which energy is not being recovered, by
land burial or other methods approved by the department. 56'
This legislation clearly sets forth a state policy of reducing
and recycling waste where possible and of providing adequate
and safe disposal for waste which cannot be eliminated or
recycled.M2
In September 1988, New York enacted legislation which set
strict penalties for the illegal release of infectious waste into the
environment. 56s In addition to the penalties, $2 million was ap-
propriated for the vigorous enforcement of New York's laws per-
taining to the storage, treatment, and disposal of infectious
waste. 56
In April 1989, the largest fine to date for pollutant discharge
permit violations under New York's Water Resources Law565 was
levied against Deutsch Relays Incorporated. 56 The Department
559. New Mexico Receives $1.1 Million Grant, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 280 (June
24, 1988).
560. Id.
561. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-0106 (McKinney 1988).
562. See Id.
563. See Cuomo Signs Two Infectious Waste Bills With Criminal, Civil Penalties for
Violations, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 997 (Sept. 16, 1988).
564. Id.
565. N.Y. EwNvL. CO]SERV. LAw §§ 15-0101 to -2723 (McKinney 1984).
566. New York Agency Imposes $1 Million Penalty, Orders Study at Contaminated
1990] 305
61
Editors: Synopsis of Environmental Law in the States
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
306 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. I: p. 245
of Environmental Conservation (DEC) ordered the company, to
pay a $1.05 million fine for illegally discharging waste water on
874 occasions. 567 The company was also ordered to perform a
remedial investigation and feasibility study of the contaminated
site and to post a $1 million bond in order to guarantee that the
site was cleaned up.56
In June 1989, the EPA approved New York's stringent reduc-
tion in its fuel volatility standard to nine pounds per square
inch.569 This standard is in effect for all gasoline sold during the
summer months and is intended to limit volatile organic com-
pound emissions from gasoline, thus helping to prevent local
ozone formation. 570
In 1989, revisions were made to the state's hazardous waste
regulatory program which included closure and remedial require-
ments and definitions of hazardous waste. 57'
Also in 1989, four bills were enacted to protect New York's
beaches, tidal wetlands, and other water resources. 572 First, the
legislature created a state revolving loan fund which will receive
federal grants under the Federal Water Quality Act of 1987.573
Pursuant to this law, New York will be expected to receive $1 bil-
lion in federal funds by 1994 for sewage treatment plants.57 4 Sec-
ond, the legislature created the Clean Oceans Fund to collect
federal penalties assessed against local governments in New York
for failure to meet the 1992 deadline for the cessation of ocean
dumping of sewer sludge.5 75 Third, a bill was enacted to estab-
lish a comprehensive state system for the regulation and tracking
of medical wastes. 576 Finally, the state enacted a statute to pro-
vide greater protection of tidal wetlands through more efficient
administrative methods and tougher enforcement measures, in-
Long Island Site, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 160 (May 19, 1989) (citing In re Deutsch
Relays Inc., NYDEC, No. 1-1388, Apr. 13, 1989).
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Fuel Volatility Rules Approved for N.J., N. Y, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 480
(June 23, 1989).
570. Id.
571. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 27-1003-1313 (McKinney 1989).
572. Cuomo Signs Sewage Treatment Loan Bill, Measure on Medical Waste, Oceans,
Wetlands, 20 Env't Rep. 669 (Aug. 11, 1989).
573. Id. (citing 1989 N.Y. LAws 565).
574. Id.
575. Id. (citing 1989 N.Y. LAws 564).
576. Id. (citing 1989 N.Y. LAws 180).
62
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss1/7
STATE SYNOPSIS
cluding higher fines and permit fees. 57 7
AIR POLLUTION
In Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Department of Environ-
mental Conservation,578 the Long Island Lighting Company
(LILCO) appealed the Albany Supreme Court's dismissal of its
request to compel DEC to hold hearings on LILCO's application
for authorization to use higher sulfur content fuel at its electric
generating facilities. 579 In affirming the lower court's decision,
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that
LILCO's request was not an application for a special fuel allow-
ance permit under the Uniform Procedures Act, but rather a re-
quest to initiate a rule change. 5 0 The Appellate Court noted that
the DEC was "under no legal obligation to initiate a rule change
simply at the request of a regulated party" since the DEC has dis-
cretionary power to provide special fuel allowances. 58' In addi-
tion, the court stated that there was adequate evidence to support
DEC's refusal to approve higher sulfur content limits at the Long
Island Lighting Company's facilities because LILCO was able to
maintain operations, "albeit under more stringent fuel
limitations." 582
WA TER POLLUTION
In Industrial Liaison Committee of the Niagara Falls Area Chamber
of Commerce v. Williams,583 the New York Court of Appeals upheld
DEC's amended ambient water quality standards, which had been
challenged by an association of industrial dischargers known as
the Industrial Liaison Committee. 58 4 The court based its decision
on a finding that DEC, in promulgating the revised standards, had
satisfied statutory requirements for public notice, meaningful
comment and opportunity to be heard.585 According to the court
577. Id. (citing 1989 N.Y. LAws 666).
578. 145 A.D.2d 70, 537 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1989).
579. Id. at 71, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
580. Id. at 73, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 928. Uniform Procedures Act provides for
authorization of permits not for legislative rule making.
581. Id. at 73, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
582. Id. at 73, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
583. 72 N.Y.2d 137, 527 N.E.2d 274, 531 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1988).
584. Id. at 146, 527 N.E.2d at 278, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 795. These standards
are used to determine effluent limitations for permits issued under the State
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES). N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 17-0801 to -0829 (McKinney 1984).
585. Williams, 72 N.Y.2d at 143, 527 N.E.2d at 276, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
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DEC was not acting arbitrarily or capriciously when it made a de-
termination under the State Environmental Quality Preview Act
(SEQRA), ignoring speculative environmental consequences
which might arise under the new or amended standards. 58 6
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Town of Is-
lip,587 the Court of Appeals of New York analyzed-DEC consent
orders in light of SEQRA and local legislation: the legislation
greatly restricted expansion in existing landfills located in deep
flow recharge areas unless no other feasible means of waste man-
agement was available. 588 The court held that the term expansion
included lateral but not vertical expansion, and therefore, that an
agreement between DEC and Islip to increase the landfill's height
did not violate the local statute as alleged by the plaintiff, New
York Interest Research Group Incorporated. 58 9 The court also
stated that the burial of ash from the town of Islip's resource and
recovery system in an existing portion of the landfill was not lat-
eral expansion. 590
In Dana Distributors Inc. v. Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion,5 9 1 the court held that DEC's rule requiring beverage distrib-
utors to pay handling fees to dealers or redemption centers, even
if the distributors did not have agreements with the dealers or
centers, was neither unauthorized nor in conflict with the terms of
the New York State Returnable Containers Act (the Act).592 The
Act authorized DEC to make rules and regulations governing the
circumstances under which distributors would be required to ac-
cept the return of empty containers. 593 Therefore, in accordance
with the language of the Act, the court reasoned that DEC was
authorized to require distributors to accept all returns of empty
(referring to requirements of New York's Administrative Procedure Act section
202 (McKinney 1984)).
586. Id. (plaintiffs alleged DEC failed to disclose background data upon
which it relied in settling water quality standards).
587. 71 N.Y.2d 292, 520 N.E.2d 517, 525 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1988).
588. Id.
589. Id. at 302-03, 520 N.E.2d at 521-22, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03.
590. Id. at 304, 520 N.E.2d at 522-23, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
591. 140 Misc. 2d 1071, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (1988).
592. Id. at 1072, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 353. There has been a great deal of con-
troversy over the New York State Returnable Container Act, N.Y. ENVrL. CON-
SERV. LAw §§ 27-1003 to 27-1017 (McKinney 1984). (distributors contend they
are unfairly burdened by statute's acceptance requirement).
593. Id. at 1071-72, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52.
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containers and to pay applicable handling fees. 594 Finally, the
court held that the Act was reasonably related to the public policy
goals of solid waste management and resource recovery and was
therefore not unconstitutional. 595
In New York State Superfund Coalition v. New York Department of
Environmental Conservation,596 the New York Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, upheld a lower court's decision that New York's
regulations governing the cleanup of hazardous waste sites were
overbroad in defining which waste sites constituted a "significant
threat" to the environment and therefore the regulations were
annulled. 597 In its ruling, the court found DEC regulations to be
inconsistent with state law.598 The DEC regulations required
"only that the hazardous waste at a particular site h[e]ld the 'po-
tential' for hazards to human health or the environment prior to
being determined a 'significant threat,'" whereas the New York
statute, upon which the DEC regulations were based, required
that a "significant threat" to the environment actually exists. 599
In Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. ,6o
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversing a
lower court finding of indemnity on the part of the defendant in-
surer, held that the plaintiff manufacturer's discharge of toxic
waste over several years was not a "sudden and accidental event"
covered by Technicon's insurance policy. co 1 Therefore, the court
determined that the "pollution exclusion" clauses, which restrict
policy coverage to "sudden and accidental" hazardous releases,
relieved the defendant insurer's from responsibility to defend
Technicon against personal injury claims and EPA proceedings
and to indemnify in case Technicon lost the personal injury
cases.6c2
In Powers Chemco Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co. ,60 the New York
594. Id. at 1072, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
595. Id. at 1073-74, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 352-53.
596. 144 A.D.2d 72, 536 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1989).
597. Id. at 75, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
598. Id.
599. Id. (emphasis added). According to the court, "[hlazardous wastes al-
ways hold the 'potential' for harm to humans or the environment." Id. There-
fore, under this DEC regulation, every hazardous waste site could pose a
"significant threat" and require remediation. Id.
600. 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988).
601. Id. at 131, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (plaintiff Technicon was insured by de-
fendant: leak occurred over extended period of time, therefore, not "sudden").
602. Id.
603. 144 A.D.2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1988).
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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant insurance company, holding that the insurance
policy's "pollution exclusion" clause precluded coverage for the
costs of removing certain hazardous wastes.604 Since it neither
expected nor intended the discharge, the plaintiff argued that the
exclusion provision was inapplicable because the pollution was
"accidental and sudden", but the court determined that whether
the discharge was unexpected and unintentional or knowing and
intentional were relevant factors in determining discharger's lia-
bility.605 The court further stated that the fact that the discharge
of hazardous materials was attributable to a prior owner of the
property, without the insured's knowledge and consent, did not
render the "pollution exclusion" clause inapplicable. 60
In Colonie Motors Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. ,o7 the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, addressing facts
similar to Powers Ckemco, reached a different decision than in Pow-
ers Chemco. The court in this case held that insurer was obligated
to pay for the costs of cleanup because the discharge of oil was
"sudden and accidental . . . as construed in the context of the
facts" of this case.608 The court explained that the "pollution ex-
clusion" did not apply to costs incurred by an insured in cleaning
up waste oil which leaked out of a crack in an underground piping
unit. co 9 The court based its ruling on a determination that the
insured did not know of the crack or discharge and that the in-
sured could not have discovered the problem by routine mainte-
nance or inspection procedures. 610
PETROLEUM
In Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation,61' the Court of Appeals of New York held
604. Id. at 447, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1011 (summary judgment granted in full;
lower court granted only partial summary judgment).
605. Id. (plaintiff admitted to discharging toxic waste over long period of
time, therefore, pollution exclusion clause applied).
606. Id.
607. 145 A.D.2d 180, 538 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1989).
608. Id. at 183, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (court recognized that "sudden and
accidental" must be construed as whole in context of particular facts and without
undue reliance on individual definitions of either word).
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. 71 N.Y.2d 186, 519 N.E.2d 320, 524 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1988) (plaintiff
Consolidated Edison sued DEC claiming that portions of DEC's new bulk stor-
age code which required additional safeguards were null because they were su-
perseded by statutes).
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that statutes regulating petroleum bulk storage facilities did not
preempt DEC's authority to regulate the storage of pollution-
causing liquids and gases. 61 2 According to the court, the statutes
at issue were not in conflict with each other, and could operate
together in harmony with DEC's broad power to regulate bulk
storage of petroleum by promulgating new storage codes. 613
WETL4NDS
In Wedinger v. Goldberger,61 4 the Court of Appeals of New York
affirmed a lower court's holding that the failure of DEC to desig-
nate properties as freshwater wetlands on a map did not exempt
the properties from DEC jurisdiction and regulation. 61 5 The
court also ruled the landowner's claims of defacto taking were pre-
mature because designating the property as wetlands did not bar
development of the property outright, but only required the de-
veloper to obtain a permit.6 16
PESTICIDES
In New York v. Abalme Pest Control Co. ,617 New York's first fel-
ony conviction for the unlawful disposal of pesticides under state
law, a Saratoga judge sentenced the former manager of a New
York pest control firm to one year in jail.618
In New York v. Blank,619 a related suit involving Abalene Pest
Control Co., the state filed suit under CERCLA to compel an in-
vestigation, feasibility study, and cleanup of Abalene's Moreau
site.620
NORTH CAROLINA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1989, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the
612. Id. at 196, 519 N.E.2d at 325, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
613. Id. (statutes at issue: Oil Spill Prevention, Control and Compensation
Act of 1977 and 1983 Control of Bulk Storage of Petroleum Act).
614. 71 N.Y.2d 428, 522 N.E.2d 25, 527 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1988).
615. Id. at 438, 522 N.E.2d at 28, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
616. Id. at 440-41, 522 N.E.2d at 29-30, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85.
617. See Manager of New York Pest Control Company Sentenced for Unlawful Pesti-
cide Disposal, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2353 (Mar. 3, 1989) (citing New York v.
Abalene Pest Control Co., Saratoga County Court, No. W 18-88, 2/15/89).
618. Id.
619. Id. at 2354 (citing New York v. Blank, N.D.N.Y. No. 88-CV-163,
2/16/88).
620. Id.
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North Carolina Waste Management Commission Act of 1989
which establishes the framework for a regional approach to haz-
ardous waste management. 62 ' With the passage of this act, the
legislature repealed its ban on hazardous waste disposal within
the state's borders. 622 The repeal was part of an effort to con-
vince South Carolina to lift its prohibition on hazardous waste
from North Carolina. 623
During the summer of 1989, a complicated EPA hearing was
held to determine the validity of a 1987 North Carolina water
quality law that blocked the siting of a GSX waste treatment facil-
ity in the state. 624 The EPA called the hearing to assess whether
the North Carolina water quality law was overly restrictive and in
violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.625 It was al-
leged by EPA, GSX Chemical Services Inc., and Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council, that the water quality law was designed to
prevent waste treatment facilities from locating within the state,
rather than to protect public health and welfare. 626
OHIO
SOLID AND HA7ARDOUS WASTE
In Ohio v. Stirnkorb627, the Clermont County Court of Com-
mon Pleas sentenced the operations manager of an Ohio hazard-
ous waste facility to one year in jail and fined him $30,000 for
allowing contaminated rainwater to be released from the facil-
ity.628 The operations manager was convicted on eight felony
counts and two misdemeanor counts for violating Ohio's hazard-
621. Legislature Passes Waste Management Act; S. C to Review Law Before Reconsid-
ering Ban, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 207 (June 2, 1989).
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. EPA Extends North Carolina RCRA Hearing; Will Resume in July, Last for 10
More Days, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 322 (June 9, 1989). "The [contested] law pro-
hibits commercial hazardous waste facilities from discharging waste water to sur-
face water that is used as a drinking water supply, unless there is 1,000-to-I
dilution at the point of discharge." Id.
625. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1976) and U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 3).
626. Id.
627. No. 85-CR-52408, slip op. (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas, Clermont County,
July 19, 1989).
628. Id. The operations manager was also sentenced to five years proba-
tion with an opportunity to reduce his jail term by serving up to 1,500 hours of
community service with a local emergency planning commission. Id.
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ous waste disposal 629 and water pollution 630 statutes. 63 1
OKLAHOMA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 8, 1989, Governor Bellmon signed a bill (HB 1532)
which created a scrap tire superfund. 63 2 Beginning July 1, 1989
the bill requires that all tire sales facilities in the state assess a $1
waste tire recycling fee on the sale of new and used tires for use
on automobiles and light trucks weighing less than 10,000
pounds.633 These sales facilities must then remit 97.5% of the $1
fees to the state.63 4 Accordingly, a waste tire recycling facility will
be eligible to receive up to $.50 per tire per year from the fund,
provided that the waste tire facility takes at least 25% of the tires
it processes from tire dumps on the Oklahoma Department of
Health's priority enforcement list.635
In an effort to protect Oklahoma's ground waters, Governor
Bellmon signed a bill (HB 1316) on April 24, 1989 that created a
$10 million environmental indemnity fund for underground tank
owners. 636 The fund will be generated through a tax on fuel dis-
tributors under a new law, called the Oklahoma Underground
Storage Tank Regulation Act. 63 7 Accordingly, owners of leaking
underground petroleum tanks will be liable for the first $10,000
of costs associated with leakage, after which the fund will reim-
burse tank owners $1 million per leakage occurrence, provided
that the tank is used for petroleum marketing purposes.6 38
629. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01-3734.99 (Anderson 1988 & Supp.
1988).
630. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6111.01-6111.99 (Anderson 1977 & Supp.
1988).
631. No. 85-CR-52408, slip op. (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas, Clermont County,
July 19, 1989).
632. Oklahoma Scrap Tire Superfund Created, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 165 (Mar. 5,
1989).
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Oklahoma- $10 Million Underground Tank Indemnity Fund Will Use Money
from Tax on Fuel Distributors, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 22 (Mar. 5, 1989).
637. Id.
638. Id.
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OREGON
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On September 9, 1988 the Oregon Environmental Quality
Commission (the Commission) adopted the "background level"
standard for hazardous waste cleanup pursuant to the state's
superfund law.63 9 A background level is the level of hazardous
emissions that occurs naturally, prior to any releases at a site.6 0
If the background level is not attainable, the Commission may re-
quire the cleanup of a hazardous site to the lowest feasible level
necessary to promote public health and safety~r4 l
On November 4, 1988 the Oregon Environmental Quality
Commission adopted a temporary rule which prohibited the dis-
posal in Oregon of waste which was classified as hazardous by its
state of origin.6 2 The rule was aimed at waste which was deemed
hazardous in California but which would not have been classified
as hazardous in Oregon. 643 In addition, the rule authorized the
Commission to begin permanent rule-making to prohibit another
state's hazardous waste from being disposed of in solid waste fa-
cilities in Oregon. 644
AIR POLLUTION
In Forelaws on Board v. Energy Facility Siting Council,645 the
Supreme Court of Oregon held that respondent Energy Facility
Siting Council (EFSC) was not required to issue a permit license
to intervenor Teledyne Wah Chang Albany (TWCA) for the stor-
age of zirconium sludge in holding ponds at its manufacturing
facility in Albany, Oregon. 46 Because the levels of radiation
found in the zirconium sludge were properly deemed by the
EFSC not to fall within the definition of "radioactive waste"
found in subsection 469.300(17)(a) of the Oregon Revised Stat-
utes,64 7 the EFSC was not compelled to issue a license for the
639. Background Level Waste Cleanup Standard Adopted by Panel Over Industry Ob-
jections, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 998 (Sept. 16, 1988).
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. State Restricts Disposal as Solid Waste of Material Considered Hazardous in
California, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1436 (Nov. 11, 1988).
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. 306 Or. 205, 760 P.2d 212 (1988).
646. Id. at 207, 760 P.2d at 215.
647. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.300(17)(a) (1987).
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storage of intervenor's industrial waste.648
In Cusma v. City of Oregon City, 49 the Oregon Court of Appeals
affirmed an order of the Land Use Board of Appeals requiring the
petitioner, an executive officer of a waste transfer facility, to com-
ply with local government permit restrictions on the amount of
solid waste to be processed at the facility on a daily basis.650 The
court determined that subsection 459.095(1) of the Oregon Re-
vised Statutes65' did not permit the petitioner to adopt independ-
ent resolutions on the amount of solid waste to be processed at
the facility. 652 The court determined that while subsection
459.095(1) prevented a local government from adopting regula-
tions in conflict with solid waste management programs imple-
mented by metropolitan service districts and approved by the
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), petitioners' waste
management plan contained no provisions establishing the
amount of solid waste to be processed daily at the facility.653
Thus, the court concluded that the local government's regula-
tions were binding on the petitioner. 6- 4
FORESTRY
In the area of forestry, there have been two related United
States Supreme Court decisions in 1989. In Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 655 the Court held that a United States Forest
Service impact statement was in compliance with standards estab-
lished by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 656 Peti-
tioner argued that Methow Valley Citizen Council's (Methow
Valley) permit, authorizing the construction of a ski resort on fed-
eral land, should have been held invalid based upon the lack of
detailed measures employed to mitgate harm to the local environ-
ment as a result of the proposed ski resort construction.657 The
Court found that the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
which was authorized by presidential order to implement regula-
tions under NEPA, only required that such environmental impact
648. Forelaws, 306 Or. at 210, 760 P.2d at 217.
649. 92 Or. App. 1, 757 P.2d 433 (1988).
650. Id. at 3, 757 P.2d at 434.
651. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.095(1) (1987).
652. Cusma, 92 Or. App. at 4, 757 P.2d at 435.
653. Id. at 5-6, 757 P.2d at 436.
654. Id.
655. 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989).
656. 109 S. Ct. at 1838.
657. 109 S. Ct. at 1843.
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statements focus on reasonably foreseeable impacts on the environ-
ment due to the proposed construction, rather than a more de-
tailed explanation of the available remedial actions. 658
In Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,659 the Supreme
Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) decision
not to file a supplemental environmental impact statement relat-
ing to the construction of a dam was not violative of standards
established under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).60° Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view found in section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),6 r 1 the Court found that the Corps had conducted a suffi-
cient evaluation of the potential harmful effects to the local envi-
ronment downstream from the construction site.662
Several forestry issues were resolved in 1000 Friends of Oregon
v. Land Conservation & Development Comm'n, Lane County.6 3 The
case arose over a dispute as to the validity of a proposed county
comprehensive land use plan which allowed the building of resi-
dences on protected forest land. 664 The court first held that
"necessary and accessory" building was not a legitimate reason
for permitting the county to construct housing on forest lands.665
The court noted that the aforementioned purpose was contrary to
Oregon's Statewide Planning Goal 4, which mandated that forest
land be conserved for forest use.6 " Second, the court held that
the use of property within Goal 3 or Goal 4 zones had to strictly
adhere to that particular Goal in which zone the land was lo-
cated.6 7 The court stated that there was no doubt that the Land
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) could cre-
ate a mixed zone if the land and property uses were closely inter-
related, but individual parcels could not meet one Goal by merely
having a similar use in another Goal. 668 Third, the court deter-
658. 109 S. Ct. at 1848-49 (emphasis added).
659. 109 S. Ct. 1851 (1989).
660. 109 S. Ct. at 1865.
661. 109 S. Ct. at 1860, n. 21.
662. 109 S. Ct. at 1863-64.
663. 305 Or. 384, 752 P.2d 271 (1988).
664. Id. at 386, 752 P.2d at 273.
665. Id. at 387-97, 752 P.2d at 274-80.
666. Id.
667. Goal zones are designated areas of land zoned according to the Ore-
gon Statewide Planning Goal in an attempt to preserve certain types of land, e.g.
forest land in Goal 4 and agricultural land in Goal 3. See id. at 386, 752 P.2d at
273.
668. Id. at 387-402, 752 P.2d at 280-82.
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mined that the substantial evidence test was proper for review of
the LCDC's decision. 669
PENNSYLVANIA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On July 28, 1988, the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling
and Waste Reduction Act (Act)670 was approved to help the state
meet the increasingly severe landfill problems. The Act estab-
lishes the framework for municipalities to create new disposal and
recycling programs and to enforce those programs by levying
penalties for non-compliance. 671
On October 18, 1988, Governor Casey signed the Hazardous
Sites Cleanup Act. 672 This law is designed to supplement the fed-
eral superfund act, Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).673 The Hazardous
Sites Cleanup Act will enable Pennsylvania to cleanup sites not
qualifying for aid under CERCLA. Much of the funding for the
state superfund is procured through the state's mill capital stock
and franchise tax. 674
In 1989, state regulations had been proposed to cut the vola-
tility rate of gasoline below Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) standards.675 Both Department of Environmental Re-
sources (DER) and Governor Casey felt that EPA's efforts at re-
ducing pollution due to butane emissions from cars were
inadequate.
AIR POLLUTION
In United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Colp., 676 (Wheeling-
Pitt 11), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed a district court decision allowing an amendment to a
669. Id. at 402-07, 752 P.2d at 282-85. Additionally, attorney's fees were
denied in light of the Administration Procedure Act (OR. REV. STAT. § 183.025-
.725, 183.497(1), 197.005, 197.040, 197.320, 197.650 (1987)). Id. In doing so,
the court found that using tax lots to determine minimum farming lot sizes
failed to meet the substantial evidence test.
670. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.101 (1988).
671. Id.
672. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.101 (1988).
673. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
674. Id.
675. Pennsylvania Asks EPA to Consider Stricter Rule on Gasoline Volatility, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) 15-16 (May 5, 1989).
676. 866 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1988).
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consent decree. Prior to its amendment, the consent decree had
required Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation (Wheeling-Pitt)
to install a sulphur dioxide emission control system in its coke
plant.6 7 7 The district court allowed the consent decree to be
amended based on the finding that a "grievous wrong" would
have been incurred by Wheeling-Pitt and the surrounding com-
munity if the Wheeling-Pitt plant were not allowed to start-up
prior to installation of the emission control system.678
The Third Circuit held that the district court abused its dis-
cretion when amending the consent decree because the district
court failed to satisfy the standard set forth in an earlier Third
Circuit decision, United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.679
(Wheeling-Pitt I). Wheeling-Pitt I placed "severe restrictions on the
ability of the district court to amend consent decrees."680 Using
the standard set forth in Wheeling-Pitt I, the Third Circuit applied
a balancing test to determine that the economic interests of both
Wheeling-Pitt and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not
outweigh the compelling public interest promoted by the federal
Clean Air Act.6'
In Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadelphia Water Dep t. 2
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
a district court judgment holding the city of Philadelphia in con-
tempt of court.683 The city was held in contempt of court because
it repeatedly violated an injunction 684 issued by the district court
pursuant to the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan.6 5 The
injunction was issued against the city for its operation of the
Northeast Water Pollution Control Plant, which was held to be in
violation of odor regulations.686 In upholding the district court's
677. Id. at 62.
678. Id. at 60.
679. Id. (citing Wheeling-Pitt 1, 818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987)).
680. Id.
681. Id. at 62. The court held that the state's economic interest in keeping
the defendants' plant open despite its failure to comply with air quality stan-
dards established by the Clean Air Act (CAA) was superseded by the more com-
pelling public interest of removing pollutants from the air. Id. Additionally, the
court found the arguments by Sharon, the company which purchased Wheeling-
Pitt, that Sharon had no control over the allegedly unforseen situation, to be
unconvincing since Sharon had advance knowledge of Wheeling-Pitt's failure to
comply. Id.
682. 843 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1988).
683. Id. at 680-81.
684. Id. at 680-82.
685. 40 C.F.R. § 52.2020 (1987).
686. Philadelphia Water Dep't., 843 F.2d at 680.
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judgment, the Third Circuit found ample evidence proving that
the city repeatedly continued to violate the regulations after the
injunction was issued." 7
In Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Commonwealth,6 8 the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a trial court order which
found Eureka Stone Quarry (Eureka) guilty on three charges of
violating air pollution standards.689 Summary citations were is-
sued against Eureka by DER for violations of section 8 of the Air
Pollution Control Act 690 and for violations of title 25, sections
123.1, 123.2, and 127.25 of the Pennsylvania Code.69 1 These
statutory provisions prohibit the release of visible contaminants,
like dust, into the air. Evidence presented by DER proved that
Eureka allowed dust to escape beyond its property and that Eu-
reka's water suppression system, which could have mitigated the
dust problem, was partially operational, thus putting Eureka in
violation of the statutory air pollution standards. 692 In particular,
the court interpreted title 25, section 123.2 as regulating both ac-
tive and inactive operations, thereby making Eureka's stockpiling
of refuse a violation of section 123.2 because wind was lifting dust
off the refuse piles into the air.693 The court also found that the
verbal communication of pending prosecution, coupled with a
notification letter, was sufficient notice of pending litigation, and
therefore, that Eureka was not denied procedural due process. 694
WATER POLLUTION
In Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas,695 the Third Circuit reversed a dis-
trict court holding that an EPA stay from enforcing the Clean
Water Act 696 could indefinitely bar a private citizen's action
against a polluter. 697 In 1976, Rohm & Haas and EPA entered
into a stipulated agreement which set limitations on the amount
687. Id. at 682. Also, since the injunction was coercive, because it was
designed to prod the city into compliance, no proof of actual loss by the citizens
was required to support the injunction. Id.
688. 118 Pa. Commw. 300, 544 A.2d 1129 (1988).
689. Id. at 301-2, 544 A.2d at 1130.
690. 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4008 (Purdon 1977).
691. 25 PA. CODE §§ 123.1-127.25 (1989).
692. Eureka, 118 Pa. Commw. at 303, 544 A.2d at 1130-31.
693. Id. at 305, 544 A.2d at 1131.
694. Id.
695. 850 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1988).
696. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
697. Proffit, 850 F.2d at 1013-15. According to the court, in case like this a
"citizen's suit is 'interstitial' rather than 'intrusive.' " Id.
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of pollutants Rohm & Haas was permitted to discharge into
neighboring navigable waters. 698 EPA granted a stay of enforce-
ment provided that certain conditions, including a final adminis-
trative decision concerning the limitations on the amount of
discharged pollutants, were satisfied.699 In 1978, a modified draft
permit was granted to Rohm & Haas, but it was never effectu-
ated.7° ° The court determined that public notice was required for
such a modified permit because the modification had the effect of
deleting certain routine substantive requirements. °7 0 Assuming,
arguendo, that the 1978 permit was valid, the Third Circuit found
that the stay evaporated because none of the conditions, particu-
larly the drafting of the final administrative decision, material-
ized.702 Therefore, a private citizen, who satisfied the criteria of
Chapter 33, section 1365 of the United States Code, was not
barred from initiating a suit for enforcement of the Clean Water
Act. 70
An environmental issue concerning statutory construction
was resolved in Eckert v. Pierotti.70 4 The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania held that section 1502 of the Second Class Town-
ship Act70 5 was repealed insofar as it was inconsistent with the
Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act. 7°6 The plaintiffs, property
owners, argued that the Second Class Township Act granted
them the power to block proposed construction of a waste water
collection facility by filing a protest signed by a sixty percent mini-
mum of the town. 70 7 The court determined this to be in conflict
with the General Assembly's intent to provide a comprehensive
program for water management through the Sewage Facilities
Act, thereby repealing the conflicting sections of the Second
698. Id. at 1109.
699. Id. at 1010.
700. Id.
701. Id. at 1012. The court determined that public notice was necessary: 1)
as a means by which the public would be provided with the necessary informa-
tion that would enable them to organize a hearing on the issue of Rohm & Haas'
permit amendments; and, 2) to provide the public with notice of those amend-
ments which deleted substantive requirements which prohibited excessive
dumping by Rohm & Haas of chemicals in violation of the Clean Water Act
(CWA). Id. at 1012-13.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. 123 Pa. Commw. 8, 553 A.2d 114 (1989).
705. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66502 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
706. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 750 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
707. Eckert, 553 A.2d at 116-17.
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Class Township Act and barring the plaintiffs' claim.70
In United States v. Philadelphia,7°9 the City of Philadelphia was
sued, by EPA for violations of the Clean Air Act. This suit is part
of EPA's continuing effort to bring all municipalities into compli-
ance with the Clean Air Act.7 10 It is the fourth such case against
the city in the past ten years, and it alleges various violations at a
southwest treatment plant.71'
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp. ,712 the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the ven-
dor-lessor and purchaser-lessee of a facility where a
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) release occurred, were jointly
and severally liable for the subsequent contamination to the land
adjoining the facility. 713 The defendant, Union Corporation, op-
erated a copper oxide production plant which leaked PCBs. 714 In
1984, the plaintiff purchased the property and continued the cop-
per oxide operations at the facility.715 Soon thereafter, the con-
tamination was discovered, and the defendants undertook
cleanup procedures pursuant to CERCLA. 716 Since the court was
unable to distinguish between the damage which was caused prior
to the sale of the facility from that damage which occurred subse-
quent to the sale, both parties were found to be jointly and sever-
ally liable. 717 However, since the defendant could not prove that
its remedial action was consistent with the National Contingency
Plan, 718 its counterclaim under CERCLA for contribution was
disallowed. 71 9
708. Id. at 117.
709. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 972 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9. 1989).
710. Id.
711. Id.
712. 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
713. Id. at 1571.
714. Id.
715. Id. at 1570.
716. Id. at 1571 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601-57 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
717. Id. at 1570-71.
718. See id. at 1574-82. In order for a private party to recover under CER-
CLA, the party must incur cleanup expenses consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan (NCP). Id. at 1574. The NCP was originally passed in 1982 to
assist in the determination of which hazardous wastes and which hazardous
waste sites could be cleaned up using federal funds. Id.
719. Id. at 1582. Additionally, the court entered a judgment in favor of the
defendant for over one million dollars on its state common law waste claim. Id.
The court recognized that the plaintiff failed to return the premises in "substan-
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In Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking,720 the Federal District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed federal and
state environmental claims concerning the contamination of
plaintiffs' property by the storage of hazardous waste at defend-
ants' landfill. 72' The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' stor-
age of hazardous wastes at the landfill violated provisions found
in CERCLA, resulting in both contamination to their land and
diminution in its value.7 22 The court found that while subsection
101(23) of CERCIA 723 entitled the plaintiffs to recover "re-
sponse costs from the defendants for expenses incurred in clean-
ing up their land," they were not entitled to be compensated for
the diminution in the value of their land under CERCLA.724 The
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' pen-
dant state claims of strict liability, negligence, and nuisance, hold-
ing they had been properly pleaded and were within the
jurisdiction of the court to hear.7 25
In Western Pennsylvania Water Co. v. DER,726 the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld an order issued by the De-
partment of Environmental Resources (DER) to the plaintiff.72 7
The plaintiff obtained a permanent easement across private prop-
erty for the purpose of installing pipes to extend its distribution
system. 7 28 During excavation, an abandoned oil well was encoun-
tered, and oil began to contaminate the surrounding soil.729 DER
ordered the plaintiff to correct the condition, and to create a plan
to deal with similar problems in the future. 7" 0 The plaintiff at-
tempted to appeal this order to the Environmental Hearing Board
(EHB).73 1 EHB denied the plaintiff's appeal, and effectively up-
held DER's order.
The Commonwealth Court asserted that in order to reverse
tially the same condition", and therefore was liable to pay for the damages
caused by its lack of reasonable care. Id. at 1569-70.
720. 686 F. Supp. 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
721. Id. at 1065.
722. Id. at 1067.
723. Id. at 1068 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
724. Id. at 1068.
725. Id. at 1069-71 (providing general elements of proof for each cause of
action).
726. 560 A.2d 905 (1989).
727. Id. at 909.
728. Id. at 906.
729. Id.
730. Id. at 906-07.
731. Id. at 907.
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the EHB decision, the court would have to make a determination
"that an error of law ha[d] been committed, constitutional rights
ha[d] been violated, or that necessary factual findings [we]re not
supported by substantial evidence." 73 2 No such determination
was made, and the EHB order was upheld. 733 The court also de-
termined that because the plaintiff, as the holder of a permanent
easement, was an "occupant" for purposes of the Clean Streams
Act,7M the plaintiff was liable for its violations of the Clean
Streams Act, and especially for the clean up of the contaminated
soil. 73
5
In Fleck v. Timmons,73 6 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania af-
firmed a trial court decision holding that the presumption of lia-
bility established by the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) 73 7
was not available to a private party who instigated a claim. 73 8 The
appellants, well owners, argued that the appellees violated
SWMA by pumping kerosene into underground storage tanks,
thereby contaminating appellants' well. 73 9 The Superior Court
concluded that section 661 of SWMA did create a presumption of
liability, but that this presumption of liability flowed not to the
plaintiffs, but only to the executive branch of government. 740
This presumption was limited to the executive branch of govern-
ment because the executive branch needed the presumption in
order to continue to effectively regulate the solid waste situation
in the state.74'
732. Id. at 907 (citing 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704).
733. Id. at 909.
734. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 691.316 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
735. Western Pa. Water Co., 560 A.2d at 907-08. Additionally, DER's order
was determined to be an appropriate exercise of police power. Id.
736. 374 Pa. Super. 417, 543 A.2d 148 (1988).
737. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 6018 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
738. The rebuttable presumption found in section 611 of Pennsylvania's
Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) as stated in plaintiff's jury instructions
provides, in part:
that a person or municipality which stores or disposes of hazardous
waste shall be liable, without proof of fault, negligence, or causation for
all damages, contamination, or pollution within 2,500 feet of the perim-
eter of the area where hazardous waste activities have been carried out.
Such presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
that the person or municipality so charged did not contribute to the
damage, contamination, or pollution.
FlecA, 374 Pa. Super. at 422-23, 543 A.2d at 151.
739. Fleck, 374 Pa. Super. at 419, 543 A.2d at 149-50.
740. Id. at 423, 543 A.2d at 149-50.
741. Id. 543 A.2d at 152 (ultimately, defendant won litigation because
plaintiff was unable to prove causation).
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In another SWMA case, Blosenski Disposal Service v. DER,742
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court de-
cision that plaintiff-Blosenski's depositing of solid waste at his
waste transfer station without first obtaining the necessary per-
mits from the Department of Environmental Resources (DER),
was a violation of section 610 of SWMA. 743 In so doing, the
Commonwealth Court determined that the section 610(4) phrase
"2nd unlawful" was a typographical error which did not preclude
the plaintiff from liability under the Act on the theory that this
was plaintiff's first offense.744 Therefore, the court held that "de-
positing" of solid waste was a punishable offense under
SWMA. 7
45
In a recent case, Pennsylvania v. Acculens Inc. ,746 the defendant
pleaded no contest to an allegation that it violated SWMA by
dumping waste out of a window into a storm drain. Although this
was a relatively minor violation, the state was willing to prosecute
the defendant, which may suggest that the state will use SWMA
expansively to promote its environmental goals.
MINING
In DER v. Big B Mining Co. ,747 the Commonwealth Court up-
held an Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) order which re-
versed DER's denial of an operating permit to Big B Mining
Company based on defendant company's failure to comply with
water quality standards limiting the amount of pollutants allowed
to be dispersed into a local stream. 748 The court held that EHB
had not abused its discretion by employing a balancing test posit-
742. 116 Pa. Commw. 315, 543 A.2d 159 (1988).
743. Plaintiff was charged with two violations of section 610 of SWMA,
which included:
1) violation of subsection 610(2) of SWMA prohibiting the operation of
a solid waste processing facility without a DER permit; and, 2) a viola-
tion of subsection 610(4) of SWMA prohibiting utilization of the plain-
tiff's land as a waste processing area without a permit issued by the
DER.
Id.
744. Id. at 320, 543 A.2d at 162. Additionally, the court held that the war-
rantless entry by a DER agent, who reasonably relied on SWMA, did not violate
Blosenski's fourth amendment rights. Id. The court bolstered its argument by
stating that "naked-eye observations", such as those in this case, are not uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 321-22, 543 A.2d at 162-63.
745. Id. at 322, 543 A.2d at 164-65.
746. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 24 (Pa. C.C.P. Montgomery County Apr. 14,
1989) (defendant failed to obtain disposal permit).
747. 123 Pa. Commw. 591, 54 A.2d 1002 (1989).
748. Id. at 592, 544 A.2d at 1003.
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ing Big. B Mining's past history of compliance with the state's
water quality standards against the theoretical dangers presented
by DER. 749 Because EHB was authorized to substitute the DER's
findings with its own interpretation of EHB regulations, the court
found that EHB had acted properly in finding that Big B Mining
Co. had complied with those provisions found in subsection
95.1 (b) of title 25 of the Pennsylvania Code. 750 The court deter-
mined that EHB had properly weighted the "public value" of the
defendant company's mining, which included a substantial influx
of revenue into the local community against the potential harmful
effects to local streams as a result of such mining.75' The court
found EHB correct in its determination that the benefit to the lo-
cal community outweighed the resulting harm to the
environment.752
In Lucky Strike Coal Co. v. DER, 753 the Commonwealth Court
affirmed an EHB determination that Lucky Strike Coal Company
(Lucky Strike) was in violation of the Clean Streams Law because
Lucky Strike allowed its wastewater to overflow into surface wa-
ters. 75 Lucky Strike unsuccessfully alleged that EHB had abused
its discretion by using a "cold record". 75 5 The court held that
although the EHB members, who found Lucky Strike in violation
of the Clean Streams Law, were not present at the hearing, the
adjudication was not an abuse of discretion because there was a
presumption that the EHB members personally considered the
records of the hearing. 756
Some Pennsylvania statutes require that in order to appeal a
civil penalty assessment, the plaintiff must post a bond equal to
the amount of the civil penalty assessment. The constitutionality
of this requirement was addressed recently in two cases. In Tracey
749. Id. at 603, 554 A.2d at 1007. Additionally, the court acknowledged
that Big B Mining Co. had proven the requisite economic benefits from its oper-
ation to establish a "public value" which justified the granting of the permit. Id.
at 602-03, 544 A.2d at 1005-07. EHB's interpretation, not DER's, that Big B
Mining proved public need is relevant, therefore, the court exercised restraint
by stating that it cannot reweigh evidence from EHB hearings. Id.
750. Id. at 594-95, 554 A.2d at 1006.
751. Id. at 602, 554 A.2d at 1007.
752. Id. at 602-03, 554 A.2d at 1007.
753. 119 Pa. Commw. 440, 547 A.2d 447 (1988).
754. Id. at 442-43, 547 A.2d at 448.
755. Id. at 443-43, 547 A.2d at 448-49 ("cold record" is one upon which
EHB members adjudicate, but members were not at the hearings which pro-
duced record).
756. Id. at 443, 547 A.2d at 449 (Lucky Strike offered no evidence to rebut
presumption).
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Mining Co. v. Commonwealth,757 the court held that the posting of a
bond was constitutional. 758 The court noted "that federal courts
ha[d] consistently upheld the constitutionality of the bond re-
quirement." 759 An exception to this general rule was created by
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Twelve Vein Coal Co. v.
DER.760 The plaintiff, Twelve Vein Coal Company (Twelve
Vein), argued that the bond requirement was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated Twelve Vein's right to due process, by requiring
pre-payment of money which Twelve Vein claimed not to possess
due to poor business. According to Twelve Vein, since it did not
have the money with which to post bond, its right to appellate
review was being restricted without due process of law.7 6 '
Although the case was remanded for a factual determination con-
cerning Twelve Vein's capacity to post the bond, the court im-
plied that if Twelve Vein's assertion was true, the bond
requirement will be deemed unconstitutional with respect to
Twelve Vein.
SUPERFUND
The United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co.,762 held that CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), created
state's liability for damages in a federal court, and that the elev-
enth amendment of the United States Constitution did not pro-
vide immunity to a state in a CERCLA action.763 EPA declared a
Pennsylvania creek contaminated by coal tar to be the nation's
first superfund site, and proceeded to clean the creek. After a
careful analysis of the Constitution, the Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress was authorized to render a state liable when legis-
lating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, regardless of the elev-
enth amendment grant of state immunity. 76
757. 117 Pa. Commw. 628, 544 A.2d 1075 (1988).
758. Id. at 663, 544 A.2d at 1077.
759. Id.
760. No. 976 C.D. 1988 (WESTLAW, Pa. database, 1988 WL 80236).
761. See PA. CONsT. art. V, § 9.
762. 109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989).
763. Id. at 2276-77.
764. d. at 2286.
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RHODE ISLAND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 8, 1988, Rhode Island voters approved a ref-
erendum which authorized $25 million to protect the state's envi-
ronment. 765 One referendum allows the state to issue up to $10
million in state bonds to protect the watersheds of public drinking
water supplies. 766 Water suppliers will also match the money
generated by the referendum to protect their own watersheds.7 67
The second referendum allows the state to issue up to $15
million in revenue bonds for waste water treatment programs in
Rhode Island.7 68 The revenues will be used to:
study and run pilot programs on pretreatment, sediment
and sludge abatement issues; provide low-interest loans
for private entities for sewage and waste water [sic] treat-
ment; provide matching funds and/or grants for munici-
pal waste water [sic] projects; and provide revolving low-
interest loans for pretreatment, pretreatment equip-
ment, and facilities, monitoring enforcement and admin-
istration and urban runoff programs. 76 9
On June 7, 1988, a bill was signed into law establishing a re-
volving loan fund to replace federal sewage treatment construc-
tion grants. 770 The grants are being phased out under the Clean
Water Act. 77 1 The bill (H-9551) provides for 1990 and 1992 ref-
erendums seeking $80 million in revolving loan funds for upgrad-
ing sewage treatment facilities on Pawtuxet River.7 72
On July 11, 1989, Rhode Island Governor DiPrete signed
several environmental bills.77 3 The Litter Control, Recycling and
Hard-to-Dispose-of Materials Act (H-5504 Sub A) is designed to
765. Rhode Island Voters Approve $25 Million in Bonds For Drinking Water, Sewer
Projects, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1505 (Nov. 25, 1988).
766. Id.
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Id. at 1505-06.
770. Loan Fund Issue To Be Placed on Ballot Under Bill Signed Into Law By Gover-
nor, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 212 (June 10, 1988).
771. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1983).
772. Loan Fund Issue to Be Placed on Ballot Under Bill Signed Into Law By Gover-
nor, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 212 (June 10, 1988).
773. New Laws Buttress Recycling Program, Address Landfills, Funding Enforcement,
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 581 (July 21, 1989).
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encourage the creation of, and an awareness of the need for, pub-
lic and private recycling.
A second bill (H-7726) will create a statewide landfill siting
process under which officials may condemn land needed for land-
fill sites."4 Under a related bill (H-6289 Sub A), the state may
purchase all residential property within 1,000 feet of the state's
Central Landfill and make offers on property between 1,000 and
2,000 feet from the landfill. 7 75
Another bill (H-7736 Sub A) authorizes Rhode Island to is-
sue $95 million in bonds, of which $74.5 million will be used to
finance state environmental programs. 776 The monies will fund
environmental emergencies and cleanups, the purchase of coastal
land and open space areas, and water quality programs. 777
The fourth bill (H-691 1 Sub A) provides for a 1990 voter ref-
erendum regarding whether the state may issue $40 million in
bonds to establish a Rhode Island Clean Water Protection Fi-
nancing Agency. 778
A fifth bill (H-5568) increases the statute of limitations for
environmental crimes, including the illegal disposal of harmful
waste, from three to seven years, and increases the maximum fine
for these offenses from $1,000 to $5,000 and five years
imprisonment. 779
The governor also signed bill H-5044, which imposes crimi-
nal penalties for the illegal disposal of infectious and medical
waste, 780 bill H-6554, which prohibits the sale or distribution of
any beverage in a metal container that is opened by a detachable
metal ring or tab,78 ' and bill S-1272, which prohibits the sale or
distribution of food or beverages in a plastic container containing
more than one resin, excluding its cap, lid or ring.78 2
WATER POLLUTION
In F. Ronci Co. v. Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management
774. Id.
775. Id.
776. Id.
777. Id. This authorization must be approved by referendum in November
1989. Id.
778. Id.
779. Id.
780. Id. at 581-82.
781. Id. at 582.
782. Id.
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District Commission,783 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island out-
lined the breadth of the authority of the Narragansett Bay Water
Quality Management District Commission (Commission).7 8 4 The
court stated that the Commission's enabling act 785 empowers it to
establish toxic discharge limitations and to enjoin or remedy the
violation of these limitations. 78 6 To this end, the Commission
may conduct administrative hearings and make findings of fact. 787
If a violator refuses to comply with these toxic discharge limita-
tions, the Commission may institute enforcement proceedings in
the Superior Court for Providence County. 7 8 Although the fac-
tual findings established by the administrative hearing are not
binding on a trial court during the enforcement proceeding, they
are considered presumptively correct. 789
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Regan v. Cherry Corp. ,7o the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island invoked tort principles to find a
783. 561 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1989). Both F. Ronci Co. (Ronci), a shoe and
beltbuckle manufacturer, and the Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management
District Commission appealed portions of the Providence County Superior
Court's decision requiring that Ronci construct a pretreatment facility and com-
ply with relevant discharge standards for its metal electroplating process, as or-
dered by the Commission. Id. at 875-76.
784. Id.
785. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 46-25-1 to 46-25-57 (1988).
786. 561 A.2d at 879; R.I. GEN. LAws § 46-25-25(4) (1988). Prior to 1988,
it was beyond the scope of the Commission to levy civil fines. 561 A.2d at 879.
The case was governed by these earlier rules. In 1988, however, section 46-25-
25.4 of the General Laws of Rhode Island was amended so that the Commission
was authorized to impose administrative penalties in accordance with chapter
25, title 46 of the General Laws of Rhode Island and article 10.6 of the Commis-
sion's regulations. Id. at 881; 1988 R.I. PUB. LAws 46 § 1.
787. 561 A.2d at 881.
788. Id.
789. Id. at 879. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island also held that the
Commission's rules were not unconstitutional either on their face or as applied
to Ronci. Ronci argued that the use of the words "significant quantities" in a
rule that puts specific restrictions on a plant that has "significant quantities of
process waste water [sic] from non-electroplating manufacturing operations"
was unconstitutionally vague. Id. The court disagreed, holding that the ordi-
nance was sufficient because it was capable of being understood by a person of
ordinary intelligence. Id. at 877-78. The court also held that the right to a jury
trial attached in a Commission proceeding to impose or enforce civil penalties.
Id. at 881-82.
790. 706 F. Supp. 145 (D.R.I. 1989). Property owners alleged a violation of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and common-law trespass for damages incurred when defendant cor-
poration allegedly dumped toxic waste on their property. Id. at 150.
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defendant corporation liable for pollution.79 ' The corporation
argued that the plaintiffs were unable to maintain a trespass ac-
tion because the plaintiffs did not own the property in question at
the time of the alleged dumping. 792 Relying on Restatement Sec-
ond of Torts Section 161, the court held that a subsequent pur-
chaser of land could maintain such an action. 793
SOUTH CAROLINA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On June 20, 1989, Governor Campbell signed legislation (H-
3326) requiring the development of suitability standards for haz-
ardous waste disposal sites and statements from disposal sites
showing that the sites are financially able to carry out their func-
tion.7 9 4 The bill also increases waste disposal fees and establishes
as law an executive order enacted by Governor Campbell (19 ER
2378) which bans waste from states which do not allow the burial
of waste within their own borders. 795
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. Id. (quoting the Restatement)
[t]he actor's failure to remove from land in the possession of another a
structure, chattel, or other thing which he tortiously... placed on the
land constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time during which
the thing is on the land and... confers on the possessor of the land an
option to maintain a succession of actions based on a theory of continu-
ing trespass or to treat the continuance of the thing on the land as an
aggravation of the original trespass.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 comment b (1965). With regard to the
transfer of land the Restatement states that:
the rule of continuing trespass stated in Comment b is of particular
importance where there has been a transfer of the possession of the
land .... If the possessory interest in the land has been transferred
subsequent to the actor's placing of the thing on the land, the trans-
feree of the land may maintain an action for its continuance there ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 comment e (1965).
794. Hazardous Waste Law Sets Siting Standards, Financial Assurance Requirements
For Landfills, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 479 (June 23, 1989).
795. Id. Prior to the enactment of the legislation, North Carolina passed a
law that required dilution of all waste sent to North Carolina for disposal; a
move described as "a thinly veiled attempt to block waste disposal in its own
state." South Carolina Agency Tells EPA It Will Restrict Outside Waste Flow, 19 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 268 (June 24, 1988). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
failed to prohibit North Carolina from taking such action. Id. On January 18,
1989, Governor Campbell banned the importation of any hazardous waste from
states that did not dispose of waste within their own borders. 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) at 479. The order initially banned waste from 32 states. South Carolina
Removes Nine More States From Ban List For Hazardous Waste Site, 19 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2527 (Mar. 24, 1989). On March 22, 1989, Governor Campbell agreed to
accept up to 850 tons of waste from North Carolina to prevent an "environmen-
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On July 7, 1989, South Carolina allowed North Carolina to
resume exporting waste for burial in South Carolina.796 A day
earlier, Governor Campbell signed an executive order that put a
cap on hazardous waste imports and required that waste bound
for landfill in Pinewood, South Carolina, be pretreated.7 97 North
Carolina met the state's requirements, and the hazardous waste
was imported.7 98
WATER POLLUTION
In Midlands Utility Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control,79 9 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held, inter alia 800, that liability under the South Carolina Pollution
Control Act (Act) 80 did not require showing of environmental
harm.80 2 The court found that under the Pollution Control Act
(identified by the court as the Clear Water Act) a violation of the
Act itself or a violation of a Department of Health and Environ-
mental Control (DHEC) permit or order, would result in a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 per day of the violation, 'egardless of
the harm done to the environment.8 03 The court stated that
"[t]he section does not make a showing of harm a prerequisite to
liability, and, in [the court's] opinion, the circuit court errone-
ously read into Section 48-1-3302804 of the Code of the Laws of
tal crisis". South Carolina To Let North Carolina Ship In Some Hazardous Waste To
Avoid 'Crisis', 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2551 (Mar. 31, 1989). The reprieve from the
ban was to last only ten days unless the North Carolina legislature passed a bill
to renew efforts to create an intrastate hazardous waste site. Id.
796. South Carolina Moves to Cut Waste Dumping, but Clears North Carolina, Flor-
ida Shipments, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 542 (July 14, 1989).
797. Id.
798. Id. Florida also met the requirements of the order, and was allowed to
resume waste disposal at the South Carolina site. Id.
799. 298 S.C. 66, 378 S.E.2d 256 (1989). In 1982 the Department of
Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) issued a ruling accusing Midlands
Utility Inc. (Midlands) of violating DHEC regulations, permits, orders, and the
Pollution Control Act. Following an administrative adjudicatory hearing, both
Midlands and DHEC appealed to the full Board of the Department of Health
and Environmental Control (Board), which ordered Midlands to take corrective
actions and assessed civil penalties for violations totaling $38,200. Midlands
then appealed to the circuit court which reversed the decision of the Board in its
entirety. Id. at 67, 378 S.E.2d at 257.
800. The court also held that discharge monitoring reports were admissible
as an admission of a party and that the circuit court erred in setting aside the
civil penalties assessed against Midlands by the Board. Id. at 68, 378 S.E.2d at
257-58.
801. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-10 to -350 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
802. 298 S.C. at 67, 378 S.E.2d at 258-59.
803. Id.
804. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-330 (Law. Co-op. 1987) states that:
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South Carolina a condition which [was] not there.80 5
SOUTH DAKOTA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On March 15, 1989, Governor Mickelson signed into law the
South Dakota Centennial Environmental Protection Act of 1989
(Act). 06 The Act requires testing of all newly-placed privately
owned ground wells, and provides for wellhead protection pro-
grams and groundwater research.80 7 The Act also provides for a
"toxic amnesty day" during which South Dakotans can dispose of
toxic household waste at designated regional centers throughout
the state.808
South Dakota also introduced a new Solid Waste Disposal
Act in 1989 (Disposal Act).8 0 9 The Disposal Act established the
following hierarchy for solid waste management:
(1) Volume reduction at the source;
(2) Recycling and reuse;
(3) Use for energy production, if appropriate; and,
(4) Disposal in landfills or combustion for volume
reduction.8 10
Those persons operating a solid waste disposal facility in South
Dakota will now be required to: 1) obtain operating permits; and,
2) install on-site groundwater monitoring systems.8 1
Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter, or any rule
or regulation or order of the Department, shall be subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars per day of such violation.
Id.
805. 298 S.C. at 67, 378 S.E.2d at 258-59.
806. South Dakota Law Uses Pesticide Fee for Five-Year Research, Education Effort,
13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 14 (Apr. 7, 1989).
807. Id. Revenue for the five-year study would come from registration fees
collected from the state's pesticide, fertilizer, petroleum, and gold mining indus-
tries d.
808. Id.
809. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-6-1.2 to 34A-6-1.38 (1989). This
legislation substantially repealed and replaced the Solid Waste Disposal Act of
1972.
810. Id. § 34A-6-1.2. In an effort to reduce the total load upon existing and
future landfill sites, landfill disposal is listed last.
811. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-A-6-1.4 (1989). Agricultural opera-
tions are excepted under this section, to the extent that such operations are con-
fined to "normal farming" and do not "create a nuisance" or "unlawfully pollute
ground or surface water." Id. The Solid Waste Disposal Act gives South Da-
kota's board of Minerals and Environment (Board) the responsibility for adopt-
ing a statewide comprehensive solid waste disposal plan. The Board's plan will
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To further ensure that South Dakota's landfills will be oper-
ated properly, liability for all deleterious effects that solid waste
disposal may have will rest in perpetuity with both waste genera-
tors and landfill owners and operators.81 2 The Disposal Act man-
dates that landfill owners provide financial assurance that their
landfill sites will remain solvent, at least to the extent that the
owners can afford to remain in compliance for not only the site's
lifetime, but also for the ensuing thirty years after closure.
In 1988, South Dakota created a state superfund by passing
the Regulated Substances Discharge Act (Discharge Act).8 13 The
fund's sources, according to the statute, include:
1) Contributions from the petroleum release compensa-
tion fund;
2) Contributions from the temporary pesticide registra-
tion fund;
3) Monies taken directly from the state's general fund;
4) All monies recovered from statutory violators, ex-
cepting criminal fines and penalties;
5) Interest; and,
6) Gifts, grants and reimbursements.8 1 4
The Discharge Act authorizes the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Water and Natural Resources (the Department) to use
the fund in the event that a responsible party either cannot be
identified or refuses to undertake immediate remedial clean up
efforts. 8 15 If the Department incurs any corrective action costs,
the Department can file a recovery action against the responsible
parties in circuit court.
AIR POLLUTION
In In re Air Quality Construction Permit,8 16 the Supreme Court of
South Dakota held that a sand and gravel quarry had the right to
cover a fifteen-year period from the effective date of the Disposal Act, and will
be comprehensively updated no later than the Disposal Act's tenth anniversary.
Id.
812. Id. § 34A-6-1.9. In order to trace liability to an out-of-state generator,
the Board has the discretion to order landfill owners or operators to document
solid waste sources. Id.
813. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-12-1 to 34A-12-17 (1988).
814. Id. §§ 34A-12-3, 34A-12-9.
815. Id. § 34A-12-4. If necessary, the filing of a lien against the property of
the responsible party is allowed under the provisions of the Discharge Act. Id.
§ 34A-12-13.
816. 441 N.W. 2d 927 (1989).
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open for business because the administrative process which con-
trolled the issuance of air quality-related construction permits
was not arbitrary, capricious or clearly erroneous.8 1 7
The South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment
(Board) had issued a construction permit to Fisher Sand and
Gravel for quarry construction. The permit's issuance was chal-
lenged on the grounds that the sand and gravel company's evi-
dence concerning anticipated air pollution contribution, due to
the quarry's operation, was so deficient that the Board's decision
must have been arbitrary, capricious, and clearly erroneous.8 18
The Court explained that a proposed business, such as the
quarry, first had to secure an air quality construction permit.8 19
Next, the quarry was required to apply for an operations per-
mit.8 20 However, under South Dakota's administrative rules re-
garding air pollution standards, the two application processes
could in effect be combined. The quarry could operate under the
construction permit and create an emissions database upon which
a final determination could be made as to whether an air quality
operations permit would be granted.82 1 Citing the "unique na-
ture" of the permit application process, the court held that any
complaints regarding the quarry's application were premature,
and that the evidence offered in support of the construction per-
mit was sufficient.8 22 With such sufficient evidence, the court
found that the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or
clearly erroneous.8 23
WA TER POLLUTION
In Blue Fox Barr, Inc. v. City of Yankton, 8 24 the Supreme Court
of South Dakota held that a municipality was liable neither in tort
nor in contract to a sewer customer whose motel sustained dam-
age due to a sewer back-up.8 25
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the defendant, Yank-
ton, South Dakota, had improved its sewage handling facilities by
817. Id. at 927.
818. Id. "The [quarry] business would involve crushing of mined rock,
which gave rise to emission of [particulate] air pollutants." Id.
819. Id. at 928.
820. Id.
821. Id. at 928.
822. Id.
823. Id.
824. 424 N.W.2d 915 (1988).
825. Id. at 917.
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installing a lift station, complete with automatic monitoring and
circuit breaker equipment. 826 At the same time, numerous cus-
tomers outside the city limits, including the plaintiff-corporation's
motel, hooked up to Yankton's utilities system.8 27 In September
of 1984, the motel's basement was flooded by a sewer backup.
Alleging causes of action in negligence, strict liability, and breach
of contract, the corporate owner of the motel filed suit against the
city of Yankton. Yankton responded by filing a summary judg-
ment motion, based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The trial court denied Yankton's motion for summary judgment
and submitted the case to a jury, which found for the city.8 2 8
Upon appeal, the jury verdict was upheld.82 9
The court first ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was inapplicable to the city of Yankton because Yankton, by con-
structing and maintaining the sewer system, was acting in a cor-
porate or proprpietary function, and was therefore liable for torts
in the same manner as any other corporation or individual.830
The court then held that the city of Yankton could not have en-
tered into a contract with the motel, because the statute allowing
the city to provide sewer service to the motel83 1, as a non-resident
individual or corporation, clearly provided that such service
would constitute a privilege, and not an outright contractual ar-
rangement.83 2 Lastly, the court dismissed the motel's allegations
that the city was strictly liable in tort for the damages caused by
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Id. at 917-18.
831. The statute upon which the court based its reasoning was section 9-
48-32 of the South Dakota Codified Laws Annotated. The statute states that:
A municipality wherein sewage treatment or septic plant is maintained shall
have the power to contract for the privilege of connecting to said plant for the
purpose of
treating or disposing of private sewage or industrial waste
originating within the municipality or within one mile of
the corporate limits, provided said plant has the capacity
over the requirements of the municipality for handling such
sewage or industrial waste.
Id. at 919 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 9-48-32).
832. Id.
The "power to contract" language in SDCL 9-48-32 is clearly qualified
by the phrase which immediately follows, "for the privilege of connect-
ing." This language implies that the only contractual right that could
be granted to the [motel] [was] the "benefit" of connecting to the sewer
line.
1990] 335
91
Editors: Synopsis of Environmental Law in the States
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
336 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. I: p. 245
the sewer back-up because to entertain such an allegation would
"place such an unreasonable burden upon the city that its author-
ities would hesitate to give the city the benefits of a [sewer]
system."833
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs,"" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that neither sover-
eignty accorded to native American tribes nor government agency
status of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or the Indian Health
Service (IHS) could bar prosecution for violations of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).8 35 Two Oglala
Sioux tribe members filed suit against the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), and the Oglala Tribe, alleging that dumpsites
on the Pine Ridge Reservation were in violation of federal envi-
ronmental laws.8 3 6 The Oglala Tribe stated that because the tribe
members had not exhausted tribal court procedures, the tribe
members' case lacked ripeness.83 7 The BIA and IHS in turn ar-
gued that RCRA did not obligate them to undertake any financial
responsibility for remedial cleanup efforts.8 38
The court found that the Oglala Tribe's limited powers of
tribal sovereignty did not bar the reach of federal environmental
law.8 39 The court also held that the BIA and IHS agencies also
fell under RCRA's ambit, and were liable to the plaintiffs because
of the Congressional intent behind RCRA. 840
833. Id. at 920.
834. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
835. Id. at 1095. The court held that the Oglala Sioux tribe and the gov-
ernment agencies charged with administering their reservation should share
landfill clean up responsibility. Id.
836. Id. The complaint specifically mentioned fourteen garbage dumps on
the reservation in violation of RCRA. The sites were located close to communi-
ties, and were contaminating ground water. Id.
837. Id. at 1097. The tribe argued that "respect for tribal self-government
require[d] that the plaintiffs initially bring suit in tribal courts." Id.
838. Id. at 1098.
839. Id. at 1098. The court stated that:
RCRA place[d] exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for suits brought
pursuant to section 6972(a)(1) of the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act. Any action under paragraph (a)(l) of this subsection [had
to] be brought in the district court in which the alleged violation
occurred.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)).
Further, the court did not uphold the tribe's sovereign immunity because it
held that Congress intended RCRA to cover "persons" and defined persons to
include Indian tribes. Id.
840. Id. at 1339-41. The court held these agencies liable under RCRA be-
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TENNESSEE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Tennessee Solid Waste Act (Act)84' established proce-
dures for determining where solid waste disposal facilities may be
sited and maintained in each county. The Act sets forth public
notice requirements regarding solid waste disposal facility siting
proposals. The Act provides for public hearings in an attempt to
balance the state's growing need for solid waste disposal sites
through land use regulations.8 42
The Tennessee General Assembly also amended existing leg-
islation concerning entries of judgment against polluters . 43 The
amendments allow any citizen to challenge court-ordered judg-
ments entered regarding state actions against polluters. 844
In July 1988, the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Stor-
age Tank Act (Act) was passed.8 4 5 This Act provided for under-
ground petroleum storage container construction standards 6,
established strict liability for underground releases84 7, and cre-
ated a fund for petroleum release cleanups.84 8 The Act requires
owners of all tanks, including those returned from service8 49 and
those presently in use, to notify the Commissioner of Health and
Environment of the existence of such tank or tanks in order to
obtain tank use certification. 50 Tanks already in compliance with
federal notification standards are exempt from Tennessee notifi-
cation requirements.8 5 ' The Act also provides for an under-
ground tank superfund,852 and for civil8 53 and criminalM
penalties.
cause of Congressional intent to broadly define the entities covered by the stat-
ute. Id.
841. 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 552 (codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-46-101 (1989)).
842. Id.
843. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-25-116(e)(3)(B) (1989) as amended by 1989
Tenn. Pub. Acts 321.
844. Id.
845. 1988 Tenn. Pub. Acts 984 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-53-101
to 68-53-118 (1988)).
846. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-53-105 (1988).
847. Id. § 68-53-104 (1988).
848. Id. § 68-53-110 (1988).
849. Id. § 68-53-106(a)(2) (1988).
850. Id. § 68-53-106 (1988).
851. Id. § 68-53-106(a)(5) (1988).
852. Id. § 68-53-101 (1988).
853. Id. § 68-53-121 (1988).
854. Id. § 68-53-120 (1988).
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SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Wayne County v. Tennessee Solid Waste Control Board,8 55 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals precluded the Tennessee Solid
Waste Control Board (the Board) from granting tort damages
and restitution to a landowner whose wells were polluted by a
county landfill.8 56 The court held that the landowner could seek
redress only through the courts.8 57
In 1976, the appellant, Wayne County, installed a landfill fa-
cility near the landowner's home. Within one year, the landown-
ers noticed a marked change in their well water's quality.858 Four
years later, leachate began to escape from the landfill.8 59 After
numerous attempts to show that the landfill had ruined down-
gradient water wells, the Board ordered Wayne County to close
the landfill and to provide the landowners with uncontaminated
water. 86° The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the land-
fill contributed to the landowner's well contamination, but over-
turned the trial court's ruling that the Board had the authority to
order Wayne County to provide fresh water to the landowners. 86 t
Although the court limited the landowners' right of redress
through the Board's administrative proceeding, the court ex-
plained that the landowners could maintain a tort action for
either private or public nuisance in a court of competent
jurisdiction.8 62
TEXAS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
New state legislation (HB 1403), signed on June 14, 1989,
amends the state's Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on High-
855. 756 S.W.2d 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
856. Id. at 278.
857. The court agreed with the trial court that nothing in the Solid Waste
Disposal Act gave the Board the authority to grant redress for private causes of
action regarding damage caused by polluters. Id. at 283.
858. Id. at 280.
859. d. at 277, n.l. "Leachate was described by [landowners' expert wit-
ness] as a 'black noxious liquid substance with an oily rainbow sheen upon its
surface.' It is caused by improperly covering the waste in a landfill, thereby al-
lowing surface water to penetrate the landfill and mix with the waste." Id.
860. Id. at 278.
861. d. at 281. "While [the Act] gives the Board broad authority to take
steps to abate the acts causing a nuisance to the public in general, we concur
with the trial court's determination that the Board does not have the statutory
authority to fashion remedies in essentially private nuisance actions." d.
862. d. at 283-84.
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ways.863 The amendment authorizes the Public Safety Commis-
sion to establish parameters for a motor vehicle emissions
inspection and maintenance program for any area of the state.8o4
In an effort to protect Texas' ground waters, Governor Cle-
ments signed House Bill 183 on June 14, 1989, creating a regula-
tory program for the licensing of underground storage tank
installers. The regulatory program will be structured in a manner
that is similar to current federal guidelines. The Texas Water
Commission will administrate the program by collecting examina-
tion and licensing fees along with assessing penalties to
violators.8 65
Governor Clements signed several bills on June 14, 1989,
dealing with waste disposal. House Bill 2979 requires that all
hazardous waste in Texas be stored, processed, and disposed of
only by industrial facilities. 8 6 The Texas legislature is employing
HB 2979 to amend the state's Solid Waste Disposal Act8 67 due to
concerns expressed about public health hazards created by illegal
disposal of hazardous waste in municipal solid waste facilities. 868
House Bill 1963 calls for the establishment of an advisory council
(the Texas Hazardous Materials Safety Board) to better coordi-
nate state agencies' response to federal hazardous material
regulations.8 69
Senate Bill 1502 amends the state Solid Waste Disposal
Act 7 0 by setting up a fund that will be used to facilitate the fi-
nancing, investigation, and cleanup of abandoned hazardous
waste sites.8s 7 The Texas Water Commission (Commission) will
be empowered to use monies from the fund to take action with
respect to facilities posing -"immediate and irreversible harm".
The Commission will be empowered to implement remedial ac-
tion programs for facilities which fail to eliminate hazardous situ-
ations for which they are responsible. The expenses for such
863. TEx. REV. CIT. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(d) (Vernon 1975).
864. Texas: Underground Tank, Ground Water Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 500
(June 30, 1989).
865. Id.
866. Texas: Other Environmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 499 (June 30,
1989).
867. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7(a) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1987).
868. Texas: Other Environmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 499 (June 30,
1989).
869. Id.
870. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7(a) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1987).
871. Texas: Other Environmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 499 (June 30,
1989).
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remedial actions are to be borne by the persons to whom a reme-
dial action order was issued.8 72
In other legislative activity, Governor Clements signed Sen-
ate Bill 1519 in June 1989.873 This Bill provides financing for a
Texas Health Department program which offers aid to local gov-
ernments engaged in landfill cleanup projects. The monies for
the program will be generated through a fee placed on municipal
waste used in new landfills.
Governor Clements also signed a joint senate and house bill
which requires new plastic containers in Texas to be marked with
a code revealing the materials used to make the containers in an
effort to facilitate proper disposal and recycling.8 74
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Texas v. Malone Service Co. ,875 a Texas jury recommended
that a disposal company and two individuals pay $3 million in civil
penalties for dumping 400 different types of industrial waste, on
418 different occasions, since September 1979, into an earthen
sludge pit.8 76 The civil penalty was reported to be the largest
ever recommended by a state court jury.
In Texas v. Hart,877 an action was brought by the state alleging
that a creosoting company had discharged hazardous waste into a
creek tributary. The Court of Appeals of Texas, in reversing the
lower court's dismissal of the state's claim, held that an action for
civil penalties under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act8 78 was
not a penal action and therefore did not invoke the pleading re-
quirement of the penal code.8 79 The court explained that an op-
erator of a hazardous waste facility has a continuous duty to notify
emergency response authorities of activities involving hazardous
waste, and thus an operator of a hazardous waste facility could
have been found to have violated a notification requirement more
than once.88 0
872. Id.
873. Texas: Budget Snafu Undermines New Law on Assistance for Landfill Cleanup,
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 499 (June 30, 1989).
874. Texas: New Law Requires Labeling of Materials Using Special Codes on Plastic
Containers, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 127 (May 12, 1989).
875. Texas Jury Recommends $3 Million Fine for Illegal Dumping of Toxic Materi-
als, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 20 (May 5, 1989).
876. Id.
877. 753 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
878. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7(a) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1987).
879. Hart, 753 S.W.2d at 214. Creosote is wood preserving waste water.
880. Id. The court found that: 1) the lower court abused its discretion by
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UTAH
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Several important pieces of environmental legislation con-
cerning solid and hazardous waste were enacted by Utah in 1989.
Utah passed a state superfund law to deal with hazardous waste
site cleanup costs and leaking underground storage tank ex-
penses.8 8' The Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act (Mitigation
Act)88 2 provides for regulation of hazardous substance releases by
the Director of the Division of Environmental Health, consistent
with the substantive requirements of the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).183 The Mitigation Act provides for civil penalties of no
more than $10,000 per day of violation. 884
The Underground Storage Tank Act (Storage Tank Act)88 5
provides for regulation of underground and petroleum storage
tanks 8 6 with civil liability for release from tanks subject to limita-
tions of liability for claims of third parties.887 The Storage Tank
Act also requires certificates of registration8 8 of storage tanks
and of compliance88 9 with statutory requirements to be eligible
for payment of costs from the Petroleum Storage Tank Fund.
Also of interest, Utah more than doubled existing hazardous
waste disposal fees from $9 per ton to $20 per ton for out-of-state
waste disposed of or treated at in-state commercial facilities. 8g
This measure was taken partially to recover revenue Utah had lost
in the past by charging lower rates than some other states.8 9'
dismissing the claim when the state filed an amended pleading four days after
the court imposed a deadline; and, 2) the defendant suffered no hardship due to
the delay. Id.
881. Governor Approves State Superfund, Waste Disposal Fee, Tax Fund Bills, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2525 (Mar. 24, 1989).
882. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-14d-101 to 26-14d-801 (1989).
883. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
884. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14d-205 (1989).
885. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-14e-101 to 26-14e-702 (1989).
886. Governor Approves State Superfund, Waste Disposal Fee, Tax Fund Bills, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2525 (Mar. 24, 1989).
887. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14e-604 (1989).
888. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14e-301 (1989).
889. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14e-403 (1989).
890. Governor Approves State Superfund, Waste Disposal Fee, Tax Fund Bills, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2525 (Mar. 24, 1989).
891. Id.
1990]
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VERMONT
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Governor Kunin signed a bill, H 260, on May 24, 1989, ban-
ning the use of ozone-depleting chemicals from a variety of prod-
ucts for a four year period.8 92 Included in the prohibition was the
use of chlorofluorocarbons in automobile air conditioners. 93
AIR POLLUTION
In Vermont v. Thomas,8 9 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that current regulations, promulgated
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to meet the goals
of the Clean Air Act,895 did not provide for federally enforceable
measures to combat the problem of "regional haze."8' 96 The
court noted that EPA had found impairment of the air quality to
be of two kinds: 1) "plume blight," i.e., pollution traceable to a
single source; and, 2) "regional haze," i.e., air pollution from a
number of sources, and thus, difficult to detect.8 97
The state of Vermont had drafted state implementation plans
(SIPs) s98 which reflected its conclusion that out-of-state sulfate
emissions were primarily responsible for the regional haze affect-
892. Vermont Governor Signs CFC Control Bill, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 210 (June
2, 1989).
893. Id.
894. 850 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1988).
895. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The current regula-
tions, promulgated in 1980, were adopted to promote the national visibility
goals of the Clean Air Act, and are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.300-341 (1980).
896. Thomas, 850 F.2d at 100. Regional haze is viewed as a problem requir-
ing long-term solutions. Id. at 101. The court was sympathetic to Vermont's
contention that more than ten years had passed since EPA had characterized the
problem as one requiring long-term strategies to combat it, but nevertheless
held such an issue was better left to the national rulemaking process rather than
to a SIP approval proceeding. Id. at 104.
897. Id. at 101. EPA adopted a phased approach to deal with these two
different types of pollution. See 45 Fed. Reg. 80,085 (1980). Phase I of the pro-
gram dealt with plume blight, while Phase II addressed regional haze. Id. at
80,085-87. Phase II was a future program that would be initiated once monitor-
ing and scientific techniques progressed to a point that EPA could develop a
regulatory program for this type of pollution. Id. at 80,087.
898. The Clean Air Act directs EPA to prescribe national ambient air qual-
ity standards and requires states to ensure that the national standards are com-
plied with by adopting state implementation plans (SIPs). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-
10. EPA coordinates the regional air pollution control measures implemented
by the states, thus establishing shared state and federal responsibility for achiev-
ing a cleaner and safer environment. Id. § 7401 (a)(3), (4). EPA is empowered to
approve or disapprove SIPs and any subsequent revisions to ensure that these
SIPs meet the requirements of the Act and EPA regulations. Id. § 7410.
[Vol. 1: p. 245
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ing visibility at the Lye Brook National Wilderness Area.8 99 In
response to this conclusion, Vermont sought to have EPA reject
and revise SIPs of eight upwind states that were principally re-
sponsible for sulfate emissions. 9° ° The Second Circuit upheld
EPA's "no action" response to Vermont's proposed SIP, and
pointed to the preamble of the final regulations which EPA had
promulgated. 9° t Specifically, the court agreed with EPA that
EPA's phased approach to impaired air quality did not authorize
the implementation of measures to combat regional haze through
federally enforceable SIPs.9 02
899. Thomas, 850 F.2d at 101. The Lye Brook National Wilderness Area is a
12,000 acre mountain plateau in the southern portion of the Green Mountain
National Forest and Vermont's only Class I area. Id. The 1977 amendments to
the Clean Air Act directed EPA, in pertinent part, to adopt regulations protect-
ing visibility in certain national parklands and wilderness areas, designated as
"Class I Federal Areas". 42 U.S.C. § 7491. Class I areas are defined to include
international parks, national wilderness areas exceeding 5,000 acres, national
memorial parks exceeding 5,000 acres, and national parks exceeding 6,000
acres. 42 U.S.C. § 7472(a). Class I areas were singled out by Congress for spe-
cial protection due to their scenic beauty. Thomas, 850 F.2d at 100. Congress
thus directed EPA to provide guidelines for the states in order to preserve these
areas and increase visibility enhancement. 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (a),(b). EPA subse-
quently enacted regulations in 1980 pertaining to these Class I areas. 40 C.F.R.
51.300-341 (1980). These regulations require that each state's SIP contain a
"long-term (10-15 years) strategy" to reduce visibility impairment in each Class
I area. Id. at 51.306(a). It is against this background that Vermont promulgated
its SIP and its proposed long-term strategy to combat the effects of regional
haze at Lye Brook.
Id. at 104. While EPA agreed that the visibility impairment at Lye Brook
was due predominantly to out-of-state causes, they proposed taking "no action"
because they had not yet established requirements for strategies relating to re-
gional haze. Id. at 102. EPA objected to Vermont dictating a national solution
without EPA's promulgating regulations in order to implement a Phase II re-
gional haze program. Id. Thus, their approval of Vermont's SIP, and its subse-
quent federal enforceability, would be outside the scope of EPA's existing
regulations. Id.
900. Id. In addition, Vermont asked that four of these upwind states not
containing class I areas, be added to the list of 36 states required to submit
visibility plans. Id.
901. Id. at 103. The court held that the preamble to the regulations limited
their scope and found that EPA intended to limit their scope to the issue of
plume blight. Id. The court further held that the Clean Air Act itself and its
legislative history made it clear that it was EPA who was charged with the re-
sponsibility, through its rulemaking powers, to ensure the attainment of the
goals of the Act. Id. Thus, Vermont's SIPs were, in effect, ultra vires and not
subject to federal enforcement. Id. at 103-104.
902. Id. at 103. The "phased approach" distinguishes between single
source impairments, which would be approached in phase I of the program, and
more complex impairments such as regional haze, which are more difficult to
address and would be approached in phase II of the program. Id. See supra note
6.
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SOLID AND HAZ4RDOUS WASTE
In a case involving liability under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA)9°3 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),9°4 the United State District Court for the District of Ver-
mont, in Vermont v. Staco, Inc. ,9o held that inadequate prophylac-
tic measures to prevent employees from transporting mercury out
of a plant constituted "release" for liability under section
9601 (22)906 of CERCLA and "disposal" for liability under section
6903(2) of RCRA.90 7 In this case, the state brought suit against
the owners of a mercury thermometer manufacturing plant to re-
cover expense costs associated with the removal of mercury as a
hazardous substance alleged to be contaminating the local sewage
treatment plant, sewer lines, and certain septic tanks. 0 8
Although the state had previously sued many of the same defend-
ants in state court,9° 9 the district court held that principles of res
judicata did not bar the present action because the present action
was based on different statutory provisions than was the previous
action. 910 The court also stated that the principle of res judicata
did not bar the present action because the mercury releases in the
present action were different from those originally litigated. 91'
903. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1983).
904. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1983).
905. 684 F.Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988). Procedurally, this case came before
the court on a motion for summary judgement.
906. Id. at 823-33. The court noted that the CERCLA definition of "re-
lease" at section 9601(22) was given a broad judicial interpretation and included
"any environmental presence of a hazardous substance originating from a
known industrial, manufacturing, or storage facility." Id. at 832.
907. Id. at 836. The court noted that Section 6903(3) of RCRA defined
"disposal" broadly. Id. In addition, the court noted that while "handling" was
not statutorily defined, it did subject persons to liability under RCRA, and that
allowing employees to become carriers of mercury because of inadequate pro-
tective procedures constituted handling under RCRA. Id.
908. Id. at 825.
909. Id. at 827. The previous suit had been for violation of the Vermont
Water Pollution Control Act, located at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1259(a) (1984).
910. Staco, 684 F.Supp. at 826-27. The present suit was based on violations
of section 1274 of the Vermont Statutes. Id. (citing 10 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10
§ 1274 (1984)). Section 1274 involves the enforcement of the Water Pollution
Control Act. The action brought in this case concerned subsequent violations of
the Act, thus allowing the state to institute enforcement action against a violator
who "failed to comply with any provisions of any order... issued in accordance
with this chapter." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1274 (1984). The action also in-
voked pertinent provisions of federal and state environmental laws that were not
available at the time of the previous state proceeding. Staco, 684 F.Supp. at 827.
911. Id. at 827. The state action was based on the release of mercury from
1973 to 1984 when the plant was still in production. The present suit, however,
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In Allen v. Uni-First Corp. ,912 the issue before the Vermont
Supreme Court was whether or not it was prejudicial error for the
trial court to limit the jury's consideration of areas of contamina-
tion to two specific areas in a nuisance case involving the disposal
of toxic waste. 913 In Allen, the defendant, an industrial dryclean-
ing corporation, used a chemical solvent in its operations. The
solvent 9 14 had escaped, and had contaminated at least two public
areas. 915 The plaintiffs brought a nuisance action, charging that,
as a result of the toxic leaks, their property value had been ad-
versely affected. 9' 6 The court noted that the plaintiffs' private
nuisance theory depended on their ability to show that there was
a public perception of widespread contamination. 91 7 The trial
court restricted the jury's deliberations to the two public areas
contaminated and did not allow the jury to consider the overall
contamination issue pleaded by the plaintiffs. 918 As a result, the
court held that there had been prejudicial error in restricting the
jury's deliberations, and therefore reversed the trial court and re-
manded the case for a new trial.919
VIRGINIA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The State of Virginia agreed to drop a $19.7 million lawsuit
that it had filed against a rayon manufacturer. 920 The state had
filed suit against the owners of Avtex Fibers Incorporated for vio-
lations of environmental and worker safety laws at one of the
company's plants. 92' The state dropped the lawsuit in response
was based on releases in 1985 that were the result of a mercury release by drain-
age. Id.
912. 558 A.2d 961 (1989).
913. Id. at 962.
914. The solvent was perchloroethylene, commonly known in the dry clean-
ing industry as "perc." Id. at 963.
915. The two public areas considered by the jury were the town well and
the public schools. Id. at 963.
916. Id.
917. Id.
918. Id. at 963-64.
919. Id. at 965.
920. Avtex Agrees to Pay Fines, Cleanup Costs; State to Drop Suit, Allow Plant to
Stay Open, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1668 (Dec. 16, 1988).
921. Id. The plant is located at Front Royal, Virginia. Id. The Front Royal
plant is the sole supplier of rayon fabric to the United States space program for
use in rocket nozzles. Id.
The Front Royal plant has been cited in the past for well over one hundred
environmental law violations since 1980. Id. at 1669. The violations range from
1990] 345
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to an Avtex proposal to correct environmental problems at the
plant and to pay fines levied by the state.922
COAL MINING
In Brown v. Red River Coal Co.,923 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that the state could maintain a Notice of Violation
(NOV) against a coal operator for violations of the Virginia Coal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 92 4 even if the coal
operator was not at fault in causing the violation.925
A Virginia Division of Mined Land Reclamation (DMLR) in-
spector issued an NOV after finding that Red River Coal Com-
pany (Red River), a coal operator, was in violation of the Virginia
Coal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.926 The Com-
missioner of DMLR vacated the NOV upon a finding that Red
River was not at fault in causing the violation.92 7
The court of appeals stated that coal surface mine reclama-
tion was a substantive area preempted by federal law.928 The
court explained that once in such a federally preemptive area,
states could not enact laws that were either inconsistent with or
narrower than federal law.9 2 9
Because the federal law had been interpreted by the federal
authorities to mandate the issuance of NOVs to both negligent
and non-negligent mine operators, the court reasoned, the Vir-
ginia Act also had to require non-negligent NOVs to be sus-
tained. 930 The court concluded that because the vacation of Red
River's NOV pursuant to the state coal mining reclamation act
was broader in scope than what was allowed by the federal act, the
NOV would have to be reinstated.93'
unlawful discharge of pollutants into the Shenandoah River to exposure of plant
employees to potentially dangerous chemicals. Id.
922. Id. at 1668. Avtex proposed an earlier cleanup plan which was re-jected by the state due to Avtex's inability to demonstrate its ability to finance
the cleanup plan. Id. at 1669.
923. 7 Va. App. 331, 373 S.E.2d 609 (1988).
924. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 45.1-266 to 45.1-270.7 (1989).
925. 7 Va. App. at 331, 373 S.E.2d at 610.
926. Id.
927. Id. A third party had disturbed Red River's inactive mine. Id.
928. Id.
929. Id.
930. Id. at 332-33, 373 S.E.2d at 610-11.
931. Id. at 333, 373 S.E.2d at 611.
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WASHINGTON
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In an effort to remedy the destruction of Washington's natu-
ral resources, Governor Gardner imposed stringent liability stan-
dards on the oil industry.93 2 HB 2242, signed May 8, 1989,
imposed a moratorium until July 1, 1995, on leasing for oil or gas
exploration or drilling on Washington's tidal or submerged
lands.93 3 HB 2242 also required that oil tankers demonstrate fi-
nancial responsibility to meet liability for costs of oil spill re-
moval, civil penalties, and damages to natural resources.93 4
HB 1854 amends the state water pollution control act, and
enables the state to collect money damages resulting from the de-
struction of natural resources caused by illegal oil discharge into
state waters. 935 The amendment alters the current language de-
fining damages, as the amount required to restock state waters,
replenish resources, and otherwise restore the waters.93 6 Also,
effectiveJuly 23, 1989, HB 1671, another legislative bill, requires
local governments to provide certain waste reduction and re-
cycling services, and authorizes the counties to contract for the
collection of recyclable materials. 937 HB 1671 sets a goal of re-
cycling at 50% statewide.938 HB 1671 imposes a special $1
surcharge on each new rubber tire. The surcharge will earn $6
million per biennium, for a total $12 million by 1993. 939 The
earnings from the surcharge will pay for the disposal of illegally
932. Governor Signs Legislation on Oil Spills, Drilling Moratorium, Waste Reduc-
tion, Recycling, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 180 (May 26, 1989).
933. Id.
934. Id.
935. Id.
936. Id. at 181. The amendment states the damages include whatever is
necessary to restore the resource and compensate for the lost value during that
period of time between injury and restoration. Damages also include compensa-
tion for lost value if restoration is not technologically feasible.
HB 1853 requires the Department of Ecology to adopt an oil spill compen-
sation schedule by July 1, 1991, to compensate the state for oil spill damages
that are not quantifiable. The amount of compensation is to range from at least
$1 per gallon of oil spilled to a maximum of $50 per gallon spilled.
The new law seeks to punish any person who intentionally or recklessly
causes an oil spill by subjecting them to a civil fine of up to $100,000 per day for
every day the spill poses risks to the environment. The bill requires the depart-
ment to develop a ranking system for the compensation schedule, damage as-
sessment procedures, and a system for the application of the compensation
schedule.
937. Id.
938. Id.
939. Id.
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dumped tires. 940
HB 1086 establishes a regulatory program for underground
storage tanks. 94 ' The new law sets penalties for its violation and
prohibits delivery of regulated substances to tanks which lack
permits. 94
2
HB 1180 created an independent state agency to provide dis-
counted reinsurance to insurance companies or risk retention
groups. 94 3 These insurance companies and risk retention groups
will be selected by the state agency's administrator to sell pollu-
tion insurance to those in control of underground petroleum
storage tanks.94 4 This law, which took effect on July 23, 1989, is
designed to help owners and operators of underground storage
tanks meet EPA financial responsibility rules by giving the state
agency broad authority to design and price reinsurance and insur-
ance coverage. 94 5
On May 14, 1989, the governor signed SB 5566. SB 5566
updated and clarified the authority of the State Board of Health
with respect to its duties relating to the enforcement of the Safe
Drinking Water Act.94 6
AIR POLLUTION
In Asarco, Inc. v. Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency, 947 the
Court of Appeals of Washington examined the scope of the indi-
vidual rule-making authority of the Puget Sound Air Pollution
Control Agency (PSAPCA) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
to determine whether those agencies had exceeded the scope of
their authority by fining Asarco for violation of two
regulations .948
In December 1983, a PSAPCA inspector witnessed an Asarco
employee dumping a by-product of the company's copper-smelt-
ing activity into a disposal unit, and observed large quantities of
blue-white smoke coming out of the company's disposal unit.
The PSAPCA inspector, using the standard method (or Ringle-
mann method), to gauge the opacity of smoke, determined that it
940. Id.
941. Id.
942. Id.
943. Id.
944. Id.
945. Id.
946. Id.
947. 51 Wash. App. 49, 751 P.2d 1229 (1988).
948. Id. at 49, 751 P.2d at 1230.
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exceeded the amounts allowable under both PSAPCA and DOE
regulations. Subsequently, Asarco was assessed a civil penalty for
its violation of these regulations.949
PSAPCA adopted and applied PSAPCA Regulation 1, Sec-
tion 9.03(b)(1) to the present case.950 DOE promulgated a very
similar regulation in 173-400-040(1) of the Washington Adminis-
trative Code (WAC). 95 1 Asarco argued that air contaminants cre-
ating a degree of opacity, did not amount to air pollution as
defined by these regulations. 952 Furthermore, Asarco stressed
that PSAPCA Regulation 1 Section 9.03(b)(1) and section 173-
400-040(1) of WAC as applied to its case were in conflict with the
intent and purpose of the Washington Clean Air Act 955 and thus
should not have been applied to Asarco. 9M
The Superior Court agreed with Asarco and found that the
two regulations were invalid. The Washington Court of Appeals
however, reversed the Superior Court's decision.955 The Court
of Appeals stressed that, as a judicial body, its ability to question
the validity of the opacity test as an indicator of air pollution was
very limited. The court further emphasized that it, "[was] not
free to substitute its judgment as to desirability or wisdom of the
rule, for the legislative body, by its delegation to the agency,
ha[d] committed those questions to administrative judgment and
not to judicial judgment. '956
949. Id. at 50, 751 P.2d at 1231.
950. PSAPCA Regulation 1, Section 9.03(b)(1) in part provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to cause or allow the emission of
any air contaminant for a period or periods aggregating more than
three (3) minutes in any one hour which is (1) "darker in shade than
that designated as No. 1 (2076 density) on the Ringlemann Chart, as
published by the US Bureau of Mines." Id.
951. § 173-400-040(1) of WAC states in part:
(1) VISIBLE EMISSIONS. No person shall cause or permit the emission
for more than three minutes, in any one hour, of an air contaminant
from any emissions unit which at the emission point, or within a reason-
able distance of the emission point, exceeds twenty per-cent opacity
Asarco, 51 Wash. App. at 51, 751 P.2d at 1231 (quoting WAC § 173-400-040(1)).
952. Id. at 51, 751 P.2d at 1232.
953. The Washington Clean Air Act (WCAA) was enacted in 1967 to pro-
vide and maintain safe levels of air pollution emissions in the state in compliance
with the Federal Clean Air Act. The WCAA has defined "air pollution" as the
"presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air contaminants in suffi-
cient quantities and of such characteristics and duration as is . . . injurious to
human health .... WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.94.030(2) (1987).
954. Asarco, 51 Wash. App. at 51, 751 P.2d at 1232.
955. Id. at 53, 751 P.2d at 1234.
956. Id. at 56, 751 P.2d at 1233, (citing Weyerhauser Co. v. Department of
Ecology, 86 Wash. 2d 310, 314, 545 P.2d 5 (1976)). There was a significant
1990] 349
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In City of Everett v. Snohomish County,957 the Supreme Court of
Washington addressed the question of whether the land-use ac-
tivities of the City of Everett, as an intruding sub-unit of govern-
ment, was immune from the zoning regulations of Snohomish
County, as a host sub-unit of government. 958
The court examined traditional tests used for zoning con-
flicts,959 and held that these traditional tests oversimplified very
complicated issues which varied from case to case. The court, re-
fused to accept any one of these traditional "blanket rules" be-
cause the court found them to be problematic.96° The court
chose instead to let the legislative intent be determinant. 96' The
Legislature, according to the court, prescribed, by statute, the ex-
tent to which state facilities should have been subject to local land
use controls. 962
The court reviewed the statutes empowering the respective
subunits' activities and determined that because the legislature in-
tended that the City be required to comply with the zoning of the
County in establishing a sewage/sludge and solid waste disposal
site in the County, the County had the discretion to decide
whether or not to issue a permit to the City.963
dissent by Judge Worswick arguing that regulations fining companies like Asarco
for opaque emissions, should be held invalid in all cases, regardless of whether
or not these emissions constitute air pollution. Id. at 59, 751 P.2d at 1235-36.
957. 112 Wash. 2d 433, 772 P.2d 992 (1989).
958. The City of Everett brought suit against Snohomish County after Sno-
homish County failed to issue Everett a use permit for a sewer/sludge disposal
waste facility. Id. at 435, 772 P.2d at 993.
959. The four tests examined in this case are as follows:
1. Superior Sovereignty test establishes that the unit is higher up
on the hierarchical structure of government rules.
2. Governmental-proprietary test establishes that the unit per-
forming the governmental function prevails.
3. Eminent Domain test establishes that government can be im-
mune from local zoning.
4. Balancing of Interests test considers all interests involved.
Id. at 437-39, 772 P.2d at 994-95.
960. Id. at 439, 772 P.2d at 995.
961. Id. at 441, 772 P.2d at 996. The court predicated this idea on the
theory that under the state constitutional system, it is the legislature which not
only enacts statutes enabling the municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances, but
which also enacts the "statutes which authorize state agencies and other
subunits to undertake these governmental functions." Id.
962. Id.
963. Id. at 443, 772 P.2d at 997.
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WEST VIRGINIA
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On April 24, 1989, Governor Gaston Caperton signed a new
statute, which is intended to encourage county recycling pro-
grams and to reduce the flow of garbage by thirty percent by the
turn of the century. 964 Along with recycling goals, the law re-
quires plans for identifying solid waste landfill sites in each of the
state's fifty-five counties, as well as a siting plan for potential haz-
ardous waste dump sites.965 Additionally, the law gives the West
Virginia Public Service Commission jurisdiction over commercial
garbage dumping fees. 966
The new law establishes an interim goal of reducing the
state's flow of waste twenty percent by January 1, 1994, in ad-
vance of the thirty percent goal by the year 2000.967 Additionally,
each county must complete their respective siting plans for the
location of all commercial garbage dumps and other solid waste
facilities by July 1, 1990.9"8 A new $1-per-ton interim assessment
fee, started on July 1, 1989, and continuing through June 30,
1991, will be levied on all garbage dumped at the state's licensed
landfills.96 9
WISCONSIN
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On June 2, 1989, the Wisconsin legislature passed legislation
providing penalties for the release of genetically engineered orga-
nisms into the environment. 970 The purpose of this legislation is
to provide for state and federal regulation of man-made orga-
nisms through strict permit and licensing procedures, as well as
penalties, to minimize the amount of "unnatural" elements in the
ambient air.9 7 '
AIR POLLUTION
In New Richmond v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Re-
964. New Law Sets County Recycling Goal, Aims to Cut 30 Percent Garbage Flow by
2000, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2703 (Apr. 28, 1989).
965. Id.
966. Id.
967. Id.
968. Id.
969. Id.
970. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.60 (West 1989).
971. Id.
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sources, 9 7 2 the citizens of the city of Richmond challenged the Wis-
consin Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) decision to
grant an air pollution control permit and solid waste facility li-
cense for the construction of an incinerator without an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS). 973 Under the Wisconsin
Environmental Policy Act (WEPA), DNR has the initial authority
to determine whether a particular set of circumstances requires
an EIS, but when that authority is challenged, it is up to the re-
viewing court to determine whether or not the DNR's decision
was reasonable under the circumstances. 974
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed the administrative
record of DNR's examination of the relevant environmental is-
sues and held that DNR's examination reflected an "in-depth con-
sideration" of the relevant environmental issues, possible effects
of an incinerator on New Richmond, and available environmental
alternatives. Therefore, DNR's decision to forego the EIS was
held to be reasonable.9 75 The city's petition to review the appel-
late court's decision was subsequently denied by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.976
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin De-
partment of Natural Resources,9 77 Waste Management challenged the
authority of DNR to allow a competitor of Waste Management to
open and operate a landfill facility.978 The question presented to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was whether Waste Management
had standing to contest DNR's determination of the need for an-
other facility. 979
The injury suffered by Waste Management was recognized by
the court as primarily economic. 980 However, the court held that
Waste Management lacked the standing necessary to challenge
DNR's decision because the economic interests of Waste Manage-
ment did not supersede DNR's environmental interest in solid
972. 145 Wis. 2d 535, 428 N.W.2d 279 (1988).
973. d. at 539, 428 N.W.2d at 280.
974. Id. at 541-2, 428 N.W.2d at 282.
975. Id. at 551-2, 428 N.W.2d at 286.
976. New Richmond v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Re-
sources, 145 Wis. 2d 535, 428 N.W.2d 279 (1988).
977. 144 Wis. 2d 499, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988).
978. Id. at 501-2, 424 N.W.2d at 687.
979. Id. at 505-6, 424 N.W.2d at 688.
980. Id. at 510, 424 N.W.2d at 689.
108
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss1/7
STATE SYNOPSIS
waste disposal. 98 '
WYOMING
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In order to maintain the ground water quality at a level as
pristine as much of the land above, Wyoming has enacted legisla-
tion that restricts oil field waste disposal facilities. 9 2 The provi-
sion provides that no person shall locate, construct, or operate
any commercial oil field waste disposal facility within one mile of
any occupied dwelling house or school without sufficient con-
sent.983 Any knowing violation of the provision will subject that
person to penalties under Wyoming law.984 In order to receive a
permit to establish a facility, bond shall be posted to cover costs
such as closure, inspection, maintenance, and environmental con-
trol and monitoring.985 When the director has determined that a
violation has been remedied or the damage abated, the director
shall release the portion of the bond or financial insurance instru-
ment being held under the provisions of the act. 98 6 Essentially,
this new provision safeguards against the pollution of the ground-
water supply by oil field waste disposal facilities before it happens
and provides a means to remedy the situation if contamination
does occur.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
In V-I Oil Co. v. Department of Environmental Quality, the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming held in part that:
(1) Wyoming law permitted a warrantless search; and, (2) the war-
rantless search was not reasonable. 987
First, the court found that the controlling law enabled an en-
vironmental inspection officer to make a warrantless nonconsen-
sual search of the soil and area surrounding the service station's
981. To have standing to challenge an administrative decision, the party
must demonstrate that it sustained injury due to the agency's decision, and that
the injury is of the nature of an interest the law recognizes or seeks to regulate.
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.52, 227.53 (1986) (emphasis added).
982. Wvo. STAT. § 35-11-306 (1989).
983. Id. § 35-11-306(a)(i)(ii).
984. Id. § 35-11-306(b). Penalties for violation of the provision are pursu-
ant to Wvo. STAT. § 35-11-901.
985. Id. § 35-11-306(c)(d)(i)(ii).
986. Id. § 35-11-30 6 (p).
987. 696 F. Supp. 578 (D. Wyo. 1988).
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gasoline tanks. 988 The court noted that where the officer was
qualified to make the search, performed the search during busi-
ness hours, made the search without delay after properly present-
ing himself at the station, and where the area was temporarily
exposed constituted sufficient criteria to allow the warrantless
search under Wyoming law. 989
Second, the court found that the warrantless search by a state
administrative officer was not unreasonable upon fulfillment of
the requirements for warrantless searches as set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in New York v. Burger.99° The court
opined that the state's effort to obtain a court order before taking
the soil samples coupled with the health and safety dangers re-
sulting from leaks in underground gasoline storage tanks was suf-
ficient to fulfill the Burger test. Therefore, the court determined
that the service station's rights were not violated.
V-1 Oil Co. is significant in two respects: (1) It shows that
state statutes may be construed in such a way to allow warrantless
searches even without an express provision in the statute; and, (2)
it demonstrates that when an owner of a pervasively regulated
business is involved, certain privacy interests may be
subordinated to the state's concerns of health and safety.
988. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-109(a)(vi) (Supp. 1989).
989. 696 F. Supp. at 580-81.
990. Id. at 581-82. A warrantless search of a pervasively regulated business
will be deemed reasonable if:
(a) There is "a 'substantial' government interest that informs the
regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made."
(b) "The warrantless inspections must be 'necessary to further
[the] regulatory scheme.' "
(c) "The regulatory statute must perform two basic functions of a
warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the
search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined
scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers." New
York v. Burger 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987).
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